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CONFIDENTIAL

Governmental Affairs

WASHINGTON POST
23 August 1973

Kissinger Replacing Rogers

By Murray Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

Henry A. Kissinger will replace William P. Rogers as Secretary of State, President Nixon announced yesterday. Rogers, one of the President's oldest and closest friends, is resigning to return to private law practice, effective Sept. 3. He has spent more than 4½ years as Secretary of State.

President Nixon named Kissinger to serve in what amounts to a super-cabinet post, in which Kissinger will retain his extraordinarily influential position as assistant to the President for national security affairs, in addition to becoming Secretary of State. The President said Kissinger's dual function in foreign affairs will be similar to the dominant, double position of Treasury Secretary George P. Schultz in economic policy.

There was no open sign that Rogers' departure from the State Department was anything but voluntary and at his own request. Some administration officials, who have been critical of Rogers, maintained that the President was highly displeased that Rogers, in response to questions about the Watergate scandal, told a news conference last Monday that the United States must not "become so obsessed with security matters that laws are freely violated" at the expense of individual rights.

Rogers' formal letter of resignation, however, was dated Aug. 16. The President's acceptance was dated Aug. 20, the same day as the Rogers press conference.

In that press conference, Rogers unquestionably sought to disassociate his own role in history from the Watergate abuses. But President Nixon, nevertheless, extolled Rogers in his letter as a tested and "completely dedicated and completely selfless" friend and adviser for a quarter century, who played "an historic role" in shaping American foreign policy.

The Kissinger-Rogers shift has been rumored for several years during which Kissinger overshadowed Rogers as the President's major international strategist, and speculation mounted in recent weeks that the shift was imminent. Nevertheless, the actual announcement caused some considerable surprise if only because earlier reports of it repeatedly failed to materialize.

Kissinger, who was born in Germany and came to the United States at the age of 15, will be the first foreign-born Secretary of State, attaining that post with reinforced power after a meteoric career as a world strategist.

Preoccupation with the Watergate scandal so overshadowed the President's Kissinger-Rogers announcement yesterday that not a single question was asked about the secretaryship of state during Mr. Rogers' press conference. This showed that for the present, at least, President Nixon was un-

successful in transferring national press attention to what he regards as the greater issues of national affairs.

Internationally, however, the elevation of Kissinger to head the Department of State is bound to be regarded as a major diplomatic event.

Even though Kissinger, who at 50 is 10 years younger than Rogers, already held the preeminent foreign policy-making function in actuality, the conduct of American diplomacy has been openly and sometimes embarrassingly split between Kissinger's White House operation and the State Department.

President Nixon himself acknowledged that yesterday when he said, "The purpose of this arrangement is to have a closer coordination between the White House and the departments," when he referred to the dual roles for Shultz and Kissinger. President Nixon added that "another purpose is to get the work out in the departments where it belongs."

This indicated that the President intends the State Department, for the first time in the Nixon administration, to fill a more normal function in the planning and execution of foreign policy. But there will now be a new form of abnormality, in the fact that Kissinger will wear two impressive hats, one in the White House and the other in State.

Senate Democratic leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) told reporters yesterday that "I am disturbed about the dual relationship. It brings in the question of executive privilege, and that will have to be cleared up."

Mansfield was registering concern that Kissinger, in continuing to serve as national security adviser to the President, could claim that his functions in that personal advisory role are not subject to congressional scrutiny. This is expected to be a major issue when Kissinger goes before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for confirmation hearings.

Kissinger is bound to face questions on this subject at a press conference scheduled in San Clemente today. He is expected to take the position that as Secretary of State he will be abundantly forthcoming on all questions that a secretary normally would respond to, and that even a Secretary of State regards as "privileged and personal advisory conversations with a President."

Rogers, meeting with newsmen at the State Department yesterday following the President's announcement, smilingly declined to discuss the executive privilege question as it applies to Kissinger's new status.

The outgoing secretary was genial as always. Rogers gave no outward signs that he was displeased or unhappy about his departure. But many of his associates long have said that Rogers was ready to leave office at a point of higher, world-recognized personal accomplish-

ment, especially an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. Instead he had to settle for the maintenance of an Arab-Israeli cease-fire for three years as his proudest personal accomplishment.

Referring to Kissinger, Rogers said, "I called him today and congratulated him and told him I was looking forward to working with him on the transition. I'm sure that it will work out well."

Asked yesterday if he believed there has been an exaggeration of "the rivalry" between himself and Kissinger through the past 4½ years, Rogers, who traditionally scoffed at, or minimized such questions, replied:

"Well, I think not so much between Henry and myself as I think it is true between the White House and the department."

"I think part of that was because there was a feeling on the part of the White House that the government was not leak-proof, and if you wanted to do things without a lot of public knowledge, you had to do it quietly."

"I suppose it is partly a natural jealousy that exists in bureaucracies. But, for my own part, I think it has produced good results and, after all, that's what counts."

Rogers said, as his exchange of letters with the President, stated, that he accepted the post of secretary with "a firm resolve to return to the private practice of the law" at the end of the President's first term in office.

Privately, however, Rogers also had told associates, and sometimes the press, that he enjoyed his post and might stay on.

He said yesterday that he talked to President Nixon about his tenure at the end of the first term. Then, he added: "I talked to him about it a couple of times . . . June or some time in July—but I still had some things to complete. Then, once they were completed, as they have been now for a couple of weeks, I talked to him again. I talked to him last week for a couple of hours."

After the latter meeting, said Rogers, he wrote the letter of resignation dated Aug. 16. The only reason that was not announced then, said Rogers, was because the President was speaking on Watergate, "and we didn't want to relate it to that."

The President's Watergate speech actually came a day earlier, Aug. 15.

Rogers, when asked yesterday if it is true that "you didn't completely agree with some of the actions taken in the President's name" in the Watergate scandals, said, "I don't really want to make any other comments about the Watergate."

"As you know," he said, "I was out of the country for the most part during the first stages of the Watergate hearings. I have discussions with the President, as you remember, just prior

to the resignation of Mr. (H. R.) Haldeman and Mr. (John D.) Ehrlichman and Mr. (John W.) Dean, and I was up at Camp David with him (the President) for the better part of two days. But since that time, I have not been involved."

"I would have left whether there had been a Watergate or no Watergate," said Rogers, "that doesn't mean I don't have feelings about Watergate. It doesn't mean that I don't think this is not a good time to make a decision. I think this is very timely."

Rogers acknowledged, however, that he did not begin to tell even any of his ranking subordinates about his intention to resign until Tuesday night. Most did not learn about it until yesterday morning.

The secretary said there were many international matters of considerable urgency hanging over at the end of the President's first term which he wanted to see resolved before he left office, notably "the end of the war in Indochina" and Middle East questions.

Rogers said of his secretaryship: "I think my sole regret is that we weren't able to end the war in Indochina more speedily. Whether anything could have been done that would have made that possible, that we didn't do or not, I don't know. I think history will have to judge that."

Reviewing the foreign policy accomplishments of the administration during his term in office, Rogers said, "I'd say, on the whole, that the picture looks very bright."

"You always have problems in foreign affairs," said Rogers. "But certainly at the moment, I think the foreign affairs of this country are in very good shape."

Rogers said that in terms of the nation's welfare, "the initiative that the President took as far as China and the Soviet Union (are concerned) are things that will probably have the most lasting impact and the ones that I think will make these last 4½ years of great significance."

"I think the credit has to go to the President," he said, "but all of us played a part, and obviously Dr. Kissinger played a very active role in a way that you all know about, but so did a lot of people in the department. It was a team effort, and I think the President understands that."

NEW YORK TIMES

23 August 1973

The Kissinger Appointment: A New Approach to Conduct of Foreign Policy Is Seen

By JAMES RESTON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 22—

Long before President Nixon nominated him to be Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger had decided that the problems of American foreign policy in Mr. Nixon's second term would be quite different from the problems of the first term, and therefore required a new approach to the formulation, negotiation and presentation of foreign policy. No doubt there were subjective reasons for the appointment of Mr. Kissinger—the need to change the question and the headlines, to get the mind of the country off Watergate by action rather than by words, to give a sense of a new beginning—but there were compelling objective reasons as well.

Mr. Nixon's first term was a time of secret diplomacy and summitry to end the Indochina war, bring China out of isolation and get the Soviet Union down to the balanced control of nuclear weapons. But the coming problems are more open, more diverse, more economic and financial, requiring much more cooperation from Congress.

Mr. Kissinger insisted in private, once the Indochina cease-fire was negotiated, that he could not go on playing the role he did from within the confines of the White House. He felt he could no longer be both remote and effective, cut off from testimony before the Congressional leaders and from free discussion with intellectual leaders, whose support, he believed, was increasingly essential.

He brought this theme into the open at the beginning of this month in a speech before the International Platform Association in Washington. "What we are 10 years hence," he said, "depends upon what we do today, next week, and in the months that follow. Our influence for good or ill will be measured by the world's

judgment of our constancy and self-confidence. Our foreign policy will mean little if other nations see our actions as sporadic initiatives of a small group reflecting no coherent national purpose or consensus."

"No foreign policy—no matter how ingenious—has any chance of success if it is born in the minds of a few and carried in the hearts of none," he declared.

Only a couple of weeks ago, Mr. Kissinger was saying that the President had never discussed the State Department job with him. But even then he was talking privately with Senators Mike Mansfield, J. W. Fulbright, George McGovern and Stuart Symington, among others, in an effort to revive a nonpartisan spirit in foreign policy.

"Foreign policy," he said in that same speech this month, "must not become an alibi or a distraction from domestic problems must not be used as an excuse for abandoning our international responsibilities. There can be no moratorium in the quest for a peaceful world," he went on. "And as

we pursue that quest, we will need to draw upon the country's best minds, no matter what their partisan political persuasion—not on a bipartisan but on a nonpartisan basis. Especially at this moment of necessary self-examination, we must reaffirm the basis of our national unity."

Apparently, President Nixon in the midst of all his other troubles, recognized the validity of this argument, and also the force of an old Washington principle, that the weaker the President is, the stronger his Cabinet must be. In any event, after a couple of unhappy weeks, he started a brave performance in his news conference today by announcing the resignation of Secretary of State William P. Rogers and the succession of Mr. Kissinger. He explained his reasons:

Mr. Kissinger will retain his position—as assistant to the

President for national security as well as taking the State Department post, if confirmed, the President said.

"The purpose of this arrangement," he added, is to have a closer coordination between the White House and the departments. "And also, another purpose is to get the work out in the departments where it belongs."

It is generally agreed here that this is what Secretary Rogers wanted to do all along but could not so long as Mr. Kissinger was the principal adviser in the White House. But now Mr. Kissinger will have both access to the President and the leadership of a talented but neglected State Department, which is likely to be reinvigorated by the change.

The confirmation of Mr. Kissinger in the Senate is fairly well assured, but it will not be all easy sailing. The Foreign Relations Committee has been frustrated in getting at the heart of Mr. Nixon's foreign policy mainly because it had access to Secretary Rogers, who was not always informed, but no official access to Mr. Kissinger, who was informed and who was in on the big meetings with Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Premier Chou En-tai in China and with Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist party chairman, in Moscow, when Mr. Rogers was not.

For this reason, Senators Fulbright and Mansfield and other critics of Mr. Nixon's foreign policy will probably welcome the switch to someone who is both knowledgeable and available, and who has tried under very difficult circumstances to see them in private throughout the bitter White House-Congressional conflicts of the last four and a half years.

Nevertheless, the Democratic leaders are troubled by Mr. Kissinger's involvement in the bugging of his own National Security Council aides, and will want to know what assurances he can give them on his philosophy of carrying out this sort of secret wiretapping in the

future.

There is, therefore, some evidence in this nomination of M. Kissinger that the President is acting more moderately than he indicates by his talk. The significance of this appointment is that the President's critics in Congress, the universities and the press, radio and television.

Also, the President faced up to his questioners in the press today under great stress. He seemed tense and breathless, but he was patient in the face of a relentless barrage of questions, which probably brought him more sympathy from the television audience than he got from his questioners.

According, this was probably the President's best day in months, and the chances are that it will help him even more when M. Kissinger gets the Senate's approval and begins his new job.

How much freedom Mr. Kissinger will have in reorganizing the State Department is not clear. As one former White House aide put it: "State has been a sieve because nobody has asked it to be a bowl. Meeting Kissinger's intellectual standards and driving work habits will not be easy, but the talent is there, and it will probably be rejuvenated by the challenge."

Peking, Moscow and Europe are likely to welcome the change, while Japan may not be so sure. But in general, Mr. Kissinger's turn of mind and love of philosophic analysis are bound to open up his thought and energies to a far larger constituency at home and abroad than he has had so far.

For Mr. Kissinger personally, of course, the nomination is a climax to a remarkable career. "As someone who came to this country as a refugee from totalitarianism," he said the other day, "I have a special feeling for what America can still mean to the world and how a withdrawal of America from the world would deprive mankind of hope and purpose." There is a deep philosophic

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Changes at the State Department

melancholy in Mr. Kissinger at times, but he has grown into every job he has, and he is not without hope and a kind of ironic and mocking humor.

"Is man doomed to struggle without certainty and live without assurance?" he once wrote. "In a sense that is so. Man cannot achieve a guarantee for his conduct. No technical solutions to the dilemmas of life are at hand. That is the fatedness of existence. But it also poses a challenge, an evocation of the sense of responsibility to give one's own meaning to one's life."

"To be sure, these may be fired times. But we cannot require immortality as the price for giving meaning to life. The experience of freedom enables us to rise beyond the suffering of the past and the frustrations of history. In his spirituality resides humanity's essence, the unique which each man imparts to the necessity of life, the self-transcendence which gives peace."

This may be one of the most significant things in Mr. Kissinger's nomination. An articulate and philosophic voice has now been invited out into the open, and it is bound to make a difference in the daily articulation of the nation's policy and purpose.

It makes sense for Henry Kissinger, and now Mr. Nixon's assistant for national security affairs, to become Secretary of State, and not merely because he has dominated the diplomacy of the Nixon presidency anyway. A tight White House foreign-policy operation served the President's first-term focus on secret contacts with a few adversaries, but only the State Department apparatus can help Mr. Nixon pursue his second-term need for broader, more diverse exchanges with a much wider range of partners. While Mr. Nixon's prime first-term task of withdrawing the United States from Indochina was carried out amidst high-congressional-executive tension, his necessary second-term emphasis on trade negotiations and defense spending require considerable congressional-executive consensus. If confirmed as Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger not only would become available to congressional interlocutors, but Congress would come equally within the reach of his formidable powers of exposition and persuasion. Finally, by having at State a chief with the President's confidence and with great personal stature and talent, the department should be enabled to recoup its sunken prestige and morale. The country will have better assurance that considerations of diplomacy will be fairly weighed in the knot of economic, political and strategic problems ahead.

Some organizational purists may be offended that Dr. Kissinger retains his White House hat, although his National Security Council staff can hardly retain the particular function and special significance which President Nixon gave to them in his first term. Other departments concerned with international decision-making may wonder if State will not now take on excessive influence. The arrangement is something of an anomaly; students of power and bureaucracy in Washington will surely keep a beady eye on it. Our view is that there is no special magic in any one particular way of organizing the executive branch to conduct foreign affairs. No one should be better situated to decide how he wishes to organize his administration for that purpose than a second-term President who has concentrated on foreign policy.

Departing Secretary of State William P. Rogers, for reasons not entirely of his own making, did not function at the center of administration policy. He entered and left office with the hope of helping create among Americans "a new national unity and purpose in our foreign policy." Less a specialist in international relations than a man of keen insight into domestic requirements, he made a comment last Monday, in evident anticipation of his imminent resignation—which can perhaps serve as a valedictory for his nearly five years as Secretary of State. "I believe," he said, "that it is very important for the United States not to become so obsessed with security matters that laws are freely violated. I think one of the things that provide security for Americans is the fact that we are a law-abiding nation, and that is protection for all individuals, and a protection for individual rights." These are the words of a wise and honorable and decent man. They deserve to be pondered by Mr. Rogers' successor at State and by his erstwhile chief at the White House too.

BALTIMORE SUN
21 August 1973**Godley called set
for envoy post**

Washington (AP)—G. McMurtrie Godley, the controversial former ambassador to Laos, is expected to be nominated as United States ambassador to Argentina, U.S. officials said yesterday.

Mr. Godley was President Nixon's nominee for assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, but the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last month rejected the appointment by a 9-to-7 vote.

Committee liberals opposed the nomination, seeing the 55-year-old career diplomat as a symbol of American military involvement in Southeast Asia.

Foreign Relations Committee members who opposed Mr. Godley's nomination for the Asian affairs post said they would not object to his appointment to a post in another region.

The Argentine ambassadorship has been filled for the past four years by John David Lodge.

NEW YORK TIMES
16 August 1973

Transcript of President's Speech to the Nation in Answer to Watergate Charges

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 15—Following is a transcript of President Nixon's address on the Watergate scandal as recorded by The New York Times:

Now that most of the major witnesses in the Watergate phase of the Senate committee hearings on campaign practices have been heard, the time has come for me to speak out about the charges made and to provide a perspective on the issue for the American people.

For over four months Watergate has dominated the news media. During the past three months the three major networks have devoted an average of over 22 hours of television time each week to this subject. The Senate committee has heard over two million words of testimony.

This investigation began as an effort to discover the facts about the break-in and bugging at the Democratic national headquarters and other campaign abuses.

As the weeks have gone by, it has become clear that both the hearings themselves and some of the commentaries on them have become increasingly absorbed in an effort to implicate the President personally in the illegal activities that took place.

Because the abuses occurred during my Administration, and in the campaign for my re-election I accept full responsibility for them. I regret that these events took place. And I do not question the right of a Senate committee to investigate charges made against the President to the extent that this is relevant to legislative duties.

However, it is my Constitutional responsibility to defend the integrity of this great office against false charges. I also believe that it is important to address the overriding question of what we as a nation can learn from this experience, and what we should now do. I intend to discuss both of these subjects tonight.

The record of the Senate hearings is lengthy. The facts are complicated, the evidence conflicting. It would not be right for me to try to sort out the evidence, to rebut specific witnesses, or to pronounce my own judgments about their credibility. That is for the committee and for the courts.

I shall not attempt to deal tonight with the various charges in detail. Rather, I shall attempt to put the events in perspective from the standpoint of the Presidency.

On May 22d, before the major witnesses had testified, I issued a detailed statement addressing the charges that had been made against the President.

I have today issued another written statement, which addresses the charges that have been made since then as they relate to my own conduct, and which describes the efforts that I made to discover the facts about the matter.

On May 22, I stated in very specific terms—and I state again to every one of you listening tonight—these facts: I had no prior knowledge of the Watergate break-in; I neither took part in nor knew about any of the subsequent cover-up activities; I neither author-

ized nor encouraged subordinates to engage in illegal or improper campaign tactics.

That was and that is the simple truth. In all of the millions of words of testimony, there is not the slightest suggestion that I had any knowledge of the planning for the Watergate break-in. As for the cover-up, my statement has been challenged by only one of the 35 witnesses who appeared—a witness who offered no evidence beyond his own impressions, and whose testimony has been contradicted by every other witness in a position to know the facts.

Tonight, let me explain to you what I did about Watergate after the break-in occurred, so that you can better understand the fact that I also had no knowledge of the so-called cover-up.

Two Essential Points

From the time when the break-in occurred, I pressed repeatedly to know the facts, and particularly whether there was any involvement of anyone at the White House. I considered two things essential:

First, that the investigation should be thorough and above-board; and second, that if there were any higher involvement, we should get the facts out first. As I said at my August 29 press conference last year, "What really hurts in matters of this sort is not the fact that they occur, because overzealous people in campaigns do things that are wrong. What really hurts is if you try to cover it up." I believed that then, and certainly the experience of this last year has proved that to be true.

I knew that the Justice Department and the F.B.I. were conducting intensive investigations—as I had insisted that they should. The White House counsel, John Dean, was assigned to monitor those investigations, and particularly to check into any possible White House involvement. Throughout the summer of 1972, I continued to press the question, and I continued to get the same answer: I was told again and again that there was no indication that any persons were involved other than the seven who were known to have planned and carried out the operation, and who were subsequently indicted and convicted.

On Sept. 12 at a meeting that I held with the Cabinet, the senior White House staff and a number of legislative leaders, Attorney General Kleindienst reported on the investigation. He told us it had been the most extensive investigation since the assassination of President Kennedy, and that it has established that only those seven were involved.

On Sept. 15, the day the seven were indicted, I met with John Dean, the White House counsel. He gave me no reason whatever to believe that any others were guilty; I assumed that the indictments of only the seven by the grand jury confirmed the reports he had been giving to that effect throughout the summer.

On Feb. 16, I met with Acting Director Gray prior to submitting his name to the Senate for confirmation as permanent director of the F.B.I. I stressed to him that he would be questioned closely about the F.B.I.'s conduct of the Water-

gate investigation. I asked him if he still had full confidence in it. He replied that he did; that he was proud of its thoroughness and that he could defend it with enthusiasm before the committee.

Because I trusted the agencies conducting the investigations, because I believed the reports I was getting, I did not believe the newspaper accounts that suggested a cover-up. I was convinced there was no cover-up, because I was convinced that no one had anything to cover up.

I was not until March 21 of this year—that I received new information from the White House counsel that led me to conclude that the reports I had been getting for over nine months were not true. On that day, I launched an intensive effort of my own to get the facts and to get the facts out. Whatever the facts might be, I wanted the White House to be the first to make them public.

At first I entrusted the task of getting me the facts to Mr. Dean. When, after spending a week at Camp David, he failed to produce the written report I had asked for, I turned to John Ehrlichman and to the Attorney General—while also making independent inquiries of my own. By mid-April I had received Mr. Ehrlichman's report, and also one from the Attorney General based on new information uncovered by the Justice Department.

These reports made it clear to me that the situation was far more serious than I had imagined. It at once became evident to me that the responsibility for the investigation in the case should be given to the Criminal Division of the Justice Department. I turned over all the information I had to the head of that department, Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen, a career Government employee with an impeccable nonpartisan record, and I instructed him to pursue the matter thoroughly. I ordered all members of the Administration to testify fully before the grand jury.

And with concurrence, on May 18 Attorney General Richardson appointed a special prosecutor to handle the matter, and the case is now before the grand jury.

Far from trying to hide the facts, my effort throughout has been to discover the facts—and to lay those facts before the appropriate law-enforcement authorities so that justice could be done and the guilty dealt with.

I relied on the best law-enforcement agencies in the country to find and report the truth. I believed they had done so—just as they believed they had done so.

Many have urged that in order to help prove the truth of what I have said, I should turn over to the special prosecutor and the Senate committee recordings of conversations that I held in my office or my telephone.

However, a much more important principle is involved in this question than what the tapes might prove about Watergate.

Each day a President of the United States is required to make difficult decisions on grave issues. It is absolutely

necessary, if the President is to be able to do his job as the country expects, that he be able to talk openly and candidly with his advisers about issues and individuals. This kind of frank discussion is only possible when those who take part in it know that what they say is in strictest confidence.

The Presidency is not the only office that requires confidentiality. A member of Congress must be able to talk in confidence with his assistants. Judges must be able to confer in confidence with their law clerks and with each other. For very good reasons, no branch of government has ever compelled disclosure of confidential conversations between officers of other branches of government and their advisers about government business.

This need for confidence is not confined to Government officials. The law has long recognized that there are kinds of conversations that are entitled to be kept confidential, even at the cost of doing without critical evidence in a legal proceeding. This rule applies, for example, to conversations between a lawyer and a client, between a priest and a penitent, and between a husband and a wife. In each case it is thought so important that the parties be able to talk freely to each other that for hundreds of years the law has said that these conversations are "privileged" and that their disclosure cannot be compelled in a court.

It is even more important that the confidentiality of conversations between a President and his advisers be protected. This is no mere luxury, to be dispensed with whenever a particular issue raises sufficient uproar. It is absolutely essential to the conduct of the Presidency, in this and in all future Administrations.

If I were to make public these tapes, containing as they do blunt and candid remarks on many different subjects, the confidentiality of the Office of the President would always be suspect from now on. It would make no difference whether it was a servant of the interests of a court, of a Senate committee or the President himself—the same damage would be done to the principle, and that damage would be irreparable. Persons talking with the President would never again be sure that recordings or notes of what they said would not suddenly be made public. No one would want to advance tentative ideas that might later seem unsound. No diplomat would want to speak candidly in those sensitive negotiations which would bring peace or war. No Senator or Congressman would want to talk frankly about the Congressional horse-trading that might get a vital bill passed. No one would want to speak bluntly about public figures, here and abroad.

That is why I shall continue to oppose efforts which would set a precedent that would cripple all future Presidents by inhibiting conversations between them and those they look to for advice. This principle of confidentiality of Presidential conversations is at stake in the question of these tapes. I must, and I shall oppose any efforts to destroy this principle, which is so vital to the conduct of this great office.

Turning now to the basic issues which have been raised by Watergate, I recognize that merely answering the charges that have been made against the President is not enough. The word "Watergate" has come to represent a much broader set of concerns.

To most of us, "Watergate" has come to mean not just a burglary and bugging of party headquarters, but a whole

series of acts that either represent or appear to represent an abuse of trust. It has come to stand for excessive partisanship, for "enemy lists," for efforts to use the great institutions of Government for partisan political purposes.

For many Americans, the term "Watergate" also has come to include a number of national security matters that have been brought into the investigation, such as those involved in my efforts to stop massive leaks of vital diplomatic and military secrets, and to counter the wave of bombings and burnings and other violent assaults of just a few years ago.

Let me speak first of the political abuses.

I know from long experience, that a political campaign is always a hard, and a tough contest. A candidate for high office has an obligation to his party, to his supporters, and to the cause he represents. He must always put forth his best efforts to win. But he also has an obligation to the country to conduct that contest within the law and within the limits of decency.

Government and Politics

No political campaign ever justifies obstructing justice, or harassing individuals, or compromising those great agencies of government that should and must be above politics. To the extent that these things were done in the 1972 campaign, they were serious abuses. And I deplore them.

Practices of that kind do not represent what I believe Government should be, or what I believe politics should be. In a free society, the institutions of government belong to the people. They must never be used against the people.

And in the future, my Administration will be more vigilant in ensuring that such abuses do not take place, and that officials at every level understand that they are not to take place.

And I reject the cynical view that politics is inevitably or even usually a dirty business. Let us not allow what a few of dedicated Americans of both parties who fought hard but clean for the candidates of their choice in 1972. By their unselfish efforts, these people make our system work and they keep America free.

I pledge to you tonight that I will do all that I can to ensure that one of the results of Watergate is a new level of political decency and integrity in America—in which what has been wrong in our politics no longer corrupts or demeans what is right in our politics.

Let me turn now to the difficult questions that arise in protecting the national security.

It is important to recognize that these are difficult questions and that reasonable and patriotic men and women may differ on how they should be answered.

Only last year, the Supreme Court said that implicit in the President's constitutional duty is "the power to protect our Government against those who would subvert or overthrow it by unlawful means." How to carry out this duty is often a delicate question to which there is no easy answer.

For example, every President since World War II has believed that in internal security matters the President has the power to authorize wiretaps without first obtaining a search warrant.

An act of Congress in 1968 had

seemed to recognize such power. Last year the Supreme Court held to the contrary. And my Administration is of course now complying with that Supreme Court decision. But until the Supreme Court spoke, I had been acting as did my predecessors—President Truman, President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, President Johnson—in a reasonable belief that in certain circumstances the Constitution permitted and sometimes even required such measures to protect the national security in the public interest.

Although it is the President's duty to protect the security of the country, we of course must be extremely careful in the way we go about this—for if we lose our liberties we will have little use for security. Instances have now come to light in which a zeal for security did go too far and did interfere impermissibly with individual liberty.

It is essential that such mistakes not be repeated. But it is also essential that we do not overreact to particular mistakes by tying the President's hands in a way that would risk sacrificing our security, and with it all involved that their cause placed them. I shall continue to meet my constitutional responsibility to protect the security of this nation so that Americans may enjoy their freedom. But I shall and can do so by constitutional means, in ways that will not threaten that freedom.

As we look at Watergate in a longer perspective, we can see that its abuses resulted from this assumption by those involved that their case placed them beyond the reach of those rules that apply to other persons and that hold a free society together.

That attitude can never be tolerated in our country. However, it did not suddenly develop in the year 1972. It became fashionable in the nineteen-sixties, as individuals and groups increasingly asserted the right to take the law into their own hands, insisting that their purposes represented a higher morality. Then, their attitude was praised in the press and even from some of our pulpits as evidence of a new idealism. Those of us who insisted on the old restraints, who warned of the overriding importance of operating within the law and by the rules, were accused of being reactionaries.

That same attitude brought a rising spiral of violence and fear, of riots and arson and bombings, all in the name of peace and in the name of justice. Political discussion turned into savage debate. Free speech was brutally suppressed as hecklers shouted down or even physically assaulted those with whom they disagreed. Serious people raised serious questions about whether we could survive as a free democracy.

The notion that the end justifies the means proved contagious. Thus it is not surprising, even though it is deplorable, that some persons in 1972 adopted the morality that they themselves had rightly condemned and committed acts that have no place in our political system.

Those acts cannot be defended. Those who were guilty of abuses must be punished. But ultimately the answer does not lie merely in the jailing of a few overzealous persons who mistakenly thought their cause justified their violations of the law.

Rather, it lies in a commitment by all of us to show a renewed respect for the mutual restraints that are the mark of a free and civilized society. It requires that we learn once again to work

poses, then at least united in respect for the system by which our conflicts are peacefully resolved and our liberties maintained.

If there are laws we disagree with, let us work to change them—but let us obey them until they are changed. If we have disagreements over Government policies, let us work those out in a decent and civilized way, within the law, and with respect for our differences.

We must recognize that one excess begets another, and that the extremes of violence and discord in the 1960s contributed to the extremes of Watergate.

Both are wrong. Both should be condemned. No individual, no group and no political party has a corner on the market on morality in America.

If we learn the important lessons of Watergate, if we do what is necessary to prevent such abuses in the future—on both sides—we can emerge from this experience a better and a stronger nation.

Let me turn now to an issue that is important above all else, and that is critically affecting your life today and will affect your life and your children's in the years to come.

After 12 weeks and 2 million words of televised testimony, we have reached a point at which a continued, backward-looking obsession with Watergate is causing this nation to neglect matters of far greater importance to all of the American people.

We must not stay so mired in Water-

gate that we fail to respond to challenges America and the world. We cannot let an obsession with the past destroy our hopes for the future.

Legislation vital to your health and well-being sits unattended on the Congressional calendar. Confidence at home and abroad in our economy, our currency and our foreign policy is being sapped by uncertainty. Critical negotiations are taking place on strategic weapons, on troop levels in Europe that can affect the security of this nation and the peace of the world long after Watergate is forgotten. Vital events are taking place in Southeast Asia which could lead to a tragedy for the cause of peace.

These are matters that cannot wait. They cry out for action now. And either we, your elected representatives here in Washington ought to get on with the jobs that need to be done—for you—or every one of you ought to be demanding to know why.

The time has come to turn Watergate over to the courts, where the questions of guilt or innocence belong. The time has come for the rest of us to get on with the urgent business of our nation.

Last November, the American people were given the clearest choice of this century. Your votes were a mandate, which I accepted, to complete the initiatives we began in my first term and to fulfill the promises I made for my second term.

Purposes of the Administration

This Administration was elected to control inflation, to reduce the power

and size of government, to cut the cost of government so that you can cut the cost of living, to preserve and defend those fundamental values that have made America great, to keep the nation's military strength second to none, to achieve peace with honor in Southeast Asia and to bring home our prisoners of war, and to build a new prosperity, without inflation and without war, to create a structure of peace in the world that would endure long after we are gone.

These are great goals. They are worthy of a great people. And I would not be true to your trust if I let myself be turned aside from achieving those goals.

If you share my belief in these goals—if you want the mandate you gave this Administration to be carried out—then I ask for your help to insure that those who would exploit Watergate in order to keep us from doing what we were elected to do will not succeed.

I ask tonight for your understanding, so that as a nation we can learn the lessons of Watergate, and gain from that experience.

I ask for your help in reaffirming our dedication to the principles of decency, honor and respect for the institutions that have sustained our progress through these past two centuries.

And I ask for your support, in getting on once again with meeting your problems, improving your life and building your future.

With your help, with God's help, we will achieve these great goals for America.

NEW YORK TIMES

16 August 1973

Text of Nixon's Statement on Watergate Scandal as Issued by the White House

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 15—Following is the text of President Nixon's statement on the Watergate scandal as issued by the White House tonight just before the President began speaking to the nation:

On May 17, the Senate Select Committee began its hearings on Watergate. Five days later, on May 22, I issued a detailed statement discussing my relationship to the matter. I stated categorically that I had no prior knowledge of the Watergate operation and that I neither knew of nor took part in any subsequent efforts to cover it up.

I also stated that I would not invoke executive privilege as to testimony by present and former members of my White House staff with respect to possible criminal acts then under investigation.

Thirty-five witnesses have testified so far. The record is more than 7,500 pages and some two million words long. The allegations are many, the facts are complicated, and the evidence is not only extensive but very much in conflict.

It would be neither fair nor appropriate for me to assess the evidence or comment on specific witnesses or their credibility. That is the function of the Senate committee and the courts. What I intend to do here is to cover the principal issues relating to my own conduct which have been raised since my statement of May 22, and thereby to place the testimony on those issues

in perspective.

I said on May 22 that I had no prior knowledge of the Watergate operation. In all the testimony, there is not the slightest evidence to the contrary. Not a single witness has testified that I had any knowledge of the planning for the Watergate break-in.

It is also true, as I said on May 22, that I took no part in, and was not aware of, any subsequent efforts to cover up the illegal acts associated with the Watergate break-in.

In the summer of 1972 I had given orders for the Justice Department and the F.B.I. to conduct a thorough and aggressive investigation of the Watergate break-in, and I relied on their investigation to disclose the facts. My only concern about the scope of the investigation was that it might lead into C.I.A. or other national security operations of a sensitive nature. Mr. Gray, the acting director of the F.B.I., told me by telephone on July 6 that he had met with General Walters, that General Walters had told him the C.I.A. was not involved, and that C.I.A. activities would not be compromised by the F.B.I. investigation. As a result, my problems that Mr. Gray may have had in coordinating with the C.I.A. were moot. I concluded by instructing him to press forward vigorously with his own investigation.

During the summer of 1972, I repeatedly asked for reports on the progress of the investigation. Every report I received was that no persons, other than the seven who were subsequently

indicted, were involved in the Watergate operation. On Sept. 12, at a meeting attended by me, and by the Cabinet, senior members of the White House staff and a number of legislative leaders, Attorney General Kleindienst reported on the investigation. He informed us that he had been the most intensive investigation since the assassination of President Kennedy, and that it had been established that no one at the White House, and no higher-ups in the campaign committee, were involved. His report seemed to be confirmed by the action of the grand jury on Sept. 15, when it indicted only the five persons arrested at the Watergate, plus Messrs. Liddy and Hunt.

Those indictments also seemed to me to confirm the validity of the reports that Mr. Dean had been providing to me, through other members of the White House staff—and on which I had based my Aug. 29 statement that no one then employed at the White House was involved. It was in that context that I met with Mr. Dean on Sept. 15, and he gave me no reason at that meeting to believe any others were involved.

Not only was I unaware of any cover-up, but at that time, and until March 24, I was unaware that there was anything to cover up.

Then and later, I continued to have full faith in the investigations that had been conducted and in the reports I had received based on those investigations. On Feb. 16, I met with Mr. Gray prior to submitting his name to the

Senate for confirmation as permanent director of the FBI. I stressed to him that he would be questioned closely about the FBI's conduct of the Watergate investigation, and asked him if he still had full confidence in it. He replied that he did, that he was proud of its thoroughness, and that he could defend it with enthusiasm.

My interest in Watergate rose in February and March as the Senate committee was organized and the hearings were held on the Gray nomination. I began meeting frequently with my counsel, Mr. Dean, in connection with those matters. At that time, on a number of occasions, I urged my staff to get all the facts out, because I was confident that full disclosure of the facts would show that persons in the White House and at the Committee for the Re-election of the President were the victims of unjustified innuendoes in the press. I was searching for a way to disclose all of the facts without disturbing the confidentiality of communications with and among my personal staff, since that confidentiality is essential to the functioning of any President.

It was on March 21 that I was given new information that indicated that the reports I had been getting were not true. I was told then for the first time that the planning of the Watergate break-in went beyond those who had been tried and convicted, and that, at least one, and possibly more, persons at the re-election committee were involved.

It was on that day also that I learned of some of the activities upon which charges of cover-up are now based. I was told that funds had been raised for payments to the defendants, with the knowledge and approval of persons both on the White House staff and at the re-election committee. But, I was only told that the money had been used for attorneys' fees and family support, not that it had been paid to procure silence from the recipients. I was also told that a member of my staff had talked to one of the defendants about clemency, but not that offers of clemency had been made. I was told that one of the defendants was currently attempting to blackmail the White House by demanding payment of \$120,000 as the price of not talking about other activities unrelated to Watergate, in which he had engaged. These allegations were made in general terms, they were portrayed to me as being based in part on supposition, and they were largely unsupported by details or evidence.

These allegations were very troubling, and they gave a new dimension to the Watergate matter. They also reinforced my determination that the full facts must be made available to the grand jury or to the Senate committee. If anything illegal had happened, I wanted it to be dealt with appropriately according to the law. If anyone at the White House or high up in my campaign had been involved in wrongdoing of any kind, I wanted the White House to take the lead in making that known.

When I received this distressing information on March 21, I immediately began new inquiries into the case and an examination of the best means to give to the grand jury or Senate committee what we then knew and what we might later learn. On March 21, I arranged to meet the following day with Messrs. Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Dean and Mitchell to discuss the appropriate method to get the facts out. On March 23d, I sent Mr. Dean to Camp David, where he was instructed to write

a complete report on all that he knew of the entire Watergate matter. On March 28th, I had Mr. Ehrlichman call the Attorney General to find out if he had additional information about Watergate generally or White House involvement. The Attorney General was told that I wanted to hear directly from him, and not through any staff people, if he had any information on White House involvement or if information of that kind should come to him.

The Attorney General indicated to Mr. Ehrlichman that he had no such information. When I learned on March 30 that Mr. Dean had been unable to complete his report, I instructed Mr. Ehrlichman to conduct an independent inquiry and bring all the facts to me. On April 14, Mr. Ehrlichman gave me his findings, and I directed that he report them to the Attorney General immediately. On April 15, Attorney General Kleindienst and Assistant Attorney General Petersen told me of new information that had been received by the prosecutors.

Independent Inquiries

By that time the fragmentary information I had been given on March 21 had been supplemented in important ways, particularly by Mr. Ehrlichman's report to me on April 14, by the information Mr. Kleindienst and Mr. Petersen gave me on April 15th, and by independent inquiries I had been making on my own. At that point, I realized that I would not be able personally to find out all of the facts and make them public, and I concluded that the matter was best handled by the Justice Department and the grand jury. On April 17, I announced that new inquiries were under way, as a result of what I had learned on March 21 and in my own investigation since that time. I instructed all Government employees to cooperate with the judicial process as it moved ahead on this matter and expressed my personal view that no immunity should be given to any individual who had held a position of major importance in this Administration.

My consistent position from the beginning has been to get out the facts about Watergate, not to cover them up.

On May 22 I said that at no time did I authorize any offer of executive clemency for the Watergate defendants, nor did I know of any such offer. I reaffirm that statement. Indeed, I made my view clear to Mr. Ehrlichman in July, 1972, that under no circumstances could executive clemency be considered for those who participated in the Watergate break-in. I maintained that position throughout.

On May 22 I said that "It was not until the time of my own investigation that I learned of the break-in at the office of Mr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist, and I specifically authorized the furnishing of this information to Judge Byrne."

After a very careful review, I have determined that this statement of mine is not precisely accurate. It was on March 17 that I first learned of the break-in at the office of Dr. Fielding, and that was four days before the beginning of my own investigation on March 21. I was told then that nothing by way of evidence have been obtained in the break-in. On April 18, I learned that the Justice Department had interrogated or was going to interrogate Mr. Hunt about this break-in. I was gravely concerned that other activities of the special investigations unit might be disclosed, because I knew this could seriously injure the national security. Consequently,

I directed Mr. Petersen to stick to the Watergate investigation and stay out of national security matters. On April 25 Attorney General Kleindienst came to me and urged that the fact of the break-in should be disclosed to the court, despite the fact that, since no evidence had been obtained, the law did not clearly require it. I concurred and authorized him to report the break-in to Judge Byrne.

Disclosure a Threat

In view of the incident of Dr. Fielding's office, let me emphasize two things:

First, it was and is important that many of the matters worked on by the special investigations unit not be publicly disclosed because disclosure would unquestionably damage the national security. This is why I have exercised executive privilege on some of these matters in connection with the testimony of Mr. Ehrlichman and others. The Senate committee has learned through its investigation the general facts of some of these security matters, and has to date wisely declined to make them public or to contest in these respects my claim of executive privilege.

Second, I at no time authorized the use of illegal means by the special investigations unit, and I was not aware of the break-in of Dr. Fielding's office until March 17, 1973.

Many persons will ask why, when the facts are as I have stated them, I do not make public the tape recordings of my meetings and conversations with members of the White House staff during this period.

I am aware that such terms as "separation of powers" and "executive privilege" are lawyers' terms, and that those doctrines have been called "abstruse" and "esoteric." Let me state the common sense of the matter. Every day a President of the United States is required to make difficult decisions on grave issues. It is absolutely essential, if the President is to be able to do his job as the country expects, that he be able to talk openly and candidly with his advisers about issues and individuals and that they be able to talk in the same fashion with him. Indeed, on occasion, they must be able to "blow off steam" about important public figures. This kind of frank discussion is only possible when those who take part in it can feel assured that what they say is in the strictest confidence.

The Presidency is not the only office that requires confidentiality if it is to function effectively. A member of Congress must be able to talk in confidence with his assistants. Judges must be able to confer in confidence with their law clerks and with each other. Throughout our entire history the need for this kind of confidentiality has been recognized. No branch of government has ever compelled disclosure of confidential conversations between officers of other branches of government and their advisers about government business.

The argument is often raised that these tapes are somehow different because the conversations may bear on illegal acts, and because the commission of illegal acts is not an official duty. This misses the point entirely. Even if others, from their own standpoint, may have been thinking about how to cover up an illegal act, from my standpoint I was concerned with how to uncover the illegal acts. It is my responsibility

laws are faithfully executed, and in pursuing the facts about Watergate I was doing precisely that. Therefore, the precedent would not be one concerning illegal actions only; it would be one that would risk exposing private Presidential conversations involving the whole range of official duties.

The need for confidence is not something confined to the Government officials. The law has long recognized that there are many relations sufficiently important that things said in that relation are entitled to be kept confidential, even at the cost of doing without what might be critical evidence in a legal proceeding. Among these are, for example, the relations between a lawyer and his client, between a priest and a penitent, and between a husband and wife. In each case it is thought to be so important that the parties be able to talk freely with each other, that they need not feel restrained in their conversation by fear that what they say may someday come out in court, that the law recognizes that these conversations are "privileged" and that their disclosure cannot be compelled.

If I were to make public these tapes, containing as they do blunt and candid remarks on many subjects that have nothing to do with Watergate, the confidentiality of the office of the President would always be suspect. Persons talking with a President would never again be sure that recordings or notes of what they said would not at some future time be made public, and they would guard their words against that possibility. No one would want to risk being known as the person who recommended a policy that ultimately did not work. No one would want to advance tentative ideas, not fully thought through, that might have possible merit but that might, on further examination, prove unsound. No one would want to speak bluntly about public figures here and abroad. I shall therefore vigorously oppose any actions which would set a precedent that would cripple all future Presidents by inhibiting conversations between them and the persons they look to for advice.

This principle of confidentiality in Presidential communications is what is at stake in the question of the tapes. I shall continue to oppose any efforts

to destroy that principle, which is indispensable to the conduct of the Presidency.

I recognize that this statement does not answer many of the questions and contentions raised during the Watergate hearings. It has not been my intention to attempt any such comprehensive and detailed response, nor has it been my intention to address myself to all matters covered in my May 22 statement. With the Senate hearings and the grand jury investigations still proceeding, with much of the testimony in conflict, it would be neither possible to provide nor appropriate to attempt a definitive account of all that took place. Neither do I believe I could enter upon an endless course of explaining and rebutting a complex of point-by-point claims and charges arising out of that conflicting testimony which may engage committees and courts for months or years to come, and still be able to carry out my duties as President. While the judicial and legislative branches resolve these matters, I will continue to discharge to the best of my ability my constitutional responsibilities as President of the United States.

NEW YORK TIMES
16 August 1973

Previous Statements by President on Watergate

WASHINGTON, Aug. 15. (AP)—Following are previous statements by President Nixon on the Watergate case, excerpted from news conferences and statements issued by the White House.

Aug. 29, 1972

Within our own staff, under my direction, counsel to the President, Mr. John W. Dean, has conducted a complete investigation of all leads which might involve any present members of the White House staff or anybody in the Government. I can say categorically that his investigation indicates that no one in the White House staff, no one in this Administration, presently employed, was involved in this very bizarre affair.

Oct. 5, 1972

I agreed with the amount of effort that was put into it [the F.B.I. inquiry]. I wanted every lead carried out to the end because I wanted to be sure that no member of the White House staff and no man or woman in a position of major responsibility in the Committee for Re-Election had anything to do with this kind of reprehensible activity.

March 2, 1973

I will simply say with regard to the Watergate case what I have said previously, that the investigation conducted by Mr. Dean, the White House counsel, in which, incidentally, he had access to the F.B.I. records on this particular matter because I directed him to conduct this investigation, indicates that no one on the White House staff, at the time he conducted the investigation—that was last July and August—was involved or

had knowledge of the Watergate matter.

And, as far as the balance of the case is concerned, it is now under investigation by a Congressional committee and that committee should go forward, conduct its investigation in an even-handed way, going into charges made against both candidates, both political parties. Of course, no President could ever agree to allow the counsel to the President to go down and testify before a committee.

March 15, 1973

I have always insisted that we should cooperate with members of the Congress and with the committees of the Congress. And that is why we have furnished information. But, however, I am not going to have the counsel to the President of the United States testify in a formal session for the Congress. He will, however—the important thing is, he will—furnish all pertinent information. I have confidence in all of the White House people who have been named. I will express confidence again. But I am not going to comment on any individual matter that the committee may go into.

Members of the White House staff will not appear before a committee of Congress in any formal session. If the Senate feels at this time that this matter of separation of powers... If the Senate feels that they want a court test, we would welcome it.

April 17, 1973

All members of the White House staff will appear voluntarily when requested by the [Senate Watergate investigating] committee. I believe now an agreement has been reached which is

satisfactory to both sides. The committee ground rules as adopted totally preserve the doctrine of separation of powers. They provide that the appearance by a witness may, in the first instance, be in executive session, if appropriate. Second, executive privilege is expressly reserved and may be asserted during the course of the questioning as to any questioning as to any questions.

On March 21, as a result of serious charges which came to my attention, some of which were publicly reported, I began intensive new inquiries into this whole matter. I can report today that there have been major developments in the case concerning which it would be improper to be more specific now, except to say that real progress has been made in finding the truth. As I said before, as I have said throughout this entire matter, all Government employees and especially White House staff employees are expected fully to cooperate in this matter. I condemn any attempts to cover up this case, no matter who is involved.

April 30, 1973

Last June 17, while I was in Florida, trying to get a few days rest after my visit to Moscow, I first learned from news reports of the Watergate break-in. I was appalled at this senseless, illegal action, and I was shocked to learn that employees of the re-election committee were apparently among those guilty.

As the investigations went forward, I repeatedly asked those conducting the investigation whether there was any reason to believe that members of my Administration were in any way in-

involved. I received repeated assurances that there were not. Because I believed the reports I was getting, because I had faith in the persons from whom I was getting them, I discounted the stories in the press.

Until March of this year I remained convinced that the denials were true. However, new information then came to me which persuaded me that there was a real possibility that some of these charges were true and suggesting further that there had been an effort to conceal the facts both from the public, from you, and from me. As a result, on March 21 I personally assumed the responsibility for coordinating intensive new inquiries into the matter, and I personally ordered those conducting the investigations to get all the facts and to report them directly to me, right here in this office.

Today, in one of the most difficult decisions of my Presidency, I accepted the resignations of two of my closest associates in the White House—Bob Haldeman, John Ehrlichman—two of the finest public servants it has been my privilege to know. The counsel to the President, John Dean, has also resigned.

May 22, 1973

Already, on the basis of second and third-hand hearsay testimony by persons either convicted or themselves under investigation in the case, I have found myself accused of involvement in activities I never heard of until I read about them in News accounts.

I can and do state categorically:

I had no prior knowledge of the Watergate opera-

tion; 2. I took no part in, nor was I aware of, any subsequent efforts that may have been made to cover up Watergate; 3. At no time did I authorize any offer of executive clemency for the Watergate defendants, nor did I know of any such offer.

4. I did not know, until the time of my own investigation, of any effort to provide the Watergate defendants with funds; 5. At no time did I attempt, nor did I authorize others to attempt, to implicate the CIA in the Watergate matter.

6. It was not until the time of my own investigation that I learned of the break-in at the office of Mr. Daniel Ellis-

berg's psychiatrist, and I specifically authorized the furnishing of this information to Judge W. Mark Byrnes. 7. I neither authorized nor encouraged subordinates to engage in illegal or improper campaign tactics.

With hindsight, it is apparent that I should have given more heed to the warning signals I received along the way about a Watergate cover-up and less to the reassurances... as more information is developed, I have no doubt that more questions will be raised. To the extent that I am able, I shall also seek to set forth the facts as known to me with respect to those questions.

Shan in Laos and including Premier Kakuei Tanaka of Japan, Prime Minister Gough Whitlam of Australia, and President Bernard Bongo of Gabon.

Despite the cloud over Mr. Nixon's reputation, he still plans to visit Europe this fall or — if preliminary negotiations are not finished — early next year. And there has been no indication that any of the European countries want to withdraw the welcome mat.

In Washington, State Department officials have reported growing anxiety among foreign public figures about the impact of Watergate on the President's ability to conduct foreign affairs.

'A State of Mind

"There's nothing tangible to point to yet," one top official said. "Rather, it's a state of mind."

"If this thing continues unchecked for another six months," he went on, "you'll see a real impact in foreign countries. Foreigners are now reacting like most Americans did earlier this year."

Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Nixon's adviser on national security, has noted a certain ebbing of interest in foreign affairs by the public because of Watergate, and has called on Americans of all political persuasions not to let Watergate become "an excuse for abandoning our international responsibilities."

In a speech last week, Mr. Kissinger said that "no foreign policy—no matter how ingenious—has any chance of success if it is born in the minds of a few and carried in the hearts of none."

Privately, he has told friends that he does not believe the full impact of Watergate will be felt in foreign relations for at least a year. As a result, he believes there is still time to repair the erosion already caused.

Washington officials tend to believe that foreigners, caught up with their own domestic problems, have been much slower to respond to the possible effect of Watergate than have Americans.

A selective nation-by-nation rundown follows:

Britain

British officials are probably more concerned about Watergate than any other ally, but this concern has had no apparent effect on day-to-day diplomatic business.

In long-range terms, British anxieties lie in three areas—trade, money and troops. Officials fear that Mr. Nixon's loss of influence in Congress will make it difficult for him to get the kind of flexible trade bill he is seeking. On monetary matters, the British are nervous about the ability of the Administration to handle economic crises at home. On troops, they are worried about his ability to hold off Congressional demands for unilateral withdrawals from Europe.

A recent article in the Evening Standard attributed to sources close to Prime Minister

Heath attracted considerable attention. It said:

"What clearly worries Heath at present is Watergate."

"At all levels of Government, British ministers and officials are finding Washington paralyzed and this is dangerous in every sphere. President Nixon's authority is simply gone. And until stability is restored, the dollar will be weak."

Whether the accuracy of these comments are accepted or not, they do reflect the mood in London, where the press is pulling no punches on Mr. Nixon. The Spectator, an ideologically conservative weekly, said recently that "a collective irresponsibility amounting to a collective madness appears to have infected almost everyone high enough up in the Nixon Administration." It added that "only Nixon must be the source of the cancer."

West Germany

Relations with Washington have proceeded at an accelerated pace in recent weeks, underscoring that Watergate had not paralyzed American foreign-policy machinery. Foreign Minister Walter Scheel and Defense Minister Georg Leber have both been to Washington.

Over-all, opinions have remained about the same as in the spring. Those who always thought Mr. Nixon was a tricky scoundrel still think so. And those who think he should be respected because he is head of Germany's leading ally, still think so.

German media coverage has been high. Recently Der Spiegel's cover carried a picture of Mr. Nixon wearing earphones plugged to the stars of the American flag, and a headline reading, "Nixon Finished?"

The chief concern in Bonn is over the troop situation, with most Germans worried about possible Congressional action to force a unilateral cutback. But one official said that West Germany was confident Mr. Nixon could hold off Congress now that negotiations with the Russians on mutual cutbacks were scheduled to begin in October, a view shared by Washington.

France

Officials, businessmen and other public figures have begun to take Watergate seriously as a development of historical impact, undeniably important though still impossible to assess, and not—as they first believed—just the latest caper of the silly season that would soon be forgotten.

Although the Government avoids all comment, privately officials acknowledge that Watergate is being heavily analyzed, with a search for clues to where it will lead. But so far, the search has been frustrating, and French-American relations are continuing as if Watergate did not exist.

Mr. Nixon's image has been tarnished somewhat, but there is also some tendency among commentators to sympathize with him as a victim of the

NEW YORK TIMES
10 August 1973

Study Shows Nixon Supported Abroad Despite Watergate

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 9 — A worldwide survey by correspondents of The New York Times in the last week has indicated that although foreign leaders and public figures now seem to take the Watergate scandal more seriously than they did a few months ago, the affair has not so far cut deeply into their widespread support for Mr. Nixon's course in foreign policy.

Nor does their concern thus far match the apprehension voiced in Washington, Henry A. Kissinger and other Administration officials have openly expressed foreboding recently that if Watergate seriously weakens Mr. Nixon's standing at home over a long period, foreign confidence in the implementation of Mr. Nixon's foreign policy goals will inevitably be undermined.

A similar survey was conducted by The Times in May and the response then showed that overseas criticism of Mr. Nixon was light and that foreign relations did not appear to have suffered any significant damage. At that time, American officials seemed more confident than they do now that Watergate could be isolated from foreign affairs.

Since May, criticism of Mr. Nixon seems to have increased abroad — particularly of his refusal to turn over the White House tapes. The foreign press has been preponderantly critical of Mr. Nixon, except in a few isolated cases, such as the conservative newspaper, Le Figaro of Paris, which said of Mr. Nixon that "there will come a moment when the versatile American democracy will be

thankful to him" for holding

The Watergate revelations, combined with America's economic problems, have produced a considerable amount of lamenting abroad about the state of American society. But this has been balanced by widespread admiration for the way that the American press and Congress have exposed the scandals.

As might be expected, interpretations of Watergate have been filtered through the national experiences of the beholders.

In South Korea, and in other Asian countries, for instance, officials asked why a suitable face-saving compromise had not been struck. In Argentina, with her own political crisis, Watergate has received less attention than in Britain and Canada, where it has remained a major news story.

Some Major Conclusions

Among major conclusions drawn from the study are the following:

A chief focus of concern is that Congress will pre-empt the President's powers in foreign policy. This is particularly disconcerting in Western Europe where the allies fear Congress will order a unilateral cut in the American force in Europe. In South Vietnam, President Nguyen Van Thieu has expressed concern lest Congress cut back on foreign aid to his country.

Although Watergate is taken more seriously now than in May, Soviet and Chinese leaders still require that their media ignore Watergate as much as possible. Neither Peking nor Moscow wants to tarnish Mr. Nixon's image because they have both based their foreign policies on good relations with his Administration. The Russians have printed only a few, noncritical reports. The Chinese have not mentioned Watergate at all in their media.

There has been no sign that Watergate has crippled any ongoing negotiations or otherwise set back normal diplomatic business. Mr. Nixon, in fact, has seemed to go out of his way to meet foreign leaders in this period, ranging from Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist party leader, to the

electronic age or of modern idealistic expectations.

There has been some slackening in press interest recently because the French feel a certain sense of impropriety in politics being allowed to interfere with the August vacation season. Some Frenchmen say they have stopped following Watergate because they cannot keep up with all the players and all the details.

France remains unenthusiastic about Mr. Nixon's new European policy, but is going ahead with discussions about his planned visit. The real concern seems to involve the economic and trade problems facing the Atlantic alliance, and Watergate definitely adds to the uncertainty.

Soviet Union

Soviet officials and journalists who were slow to take Watergate seriously at first now realize it is a major scandal. They appear increasingly worried that any loss of stature or power by Mr. Nixon will be translated into a loss for Mr. Brezhnev's policy of improved relations with the United States because the Soviet party leader has tied that policy so closely to his relations with Mr. Nixon.

These comments are made only in private because the Soviet media have suppressed virtually all news about Watergate. As a result of Mr. Brezhnev's June visit to Washington, Soviet-American relations are going ahead independent of Watergate.

Russians, even some of the most sophisticated, do not understand the American system well, and are uneasy about the new assertiveness of Congress and the aggressiveness of the press. They prefer to deal with a neat, solidified, and more unified White House.

Canada

Opinion makers seem more and more revolted with the Watergate revelations, and it is hard to find any public defense of Mr. Nixon. A common Canadian attitude was expressed

the other day by a banker in Montreal who said, "We never understood why you people elected Nixon in the first place. He's not a Canadian type at all."

Ironically, the over-all image of the United States seems stronger because of the role of its press.

Canadians, however, have used the Watergate affair as an argument against changing to a republican form of government. Many say that Watergate is a good reason to steer an independent course in political and economic areas.

Japan

Japanese Government officials continue to give the impression that the Watergate scandal has affected their attitudes toward the United States only marginally, if at all. Newspapers have become more critical, but media coverage has slackened and public interest is passive in a country accustomed to political scandal.

Some commentators have expressed concern about the relative weakening of the President in relations with Congress.

Asahi Shimbun expressed the fear that "such a change will not only make the settlement of the Indochina problem more difficult, but also will bind the hands of the President concerning various internal policies."

A high official in the American Embassy said that he had found no perceptible changes among Japanese he dealt with. But he may never be asked about Watergate because of Oriental politeness.

South Vietnam

The overwhelming fact about Watergate in South Vietnam is the concern it has caused to the Government of President Thieu regarding the future of American aid.

There has been very little interest in the merits of the case, but there has been serious worry about how Watergate will affect Mr. Nixon's power and therefore his program of strong support for Saigon.

One concrete result of Watergate, as noted in a special secret report to President Thieu, is that the American Congress is clearly becoming more important, and that more attention must be paid to it by the Saigon Government. American-South Vietnamese relations have always been a White House monopoly, and the Vietnamese have tended to regard Congress as inconsequential. But this will now change, and a high-level team may come to Washington to appeal to Congress.

South Korea

Korean officials, intellectuals and editors have expressed increasing concern about the possible adverse effects of Watergate on American commitments to Seoul.

They feel that the affair should have been ended long ago in a constructive way, for the good of all concerned, including such American allies as Korea. Although officials have refrained from commenting publicly, they privately say that they are disheartened by the American system of democracy and by the increasing power of Congress.

"We are rather sympathetic to Mr. Nixon," said one official privately. "We sympathize with him because he has been betrayed by some of his former trusted aides," which is something unthinkable in the Oriental sense of ethics.

The fear of Congress stems from Korean concern that further restraints may be placed on aid to Korea. "If worse comes to worst," one editor said, "in case of war here Mr. Nixon may be prevented from helping us under the United States-Korean mutual defense treaty."

Australia

Although Watergate has had no discernible effect on relations with the United States—note Mr. Whitlam's recent visit to Washington—President Nixon has come under increased press criticism, particularly for his refusal to turn over the White House tapes. As in other

countries with British-style political systems, in Australia people tend to express wonder that Mr. Nixon is able to remain in office. Under similar circumstances in Australia, a prime minister would probably have had to resign.

Despite Mr. Whitlam's early criticism of Mr. Nixon's Vietnam policy, he has not mentioned Watergate, and has persuaded some left-wing Cabinet members to avoid the topic as part of Australia's effort to mend fences with Washington.

India

India's relations with the United States have improved in recent months, and talks have begun between Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan and Indian officials to resolve outstanding problems. As the result, there is a tendency in leading circles in New Delhi to avoid discussion of the Watergate question.

In fact, Indian officials and others seem to have lost interest in the affair. There has been scant editorial comment and Mr. Nixon's decision not to turn over the White House tapes has won general support.

There is some concern in India, however, about whether the Watergate affair might involve Mr. Nixon so deeply in internal matters that he would be unable to pay attention to India's economic problems.

Israel

Israeli attitudes toward Watergate are primarily pragmatic. The interest seems to center on the political ramifications rather than on moral issues.

Premier Golda Meir was quoted the other day as having told an American visitor that she was "really worried" about the impact of Watergate on Mr. Nixon and his capacity to govern. But most commentators still believe he will last out this term in office.

There is general admiration for the ability of the American press to ferret out the Watergate story. One Israeli editor said that no Israeli paper could do a similar job.

NEWSWEEK

13 August 1973

The tone of the hearings shifted abruptly at midweek as Haldeman was followed to the witness chair by four past and present top officials of the FBI and CIA, all of whom reported coming under unusual White House pressure in connection with Watergate or the earlier break-in at Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office. Marine Corps Commandant Robert E. Cushman, formerly deputy director of the CIA, testified that on the basis of a call from John Ehrlichman (who had denied it) he authorized the agency to supply assorted undercover gear to White House plumber Howard Hunt on a no-questions-asked basis back in 1971.

'A Sense of Shame'

Former CIA director Helms and deputy director Walters told substantially the same story about a June 23 meeting at the White House during which, they said, Haldeman and Ehrlichman tried to maneuver the CIA into blocking the FBI

investigation, despite the flat assertion by Helms that the agency was not involved or threatened by any investigation. Helms himself repeated the point last week, briefly cracking his Establishment cool in the process. "It doesn't seem to get across very well for some reason," he barked, "but the agency had nothing to do with the Watergate break-in."

Committee vice chairman Howard Baker wouldn't let it go at that. He noted that all but two of the Watergate conspirators had worked for the CIA at one time or another—one, Eugenio Martinez, was still on a \$100-a-month retainer (NEWSWEEK, Jan. 29)—and that they were still using the CIA identification papers and equipment given earlier to Hunt at the request of the White House. Didn't that rouse any suspicions? It was the FBI's job to dig out the full story, Helms replied, and the CIA had turned over all its files on the men to the bureau.

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, August 13, 1973

PEOPLE OF THE WEEK

A "SUPERSLEUTH" TAKES OVER AT THE TROUBLED CIA

THE Central Intelligence Agency again has one of its own in command—and insiders say its recent "air of uncertainty, gloom and sagging morale" is already disappearing.

William E. Colby, new Director of the CIA, is a highly respected career man who has spent most of his life as a spy. Fellow operatives call him a "professional's professional."

Even before Mr. Colby's confirmation by the Senate on August 1, CIA aides were talking about a "new sense of pride" in the agency after a round of troubles blamed on the Watergate affair.

The road ahead. Yet officials and other observers were quick to note that Mr. Colby faces difficult problems as he assumes primary responsibility for the nation's intelligence activities. Points they made:

- CIA morale was hurt by Watergate. Two former agents were convicted in the break-in of Democratic Party headquarters. A third defendant was on a \$100 monthly retainer at the time of the bugging, and two others had previous ties to the CIA. There was a feeling that the agency has been tarnished, at least by implication.

- The CIA is now expected to come under greater congressional and public scrutiny because of disclosure of the agency's decision to prepare—on orders of White House aides—a psychological profile on Daniel Ellsberg. The 1971 action was a violation of CIA directives prohibiting activities against Americans.

- Domestic CIA operations, already severely limited by law, are being tightened even further by the agency to avoid getting it involved in U. S. politics in any way in the future.

- Mr. Colby also faces an internal morale problem brought on by a 10 per cent cutback in personnel under former Director James R. Schlesinger, who was recently named Secretary of Defense.

The fact that President Nixon chose a man who has spent some 30 years in intelligence work—more than two thirds of that time with the CIA—was expected to minimize some of the problems.

Critics in Congress. Despite Mr. Colby's qualifications, the appointment was not without controversy.

In recent congressional hearings on his appointment, Mr. Colby came under fire for his role in the "Phoenix" program for control of political opposition in South Vietnam. Begun as a CIA operation, the

program—which Mr. Colby helped to supervise—was aimed at breaking down the Viet Cong "infrastructure."

Excesses under the setup—such as torture and unnecessary killings—were charged by Congressmen and other opponents of the appointment.

Opposition on the Senate floor was led by Democratic Senators Edward Kennedy, of Massachusetts, and Harold Hughes, of Iowa. Mr. Kennedy said that more than 20,500 Viet Cong suspects were killed in the "Phoenix" program.

In answer to charges, Mr. Colby has said that "Phoenix" was an "essential part of the war effort" and that it was not an assassination program. However, he told Senators at a committee hearing, "I would not want to say here that none has ever actually been executed."

Despite questions that were raised in the Senate, the Colby nomination was approved by a vote of 83 to 13.

Mr. Colby, now 53, has spent most of his career in the field as a clandestine operative. Partly because of this, some individuals within the agency felt that he might allow his Deputy Director to administer the CIA on a day-to-day basis—while Mr. Colby concentrates on overseeing the entire intelligence community.

In 1971, the CIA chief was given this broader role by President Nixon, and was put in charge of the budgets of other intelligence organizations. It was expected that Mr. Colby might take a much more active role in this capacity than did his two immediate predecessors, Mr. Schlesinger and Richard Helms.

Mr. Colby—who once said that he has worked very hard at being "colorless"—has often been pictured as the perfect agent: One who is unassuming, cool, quiet and unobtrusive.

Yet, his career and life have been full of color.

In earlier days— The son of an Army officer, he was born in Minnesota, but spent his childhood in various places, including Tientsin, China. He was graduated from Princeton in 1941 and joined the Army. When the Office of Strategic

Services called for some French-speaking volunteers, he signed up and was parachuted into enemy-held France in 1944. Later he entered Norway the same way.

After the war, he obtained a law degree from Columbia University and worked in a New York law firm. He joined the CIA in 1950.

From 1951 to 1953, he was stationed in Sweden, then went to Italy, and finally became involved with operations in Vietnam in 1959. He was brought to Washington as chief of the Far East division of the CIA in 1962, but he re-



Mr. Colby faces problems at CIA because of Watergate, but appointment was regarded as boosting agency morale.

turned to Vietnam in 1968 and took charge of the "pacification" program, of which the "Phoenix" operation was a part.

Last March, Mr. Colby was named Deputy Director for Operations—often referred to as the "department of dirty tricks." That department has been involved over the years in such activities as dropping agents into Red China, invading Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, flying U-2 spy planes over Russia, and helping to depose a Premier in Iran.

Mr. Colby's nomination as CIA Director came in May when some top Government officials were shifted in the wake of the Watergate developments.

Said a CIA official:

"Colby impresses the people who work with him by his energy and his drive. He is capable of real flexibility which will make us, as an organization, as flexible as we need to be in these changing times. One thing you can certainly expect from him is efficiency." [END]

WASHINGTON POST
4 AUG 1973

Orders to Restrict FBI Probe Detailed

By Peter A. Jay
Washington Post Staff Writer

The deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, testified yesterday he was ordered by presidential assistant H. R. (Bob) Haldeman to cite unspecified intelligence activities as a reason why the Watergate investigation should not be extended into Mexico.

Walters, appearing before the Senate select Watergate committee, said Haldeman told him on June 23, 1972, that the investigation of the Watergate arrests six days earlier could endanger covert CIA operations in Mexico and that Walters was to go immediately to L. Patrick Gray III, then the acting director of the FBI, and tell him so.

Walters testified before Gray at yesterday's hearing. His account of Haldeman's directive and subsequent pressure from then White House counsel John W. Dean III for CIA assistance in blunting the FBI's Watergate probe was similar in detail to Thursday's testimony by Richard M. Helms, director of the CIA and Walters' boss at the time of the Watergate investigation. Helms left the CIA and became ambassador to Iran.

Gray, in his opening statement, included a list of incidents about which his recollection differed from Walters'. But most of the differences appeared to be relatively minor, as were the few points at which Walters' testimony varied from that of Helms.

Walters, referring to memorandums he prepared at the time and has used in testimony earlier this year before another congressional committee in closed session, gave a detailed account of a series of three meetings he had with Dean on June 26, 27 and 28, 1972.

Dean, he said, asked him if the CIA could provide bail money for the five men arrested during the June 17 break-in at the Watergate offices of the Democratic National Committee, or pay their salaries while they were in jail.

That conversation, he said, gave him "for the first time ... a clear indication that something improper was being explored." He said he told Dean he would have no part in any proposal that "would implicate the

agency in something in which it is not implicated."

Walters said he had considered the original directive from Haldeman, given at a meeting also attended by Helms and presidential assistant John D. Ehrlichman, to be unusual. But he said he did not believe at that point that he was being asked to do anything improper.

"I presumed Mr. Haldeman had information that I did not have," Walters said, noting that at the time of that meeting he had only been with the CIA six weeks.

"Mr. Haldeman was a very well-informed man, close to the top of the American structure of government," he said, and it was possible Haldeman knew of "something in this investigation (that) would uncover assets of the CIA" in Mexico.

He said he thought it peculiar, however, that it was he and not Helms whom Haldeman asked to visit Gray. "I thought perhaps he thinks I am military, and a lot of people have the mistaken belief that military obey blindly," Walters said he thought at the time.

Walters, a graying, heavy-set man of 56, said that during his meetings with Dean he believes he might have inadvertently planted the idea that the Watergate burglary could perhaps be dismissed as a "caper ... (with) a strong Cuban flavor."

He said he advised Dean to remember that "scandals had a short life in Washington and other newer spicier ones soon replaced them. I urged him not to become unduly agitated by this one."

When Dean asked him if he had any ideas, Walters said, he replied that "everyone knew the Cubans (four of the five men arrested at the Watergate were Cuban-Americans from Miami) were conspiratorial and anxious to know what the policies of both parties would be toward Castro. They therefore had a plausible motive for attempting this amateurish job which any skilled technician would deplore."

At this point, Walters recalled, Dean said something to the effect that "this was the best tack to take but it might cost half a million dollars."

From this remark, Walters said, he realized that Dean "obviously thought I was suggesting that he could buy the Cubans." But because he was "so relieved at seeing him apparently abandoning the idea of involving the agency" in the Watergate affair, Walters said, he did not correct him.

Throughout the period beginning with the June 23 meeting with Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Helms and continuing through the three meetings with Dean and several others with Gray, Walters said, he learned of no CIA activity that could be jeopardized by a thorough investigation of the Watergate affair.

He did say he told Gray, however, when he first went to see him on Haldeman's instructions, that "it would be best to taper off" the investigation in Mexico.

On June 23, the day of the meeting in Haldeman's office at the White House and the subsequent meeting between Gray and Walters, the Mexican implications of the Watergate case first began to appear publicly.

At a bail hearing for the five defendants that day, Assistant U.S. Attorney Earl Silbert alluded to checks drawn on a Mexican bank, totaling \$89,000, that had been deposited in the Miami bank account of Bernard Barker—one of the burglars.

The money was later found to be Republican campaign funds cycled through Mexico and Barker's account in a "laundering" process to conceal its source.

Helms testified Thursday that as he and Walters were leaving the meeting with Haldeman, he told his deputy to make certain when he met with Gray that he simply advise the FBI director of existing agreements for cooperation between the FBI and CIA. Walters was to make sure, Helms said he told him, not to involve the CIA in any way with the Watergate affair.

Walters said yesterday that he does not recall that brief conversation with Helms as "being quite as limiting as Mr. Helms mentioned. At no time did he tell me I was not to deliver the message I had been given."

Gray, in his account of the meeting with Walters that followed, said Walters did not tell him he was coming from the White House. "I understood him to be stating a CIA position, not a White House message," he said.

Earlier yesterday, Walters had responded to questioning on this point by saying "I believe to the best of my

recollection that I told him (Gray) I had come from the White House, that I had talked to some senior people there."

This contradiction was but one of many between Walters and Gray in their testimony yesterday.

A major difference between the two concerned Gray's attitude toward the FBI investigation of the Watergate, already well under way by the time of the June 23 meeting.

In his memorandum about the first meeting, Walters wrote that Gray's "problem was how to low-key this matter (the investigation) now that it was launched."

Gray said that while "I may have said words to this effect to let him know that we would handle the CIA aspects of this matter with kid gloves," he never suggested that "the FBI investigation would be other than aggressive and thorough."

Gray also sought to rebut in his opening statement to the committee various other assertions made by Walters in his various memorandums. (Several of the memos, given to congressional committees in closed-door testimony earlier this year, were subsequently published in newspapers.)

Gray denied, for example, telling Walters—as the general's memos report—that he had told Haldeman and Ehrlichman that he would prefer to resign rather than order the investigation halted, but that he was afraid his resignation would be detrimental to the President's interests.

He said he had made such a statement, but not to Haldeman and Ehrlichman and not to Walters. He said he made it at an FBI staff meeting on June 28, and gave the committee an account of that meeting written by one of the participants, assistant FBI director Charles W. Bates. In the memo, Bates said:

"I pointed out that under no circumstances should we back off of any investigation at the request of CIA without forcing them to reveal completely their interest in this matter ... the FBI's reputation was at stake as well as Mr. Gray's position ... Mr. Gray made it plain he would not hold back the FBI in this investigation at anyone's request, including the President of the U.S., and if he were ordered to do so he would resign."

Both Walters and Gray appeared to agree that the FBI—or Gray personally—declined to halt its investigation into the Mexican aspects of the Watergate affair without a written re-

quest from the CIA. But the two witnesses described the discussion of such a request in very different terms.

Gray, like Bates, said only a written request from the CIA could halt the investigation which they wanted to keep moving. Walters described Gray as saying reluctantly in a July telephone conversation that "unless he received a written letter from Mr. Helms or from me to the effect that the further pursuit of this investigation in Mexico would uncover CIA assets or activities, he would have to go ahead with the investigation."

On July 6, Walters said, he went to see Gray to discuss the matter further and told him about his three conversations with Dean.

"Mr. Gray seemed quite disturbed by this," he said, "and we both agreed that we could not allow our two agencies to be used in a way that would be detrimental to their integrity."

Reading from his memo, Walters said he told Gray that "I had a long association with the President, and

was as desirous as anyone of protecting him. I did not believe that a letter from the agency asking the FBI to lay off this investigation on the spurious grounds that it would uncover covert operations would serve the President."

"Such a letter in the current (1972) atmosphere of Washington would become known and could be frankly electorally mortal."

Walters' reference to his association with President Nixon, he explained to the committee, was to an acquaintance that goes back to 1957. That year, Walters traveled with Mr. Nixon as an interpreter and translator during the then-Vice President's tour of South America.

He was with Mr. Nixon when the car in which they rode was attacked by a mob

in Caracas, he recalled, and still feels "admiration and respect for the courage and calmness Mr. Nixon showed at that time."

For the rest of his vice presidential term, Walters recalled, Mr. Nixon gave an annual party on the date of

the Caracas incident.

He has traveled to Europe twice with the President, he said, but has not met with him personally since May, 1972, the day he was sworn in as deputy director of the CIA.

Before that, Walters spent more than four years as the defense attaché at the American Embassy in Paris. He speaks eight languages, he told the committee in response to a question, and has also served as an interpreter for Presidents Truman, Eisenhower and Johnson.

Near the end of his testimony yesterday, Walters asked by Sen. Herman E. Talmadge (D-Ga.) why, since he knew the President both personally and professionally, he did not seek to meet with him and tell him about the Watergate cover-up.

"You saw what was happening on his staff to get two of the most important agencies in the United States involved in obstruction of justice," Talmadge asked. "Why did you not . . . go over and tell him frankly what was happening?"

Walters said that, in re-

porting to Helms and to Gray, he had done all he thought was required, of him—as he did not believe he had been actually asked to do anything improper.

"If I had been pushed, if I had been told to do something improper, I would have," he said. "I made that quite plain to Dean. He was exploring with me."

In his testimony before the committee, Walters was thoroughly neutral in his descriptions of his meetings with Dean.

But Helms, on Thursday, suggested that Walters was at least slightly annoyed at being called up by Dean three days in a row and summoned to the younger man's White House office.

And Gray, in his opening statement yesterday, described Walters at their meeting on July 6 as leaning back in his chair, putting his hands behind his head and saying "that he had come into an inheritance and was not concerned about his pension, and was not going to let these kids' kick him around any more."

might be exposed. Both Helms and Walters claimed that Haldeman had introduced the subject as a potential political embarrassment, not a security matter. Walters said he was not asked to determine facts, but was told by Haldeman to tell Gray to hold back the FBI's investigation in Mexico.

WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE. This is among the earliest and clearest instances of a White House effort to impede the investigation. The past CIA service of several of the arrested wiretappers made it seem logical at first that the CIA could provide a convenient cover for the Watergate operation, but Helms' instant denials to Haldeman of any CIA involvement promptly squelched any such notion.

WHAT DID NIXON KNOW? Nixon said on May 22 that he had no intention of impeding any Watergate investigation, but was concerned about an FBI probe interfering with matters of national security. If his intent really was only to protect national security secrets, he failed to convey that to Haldeman or, through Ehrlichman, to Dean. As these aides relayed the President's instructions to Gray, Helms and Walters, the White House interest impressed those officials as highly political. The fact that Nixon asked no questions when Gray warned him about his aides' activities suggests that Nixon might well have known what those aides were trying to do.

Diem in 1963. In July 1971, E. Howard Hunt, then on the White House staff, talked to Conein about the fall of Diem and about Daniel Ellsberg (the Pentagon papers had just broken in the news). Later, Hunt concocted false cables that implicated the Kennedy Administration in the Diem affair, and early in 1972 Conein was hired as a consultant by a Federal drug-enforcement agency. Watergate prosecutor Archibald Cox is now investigating Conein's exact role.

TIME
20 AUG 1973

Watergate I: The Evidence To Date

Misuse of the CIA and FBI

UNDISPUTED FACTS. Shortly after the Watergate arrests, Nixon ordered Haldeman and Ehrlichman to meet with top officials of the CIA. They did so. Later that same day, newly installed Deputy CIA Director Vernon Walters told Gray that FBI attempts to trace money used by the wiretappers through Mexico might interfere with a covert CIA operation there. This slowed the FBI probe. Later Dean asked Walters whether the CIA might provide bail money and support the wiretappers if they were imprisoned. Both Walters and CIA Director Richard Helms decided that the White House was trying "to use" the agency. Walters, after checking further on what the agency was actually doing in Mexico, told Gray that there was no CIA operation in Mexico that could be compromised by the FBI. Gray concluded that there had been an attempt to interfere with the FBI investigation, and he warned the President on July 6, 1972, that "people on your staff are trying to mortally wound you." Nixon asked no questions, but told Gray to continue his investigation.

IN DISPUTE. Haldeman contended that he merely asked the CIA officials to find out whether the CIA had been involved in Watergate and whether they had some operation in Mexico that

NEWSWEEK
13 August 1973

THE PERISCOPE

NEW ON THE WATERGATE STAGE

A new figure is moving onto the Watergate stage: Lt. Col. Lucien Conein, a former CIA agent and the American closest to the Saigon generals who overthrew South Vietnam's President Ngo Dinh

WASHINGTON POST
21 August 1973

Court Curbs Secrecy on Information

By Cathie Wolhowe

Washington Post Staff Writer

The U.S. Court of Appeals handed down a key decision yesterday making it much tougher for government agencies to keep secrets under the Freedom of Information Act.

The decision sets detailed rules the government must follow if it wants to withhold information. It could provide a clue as to how the courts will rule in executive privilege cases—such as the Watergate investigation.

The court set these guidelines:

- Federal agencies must give the court a detailed analysis of reasons for any refusal to disclose information.

- Agencies are to establish an indexing system which divides documents into manageable parts that are cross-referenced.

- Trial courts can designate special examiners, called masters, to examine documents and evaluate an agency's contention of exemption so the court can handle "the enormous document-generating capacity of government agencies."

In handing down the decision, Circuit Court Judges Spotswood W. Robinson III and Malcolm R. Wilkey and District Judge Frank Kaufman said they hoped the ruling would "sharply stimulate what must be, in the last analysis, the simplest and most effective solution for agencies voluntarily to disclose as much information as possible and to create internal procedures that will assure that disclosable information can be easily separated from that which is exempt.

"A sincere policy of maximum disclosure would truncate many of the disputes that are considered by this court. And if the remaining burden is mostly thrust on the Government, administrative ingenuity will be devoted to lightening the load," the judges said.

The case was brought by Ralph Nader's Freedom of Information Clearinghouse on behalf of Robert Vaughn, an American University law professor seeking to obtain access to Civil Service Commission reports evaluating the efficiency of federal agencies.

Commission officials claimed the material was exempt because it related to internal rules and practices of an agency, consisted of inter-agency memoranda and was composed of personal and medical files whose disclosures would constitute invasion of personal privacy.

NEW YORK TIMES
7 August 1973

'Toughing It Out'

By William V. Shannon

WASHINGTON, Aug. 6—President Nixon has been "toughing it out" for more than four months since, according to his own statement, he was told the facts about Watergate on March 21. H. R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman, his two principal aides, have now told their version of events to the Senate Watergate Committee.

Where does the case for Mr. Nixon now stand?

The most striking feature of the situation is that Mr. Nixon's public statements and the Ehrlichman-Haldeman testimony are contradicted by the testimony of most of the other witnesses. The weight of the evidence is that regardless of what Mr. Nixon may have known prior to the Watergate break-in, he was aware of the subsequent cover-up and, in a broad sense, directed it.

He knew, for example, that his senior aides were engaged in an effort to contain the Watergate case and prevent the exposure of higher-ups in the White House and in his campaign organization. Even more important than protecting those individuals, perhaps, was Mr. Nixon's desire that Gordon Liddy and Howard Hunt, two of the Watergate defendants, not reveal the burglaries and other illegal acts which he, the President, had authorized when they were working as "the White House plumbers."

In his May 22 statement, Mr. Nixon said, "Within a few days [of the break-in] I was advised that there was a possibility of C.I.A. involvement in some way."

He has never been willing to explain who advised him. He presumably means that Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman pointed out to him that since several of the Watergate burglars had past C.I.A. connections, it might be possible to pass off the Watergate burglary as some super-secret C.I.A. operation.

Fearing that C.I.A. Director Richard Helms would not cooperate, the President directed his aides to use Gen. Vernon Walters, formerly the President's interpreter and only six weeks in his job as No. 2 man at C.I.A., as their agent to head off the F.B.I.

Fortunately, General Walters could not be used in that way. He did convey the White House warning to Acting F.B.I. Director L. Patrick Gray. But when the White House followed up with pressure on the C.I.A. to put up bail for the burglars and pay them salaries, General Walters backed away. He and Mr. Gray agreed they would resign their respective jobs rather than subvert the investigation on the

phony basis that C.I.A. activity in Mexico might be exposed.

Mr. Gray communicated their concerns in his now-famous telephone conversation with the President on July 6, 1972. He borrowed General Walters' phrase that Mr. Nixon's own senior aides might "mortally wound" the President if they persisted in trying to prostitute the C.I.A. and the F.B.I. to cover up a domestic political scandal. Mr. Nixon did not ask the innocent Mr. Gray who those White House aides were since he knew very well who they were and that they were acting on his instructions.

In view of the resistance put up by Mr. Gray and General Walters, the President and his aides abandoned the C.I.A. ploy in mid-July. But any notion that an innocent President was misused by his own subordinates is untenable. As Senator Talmadge's questioning of Mr. Gray brought out, the President had received a warning on July 6 that any "prudent and reasonable" person would regard as sufficient, presuming that person had been in the dark up to that time.

Mr. Ehrlichman has testified that he was aware in the summer of 1972 that Mr. Kalmbach, the President's private attorney, was raising money for the defendants. It is inconceivable that he withheld this information from the President.

On April 30, in his televised address to the nation on Watergate, Mr. Nixon stated that "on March 21, I personally assumed the responsibility for coordinating intensive new inquiries into the matter and I personally ordered those conducting the investigations to get all the facts and to report them directly to me right here in this office."

But, as Senator Weicker demonstrated in his questioning, the President never called Mr. Gray to press for a wider or more vigorous investigation during the weeks between March 21 and April 27 when he resigned as Acting Director of the F.B.I.

The Haldeman-Ehrlichman testimony tried repeatedly to portray John W. Dean as the archvillain of the whole affair, misleading all his superiors. But in the tight hierarchical arrangements of the Nixon White House, a middle-rank figure such as Mr. Dean could not have conducted an extensive cover-up on his own authority. Word of it would soon have reached his bosses.

The burden of the Dean testimony remains unrefuted. If the tapes of White House conversations do not clearly sustain the President, then it is difficult to see what Mr. Nixon could say in yet another public statement that would lift the lengthening shadows from his Administration.

The trial court dismissed the case without argument, in effect a victory for the government, and Vaughn appealed. Now the case will be sent back to the trial court for a decision based on the new guidelines.

The court said the government's refusal to disclose "seriously distorts the traditional adversary nature" of

our legal system because "the person with the greatest interest in obtaining disclosure is at a loss to argue with desirable legal precision for the revelation of the concealed information."

The purpose of the Freedom of Information Act, the court said, was to permit citizens to see most government records. It said that the present ap-

proach of government is "in clear contravention of the statutory mandate."

Vaughn's attorney, Ronald Plaster, director of Nader's Freedom of Information Clearinghouse, called the decision "one of the most important ones of the decade because now citizens can more easily fathom the secrets of their government."

WASHINGTON POST
7 AUG 1973

State Dept. Fears Demands for Data

By Murrey Marder

Washington Post Staff Writer

The State Department, long eclipsed in the making of foreign policy, now claims it is threatened by near-obliteration if it succumbs to present demands to supply secret data to Congress.

State officials contend they are confronted by a double challenge of operational suffocation from a Congress aroused to new rebelliousness.

The department fears it will be throttled by the purse strings of Congress unless it agrees to cough up unlimited quantities of national security information demanded by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Yet if State is legislatively committed to produce such information, its top officials maintain, it will become a pariah inside the Federal bureaucracy, cut off from national security secrets by every other agency having intelligence data.

The State Department "would be emasculated" by demands for information disclosure attached to pending legislation for \$682 million in State's annual operating funds, protested Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) insists that all Congress seeks is an end to "excessive secrecy."

"This is like trying to get more milk from a cow by giving her less food," countered Rush in an interview.

If State is forced to disclose its information to Con-

gress in sweeping degree, Rush said, that will create "a psychological barrier which amounts to the State Department being cut off from its information sources—Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Council, National Security Agency, and others."

Rep. Wayne L. Hays (D-Ohio), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on State Department Organization, scoffed at the alarm being sounded by Rush and other department officials.

"They're emasculated already," Hays said of the State Department.

"They don't have any power in this administration," said the blunt-spoken Hays. "The facts of the matter," he said, "are that the decisions are made over at the White House, by (Henry A.) Kissinger."

Hays, the ranking conference manager for the House in the Senate-House conference on the State Department Appropriations Authorization Act, described the requirement for disclosure this way:

"We've taken out all of the potential danger, and 90 per cent of the chance of the people in Congress even looking at the stuff."

For years the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has sought to obtain more information from the executive branch on the conduct of the Indochina war, on military base agreements around the world, and on foreign policy in general. Without support from the House, the Senate committee was regularly outmaneuvered by the administration, which obtained backing from the more compliant House for the legislation it required.

On July 10, however, the Senate-House conference committee wrote into the State appropriations bill two kinds of demands.

One requirement bars funds for any U.S. military installation abroad where there are American forces, unless the agreement for the installation is approved

by Congress or the Senate gives its "advice and consent."

The second, broader demand would require the State Department, the Agency for International Development, the United States Information Agency, and several others, to furnish to the Senate or House committees on foreign relations "any document, paper, communication, audit, review, finding, recommendation, report" or other material requested by a majority vote of the committee.

Only communications to or from the President would be exempted. A failure to supply the data within 35 days would cut off the funds for the agency involved.

Rep. Hays said he was instrumental in getting this language softened from stronger demands in the original Senate bill, only to find that the administration engaged in "stall tactics," compounded by talk of a veto by President Nixon, to try to block the final version.

To circumvent such a move and retain the requirement on access to information, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee added duplicate language to the pending administration request for \$1.2 billion for foreign economic aid.

As a result, the information demand is now in two bills. Hays said that if President Nixon vetoes the State appropriations authorization bill, "as far as I'm concerned, that's it—they can get along on a continuing resolution." The present funding resolution for State expires Sept. 30, and the administration is eagerly trying now to shift votes to eliminate the demands.

Deputy Secretary Rush said the congressional demand concerning military installations "is an attempt to limit the President's constitutional right to make agreements as commander-in-chief."

But this is precisely why some members of Congress insist on the requirement. The Watergate scandal, plus the recent disclosure that

for 14 months U.S. B-52s secretly bombed Cambodia in 1969-'70, have greatly intensified congressional outcries over the withholding of information on grounds of national security.

Rush said the demand for unrestricted information would end up reducing, not increasing, "the ability of the State Department to give information to Senate and House committees, because we wouldn't have the information to give."

"The implications are not fully understood," Rush protested. He said such a provision would "greatly harm the ability of State to receive information from overseas—from governments, from embassies, from official talks, from unofficial talks, from cocktail parties or dinners—these are information-gathering functions."

What is worse, said Rush, it could expose "raw security files" that could be used "to crucify people with rumor and gossip—files that should be maintained with utmost secrecy." Congressional sources claim that this is an unwarranted "McCarthy scare."

Rush maintained that the State Department's record in supplying information is "good," and "I really hate to see the State Department bill get into a veto situation—which of course means a confrontation with Congress."

Countered Rep. Hays, "I've tried to be their (State's) friend, but I don't push around very easy. If they want to play rough, their seed will fall on very stony ground with me."

Said Rush ruefully, avoiding specific mention of the Watergate affair and the tense atmosphere surrounding it: "These are manifestations of a broader problem."

WASHINGTON POST
28 July 1973

Robert G. Kaiser

The Impact Of U.S. Radio Abroad

MOSCOW—It is now customary to hold an annual debate in Washington about Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, two products of the cold war, both financed for years by the CIA, which broadcast news and commentary to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The debate is stirring, if somewhat repetitive. The stations' defenders invoke the "right to know" and other good causes; their opponents call the stations outdated, unnecessary and expensive.

From here, neither side's arguments sound very persuasive. The proponents sound too enthusiastic, and the opponents too categorical. The debate seems mired in slogans that don't really apply to the facts of life in this part of the world.

Those who defend Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe trade widely on the notion that these are the only stations broadcasting "the truth" to citizens of the Communist countries. In fact, they are only two of perhaps a dozen stations and probably not the most popular two.

One Russian who depends on foreign radio for his news of the world suggested the other day that for Moscow intellectuals, the British Broadcasting Corporation's Russian service is by far the most popular. He ranked the West German radio second, the Voice of America third, and Radio Liberty fourth.

The situation is similar in East Europe. No doubt, RFE (which broadcasts only to the satellites, leaving the U.S.S.R. to Radio Liberty) has a big audience in the region. But intellectuals seem to like the BBC better. In Hungary, Austrian stations have enormous audiences. In Poland, German stations attract thousands of listeners. The VOA is popular everywhere.

The latest elaborate defense of RFE and Radio Liberty comes from a commission appointed by President Nixon under the chairmanship of Milton S. Eisenhower. Its report is a good example of the tendency to exaggerate the specific importance of RFE and Radio Liberty.

The committee chose "the right to know" as the title for its report and proceeded to credit Liberty and RFE with virtually every embarrassing fact to penetrate the Iron Curtain in recent years. In a section called "Samples of Effectiveness," the Eisenhower committee lists 14 instances in which, it says, these two stations provided news or information that Communist media were trying to hide or delay.

One of the examples was a personal testimonial from an emigre. The 13 others were all straightforward news stories which were broadcast behind

the Iron Curtain by numerous Western stations, from the BBC to Israeli radio.

RFE and Radio Liberty stations do not provide an invaluable broadcast service. They do provide news and opinion that differs vastly from the official line, and sometimes differs from the BBC, too. To the extent that the United States wants to subsidize multiple sources of information for the citizens of Communist countries, the stations are useful.

Liberty and Free Europe devote an unusual amount of attention to the domestic affairs of the country to which they broadcast. Other stations cover domestic stories in the Communist countries, but RFE and Liberty invest a great part of their resources in this effort. They maintain large research staffs which read the Communist newspapers, monitor radio broadcasts and exploit clandestine sources for information that might otherwise pass unnoted.

This research contributes to their broadcasts and helps scholars and journalists who are trying to follow Communist affairs.

But the difficulty—in this era of detente—is that both stations are regarded as implacably hostile in the Soviet Union and its empire. Painful as it may be to acknowledge, this reputation was well earned. For years, Radio Free Europe did act as an organ for anti-government and anti-Communist forces that hoped to overthrow the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. RFE did help incite Hungarians to revolt in 1956, with consequences too well known.

Radio Liberty has also broadcast provocative programs, often prepared by Russian emigres, which the regime here interpreted as direct challenges to its authority. Many Soviet intellectuals, including some active in the dissident movement in recent years, accept the official definition of Radio Liberty as an "enemy" organization. Some prominent dissidents are upset when their petitions or articles are read on Liberty broadcasts. They fear reprisals.

For many years, these stations pretended to be financed by public donations, when in fact the CIA was providing most of the money. Not surprisingly, Communist regimes tend to regard the CIA as an implacable enemy.

Now, the Eisenhower commission and its allies promise; the stations are taking new precautions, imposing strict standards, avoiding all provoca-

tions. Perhaps so, although the Eisenhower report acknowledged "occasional aberrations from policy guidelines" in the past.

Even if a new leaf is turned, however, the two stations are tainted by their names, and to some extent by their emigre personnel—both holdovers from the period when they earned their bad reputations. It may be time for a change.

This doesn't mean the United States has to give up its information programs to the Communist countries. Despite their noble protests, the Communists are as actively engaged in propaganda as ever, and the intention of their propaganda often is to distort or hide what Americans regard as the truth. Foreign radio broadcasts have been a positive influence throughout the Communist world, and millions of people depend on them for objective facts about international affairs and their own countries.

But the benefits of shortwave broadcasts to the Communist countries can be preserved without maintaining Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe in their traditional form. Indeed, a fundamental reorganization of the stations, giving them new names, new personnel and new outlooks, could increase their audiences. Their old reputations obviously detract from their appeal now.

The RFE and Liberty research offices in Munich could be preserved. The material they produce could be shared with all the Western stations broadcasting to Communist countries. To save money, reorganized stations could operate on a more modest scale than RFE and Liberty do now. Radio Liberty broadcasts 24 hours a day, more than any domestic Soviet station.

Changes along these lines could be an effective demonstration to the Soviet Union of just what the United States understands detente to mean. America can admit past excesses and demonstrate a desire to restructure relations in a new spirit, without abandoning traditional attitudes toward censorship and falsification in the Communist countries.

The Russians know that they distort information, or hide it altogether in their own news media and propaganda abroad. It isn't in America's interest to acquiesce quietly to this policy of misinformation. But surely there are new ways to demonstrate America's unwillingness to acquiesce—new ways that are more compatible with the new atmosphere in international relations.

GENERAL

WASHINGTON POST

14 July 1973

Many U.S. Allies Worried by Recent Summit

By Marilyn Berger

Washington Post Staff Writer

A high State Department official, challenged by a West German legislator to explain just what the United States had gotten out of the two summits with the Russians, had this to say at a conference held in Washington recently.

"I can cite a number of particular areas . . . some specific benefits . . . (Before the summit) we couldn't agree on the amount of rent—how many rubles—we should pay for trade offices and apartment space. We reached agreement on this at the summit."

Although he was being quite serious, this official drew a laugh from an audience of Canadians, West Europeans and Japanese. But the laughter was uneasy. For to some of the audience, this, just about, summed up what "good" they thought the summit had accomplished. The damage they believed it had wrought became a prime subject for the conference.

The State Department official went on to talk about the improved atmosphere and the relationship between the two leaders, which, he said, should "promote" understanding. Over and above everything, he said, the summit was "part of the process of bringing the Soviets into more normal relations with the rest of the world."

This balm did little to soothe the nervousness exhibited by the government, officials, legislators and academicians representing some of America's closest allies. The just-completed summit provided a backdrop for discussions that were supposed to be devoted to "the interactions of trade, monetary, energy and security issues in North American-European-Japanese relations." Concern over the impact of the superpowers dealing over the heads of the allies, with little or no consultation, was an undercurrent of the conference, arranged by the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies.

The new summit agreements, complained Roberto Ducet, a high official in the Italian foreign ministry, create superpower condominium. But, he said, "I see no opportunity for the United States to operate in Eastern Europe while there is a lot of opportunity for the Soviets to operate in Western Europe."

Manfred Wörner, a Christian Democrat in the West German parliament, was among the most outspoken. The shadow defense minister, for example, was concerned over the new terminology to describe forthcoming negotiations on reduction of forces in Europe. The word "balanced", which the West had always insisted upon, had disappeared. "I'm not quite sure," he said, "that the omission does not mean a substantial change in U.S. policy."

On strategic arms limitations, he complained, the allies were not consulted, but informed two to three hours before the agreement was announced. "If I am to state it simply," he summed up, "I cannot see any advantages in what you got out of the talks with (Leonid) Brezhnev outside of atmosphere. You accepted parity on the strategic level and you have decided to help the Soviets in the field of technology and economy. What have you gotten in exchange?"

When the answer from the U.S. official who declined to be identified did not satisfy Etienne Davignon, director-general of the political section in the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, tried to give some measure of the impact of the summit in Europe.

"What is the agreement to prevent nuclear war?" Davignon asked. "Is it a code of nuclear conduct for the world? If it's not an agreement to manage the world, is it an agreement to manage world peace?" These issues, he said, were all related to "very delicate questions of European integration" which he said were at a critical point. "We know Soviet Russia is not very favorable to European cooperation in defense. We fear the Soviets will use this (agreement) to explain to Western Europe that there is no need for defense."

At such a delicate time, Davignon argued, "consultation is necessary. It is not useful to go out and explain that the agreement is not very important and won't affect NATO. If it's not so important why cannot one tell us beforehand?"

Former Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, a late arrival at the conference and a consistent critic of summits, said that the spectacle of the Brezhnev-Nixon meeting makes it difficult for Americans and Europeans to hate the Russians. "It makes it

hard to remember the realities of the power struggle which is still continuing." He said: "Brezhnev's public words are indistinguishable from any American politician's. It creates confusion and a tendency to think that the struggle of the past is ended."

Ball, who supported the administration in its 1971 successful effort to thwart congressional moves to cut American troop strength in Europe, expressed concern that "the somber events of the past few weeks" will undercut the administration's position this year. If the United States cuts its strength, West Germany would follow suit, he said, "and you can reach a point where the preponderance of strength is on the Soviet side." This, he said, would have great political impact on Europe.

"There will be no war in Europe," said Professor Walter Laqueur. "There will most probably not even be a threat of war . . . Yet Soviet overwhelming strength will make itself felt in many ways."

The theme, repeated over and over at this conference, was that the summit and its related agreements can interfere with European political integration precisely at a time when the whole purpose of the Western alliance has come under question. Klaus Goldschlag, a senior official in the Canadian foreign ministry explained the problem of dealing with detente today.

"We are now living with a generation that was not present at the creation (of the Western alliance) that asks to be convinced that arrangements we made 25 years ago maintain their validity," said Goldschlag. "There is no question that detente . . . leads to questioning the use of resources for defense. Public opinion questions the purchase of power that is largely unusable. Priorities are different. Now quality of life is considered a higher goal and it is asked whether there might not be as high a return on security through expenditures on development as through expenditures on defense."

Unless we convince some of those who were not present at the creation . . . that there are, in fact, common interests, it will be hard to justify not

only defense expenditures but the alliance itself."

A Japanese university professor, Michimasa Irie, put it succinctly: "The public mood in Japan has changed. There are no adversaries."

The problems, said Pierre Hassner of the French National Foundation for Political Science, is in moving "from cold war to hot peace." He told his European colleagues that "we shouldn't kid ourselves that we will have the same level of (U.S.) troops in Europe . . . We have to think about how to go to the Europeanization of NATO."

Francois Duchene, director of the London-based Institute for Strategic Studies, saw a "very dangerous trend" in a force cutback by the West. He called for a "spectacular reassertion of relations between the Western countries" and for a multilateral fund to remove balance of payments issues from the stationing of American troops in Europe.

But even without the troop question, trade issues loomed large as an adversary problem between the allies.

While the American Congress is trying to develop trade legislation, many of the European participants made it clear that U.S. negotiators would be in for some tough bargaining. Pierre Uri of the Atlantic Institute said that the European Economic Community's common agricultural policy—a major target for American negotiators—would have to change because it hurts the Europeans themselves. But the Europeans in the seats of power saw things differently. Dr. Hans Herbert Weber of the West German Ministry of Finance replied to Uri: "The EEC ministerial council thinks rather along other lines . . . they do not think of ways of changing variable levies or prices in the system."

A similar attitude was displayed by Rep. Joe D. Wagoner (D-La.) who said the United States was providing a "free ride" for countries like France on defense matters

which exacerbated an already angry mood in Congress that is based on a perception of not having gotten a fair shake in the Kennedy Round trade negotiations of the '60s.

Another aspect of the prob-

WASHINGTON STAR
15 July 1973

Beware of Basing Detente Upon Sweeping Morality

By Sen. J. William Fulbright

There is no more promising field for the cultivation of trust than trade and investment, which in fact were Mr. Brezhnev's primary interests during his recent visit. In his speech to the American people the general secretary stressed that the "long-term and large-scale deals" now in negotiation "are bound to yield real and tangible benefits to both sides," including political benefits.

The political implications of Soviet-American trade are as important as the economic, although not so important as to warrant the buying of pigs-in-pokes. There is no reason at all to consider trade with the Soviet Union as some kind of philanthropy, or to plunge into improvident transactions such as last year's sale of wheat at bargain-basement prices.

Legitimate questions are being raised about the wisdom of extending huge, long-term credits at low interest rates for the development of Siberian resources of uncertain quantity and quality. Quite properly, American businessmen are requesting rights of survey, information on hitherto secret Soviet economic data, and adequate managerial facilities in Moscow.

The Soviet Government quite evidently has made a policy decision to bolster the country's lagging technology and lagging consumer economy through large-scale economic dealings with Western countries, especially the United States. They are seeking to draw American industrialists into arrangements extending over 20 or 30 years. Before entering into such enormous, long-term transactions, American industrialists and bankers and appropriate government agencies should give close and careful scrutiny to the costs of Soviet gas and oil, to sound credit arrangements, investment guarantees and reliability of supply.

WITHOUT LOSING SIGHT of the political benefits of trade—benefits which Mr. Brezhnev rightly commends to us—we must bear in mind that the political benefits of trade are mutual and that neither side can legitimately demand a political price for its economic cooperation. Suggestions by the Russians that a trade agreement would improve the prospects for SALT II (talks on the limitation of strategic arms) are properly responded to with the reminder that the Russians have as much at stake in the SALT talks as we do and can expect no commercial inducements for an arms agreement.

Indeed, we are entitled to remind the Russians that the immediate and tangible gains of expanded trade—credits and technology—will be primarily theirs, whereas

the economic benefits to the United States, though potentially great, are less certain and will not be available for years to come. Under these circumstances the two countries would be wise to shape their commercial transactions according to commercial criteria—treating them as politically significant in context to be sure, but economically autonomous in their specifications.

IF INDEED POLITICAL conditions are attached to economic transactions, there can be neither trade nor detente. Soviet and American societies remain in many respects inimical to each other. We dislike the lack of personal liberty in the Soviet Union, the censorship of speech and writing, the suppression of dissident groups and the confinement of political prisoners in labor camps. The Russian people in turn are said to be dismayed by aspects of American life—such as unemployment, crime, drugs, political assassination, and the high costs of medical care and college education.

To the extent that the two peoples are interested in alleviating the injustices that each perceives in the other's society, the proper means are not commerce but cultural relations and educational exchange, and even these are unlikely to turn the Soviet Union into a bastion of human liberty or the United States into a socialist paradise.

It is for these reasons that when Sen. Jackson advocates a "detente based on freedom and individual liberty," he is in effect calling for no detente at all, but rather a renewal of the cold war. In a recent speech the senator from Washington averred that, "Without bringing about an increasing measure of individual liberty in the Communist world there can be no genuine detente, there can be no real movement toward a more peaceful world."

In practice Mr. Jackson has channeled his idealistic efforts toward the redress of only one of the many injustices of the Soviet system—the restrictions which in the past have been put upon the emigration of Soviet Jews. If we are to have a "detente based on freedom and individual liberty," should we not also insist upon redress of all the injustices of the Soviet system, not only to the Russian people but to the satellite states of eastern Europe? Should we not insist, as a condition of detente, that the Czechs and Poles and Hungarians be allowed to choose their own form of government, Communist or not, free of the overbearing power of the Soviet Union?

IN LOGIC and in justice, I suppose we should, but in practice I subscribe to the aphorism that "the best is the enemy of the good."

With a view to coercing the Soviet Gov-

tem was brought up by Weber. "Was it really wise," he asked, "for the U.S. to talk about export quotas while the EEC was thinking about a (negotiating) mandate? In Europe there are already comments to the effect that the Americans don't need to export so much to Europe. They have export controls themselves."

A main goal of the U.S. negotiators was to open European markets to American agricultural products. The export controls appear to have confused the issue. Rene Foch of the EEC delegation to the

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development predicted that control of exports would bring an argument within the European community. "Are we going to rely for purchases on a market which depends on the state of agriculture in Russia," he asked, alluding to U.S. grain sales to the Soviet Union.

The answer, to problems of defense and to problems of trade, was more consultation, in the view of the members of this conference. The high American official, who got the message over and over, provided little assurance. "On the question of consultation," he said, "all I can say is we do our best. We do what we can, what we think is appropriate."

ernment into removing present and all future restrictions on Jewish emigration. Sen. Jackson has offered an amendment to the trade bill pending in Congress which would deny most-favored-nation trade treatment as well as credits to "nonmarket economy" countries—which is to say Communist—which deny or heavily tax emigration by their citizens. Most-favored-nation treatment, as you know, is not a special privilege but simply a promise not to discriminate against any one country's trade as against another's; withholding most-favored-nation treatment is therefore a sanction, serving to injure or discriminate against a country's trade. I emphasize this well-known fact so as to make it clear that the issue is not one of privileged treatment for the Soviet Union, which I do not favor, but one of discrimination against the Soviet Union, which I also do not favor.

I DO NOT FAVOR this discrimination because the purpose it is meant to serve exceeds the interests and responsibilities of the United States. In a world beset with dangers and injustices, it is essential to discriminate between the greater and the lesser and to concentrate your efforts on those areas which are both important and tractable. Learning to live together in peace is the most important issue for the Soviet Union and the United States, too important to be compromised by meddling—even idealistic meddling—in each other's affairs.

It is simply not within the legitimate range of our foreign policy to instruct the Russians in how to treat their own people, any more than it is Mr. Brezhnev's business to lecture us on our race relations or on such matters as the Indian protest at Wounded Knee. We would, quite properly, resent it, and so do they.

Consider how the American people would have responded if Mr. Brezhnev had cancelled his recent visit because of the Watergate, or taken the occasion to lecture us on political corruption. We would, of course, tell Mr. Brezhnev to get stuffed, regardless of our own dismay over the Watergate.

AS TO THE JACKSON amendment, Mr. Brezhnev pointed out that the Soviet Union had in fact relaxed its emigration controls. Although the extent of that relaxation is disputed, it is acknowledged even by supporters of the Jackson amendment that the Soviet Government has in fact suspended its emigration tax, and has in fact permitted the emigration of a great many Soviet Jews.

Mr. Brezhnev, as James Reston commented, "has tolerated American interference with his internal laws more than any American President would have tolerated similar interference from the Soviet Union." In his interview with the American reporters in Moscow, the Soviet leader also pointed out that his country had never raised with the United States any question regarding its emigration policies.

There is no limit to the mischief to be wrought by a policy of basing detente upon sweeping standards of morality. The Jackson amendment would deny nondiscriminatory trade treatment to any "nonmarket economy country" which denies its citizens, or heavily taxes, their right of emigration.

Why just "nonmarket" countries? Should a country be exempted from punishment for confining its citizens, simply

because it has a capitalist economy? Is the right of emigration sacred only as applied to socialist countries?

The answer of course is that many countries impose emigration taxes, and in order to enforce the right of emigration upon all countries, we would have to renegotiate many or most of our foreign trade agreements, or if necessary cut off trade with an indeterminate number of countries, at incalculable cost to our balance-of-payments.

IN SUPPORT of his amendment Sen. Jackson invokes Article 13 of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." Note that the article refers not only to the right to leave but also to the right to return.

The latter right is invoked by the displaced Palestinians, who are denied repatriation to their own former homes within the territory of Israel. Is the right of Palestinians to return to homes from which they were expelled any less fundamental than the right of Soviet Jews to make new homes in a new land?

As long as we are to use trade sanctions to enforce one part of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, why not enforce another part of it, or all of it for that matter? Why not deny most-favored-nation trade treatment to any country, market or nonmarket, which denies its citizens the right to emigrate, or the right to repatriate, or any of the other rights we hold dear—speech, religion, press, the works? Why not universalize the Jackson amendment and make it a vehicle to redress a wide range of the world's injustices?

Even if Senator Jackson were willing to broaden his amendment in these ways, I am bound to confess that I still would not support it. Although I believe that the world can be made better, and that man is capable of aiding its betterment, I am equally a believer in selectivity of means. Important as it is to know what we hope to achieve, it is equally important to know what we are incapable of achieving; which is to say that humane aspiration must be tempered by realism.

THIS DOES NOT MEAN that we cannot sometimes pressure another country—even a big country like the Soviet Union—into changing its domestic policies. If the Russians want our trade badly enough, they will bend to the Jackson amendment; they largely have already.

But let us not pretend that this is a victory for human rights; at most it is a victory for the rights of a small fraction of the millions of persecuted people upon the earth, and they are by no means the worst persecuted.

It is a victory, moreover, purchased at the cost of intruding in the internal affairs of a proud and powerful nation, a nation which can no more be expected to endure our intrusions that we would endure theirs, a nation—and this is the central point—whose cooperation is absolutely essential if we are to protect the most fundamental of all human rights—the right of innocent people to stay alive in the age of nuclear weapons.

J. William Fulbright, D-Ark., is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. These excerpts are from a speech he gave here Wednesday before the American Bankers Association.

NEW YORK TIMES
15 July 1973

A NEW WAR GAME IN OLD WAR ROOM

U.S. Strategists Cope With
Effects of World Shifts

By DREW MIDDLETON

The emergence of new power centers in China, Japan and Western Europe—along with improving relations between Washington and Moscow—has resulted in intensified re-examination of the role of the United States armed forces.

The military are now questioning the once sacrosanct American commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization because they believe that, in conditions of nuclear parity with the Soviet Union, limited wars elsewhere in the world are more likely than direct conflict with the Soviet in Europe and that resources must be retained at home for deployment in such local wars.

Such questioning typifies the rethinking on national strategy current in higher military schools, Pentagon offices and gatherings like the recent Current Strategy Forum at the Naval War College in Newport, R. I.

Long-established international commitments, accepted tactical doctrines, naval deployments, unit organization, weapons and, significantly, the traditional "can do" response to political instructions are being studied in the light of changed world and national situations.

Events Altered Concepts

Several developments have forced the military to re-examine their role.

The strategy of containing the Soviet Union, evolved in the late forties, was nullified militarily by the expansion of Soviet naval power and politically by the improvement in relations.

Increased dependence on raw materials from overseas, particularly oil, has fixed attention on the control of trade routes—hitherto of secondary importance.

Reductions in force levels since 1968 and anticipation of future budget reductions have led to the conviction—voiced by Secretary of the Navy John W. Warner—that "we must do more with less."

Speaking at the Newport forum, Mr. Warner said that "the wave of euphoria" arising from the United States visit of Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet party leader, should not divert the services from "building the military capacity and strength of this country."

Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., Chief of Naval Operations, emphasized the Soviet Union's "massive" naval build-up and the Soviet's new capability of supporting operations overseas.

There is little disagreement among American military leaders over national strategic objectives. These are summarized

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
16 July 1973

Bonn wary of ties between U.S., Soviets

By David R. Francis
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Bonn
West Germany needs reassurance
on what President Nixon and Soviet
party leader Leonid I. Brezhnev may
have agreed about Europe during Mr.
Brezhnev's recent visit to the United
States.

This explains the sudden visit to
Washington by West German Foreign
Minister Walter Scheel and the
planned visit July 18 by Defense
Minister Georg Leber.

President Nixon received Mr.
Scheel in the White House Thursday
shortly before the President was
taken to the hospital.

After their meeting, top aides at the
White House said that Mr. Nixon and
Mr. Scheel had discussed the "Atlantic
relationship."

One of the things that Mr. Scheel is
believed to have discreetly told the
President is that America's allies do
not like surprises on key security
issues.

Unexpected pact

Such a surprise was the agreement
signed June 22 by President Nixon
and Mr. Brezhnev, which is intended
to prevent nuclear war and avoid
military confrontation.

It is believed here that the United
States gave Bonn and its other NATO
allies only a few days advance notice
of the contents of the Soviet-American
treaty. (Neither the Bonn Foreign
Ministry nor the U.S. Embassy
will confirm or deny this.)

Whether so or not, many observers
here are talking about inadequate
American consultation.

This agreement has not caused
anything like the shock given Japan
by President Nixon's surprise an-
nouncement of a visit to Communist
China. But it did cause concern.

In addition to the apparent weak-
ness in consultation, West German

officials were at least at first worried
that the pact might weaken the U.S.
nuclear deterrent—a key element in
West European defense strategy.

The United States has attempted to
allay any such fears.

President Nixon met with the NATO
ambassadors in San Clemente not
long after Mr. Brezhnev's departure.
ture.

In Bonn, American Ambassador
Martin J. Hillenbrand called on Mr.
Scheel and Defense Minister Leber to
assure them the NATO relationship
was unchanged.

And in Helsinki, U.S. Secretary of
State William F. Roberts met with
West European foreign ministers dur-
ing the opening round of the European
security conference.

It is believed that any West German
concern has thereby been consid-
erably eased.

Nevertheless, an unsigned article
issued earlier this week by the press
service of the Social Democratic
Party, Chancellor Willy Brandt's
party, though hailing the Soviet-
American agreement as a pact for
peace, also spoke of a "residue of
concern" in Europe.

One newspaper, the Sueddeutsche
Zeitung, holds that the article was
"obviously inspired by competent
circles."

Defense Minister Leber is to talk in
Washington with the new American
Secretary of Defense, James R.
Schlesinger. Mr. Leber has praised
the pact but will be discussing details
with U.S. officials.

The American position is that the
pact to prevent nuclear war was speci-
fically states it does not affect or
impair such American obligations as
the NATO alliance.

Further, any Soviet attack on West-
ern Europe would immediately mean
war, invalidate the treaty, and open
the possibility of U.S. nuclear strikes.

Consultation required

The chief difference from before the
new pact is that the U.S. and the
Soviet Union now are obliged to
consult with each other when there
appears to be a risk of nuclear
conflict.

Further, the two big powers have
now promised in a bilateral pact to
refrain from the threat or use of force
against each other.

West Europeans, however, have
always been bothered by the thought
the U.S. and the Soviets might make a
deal behind their backs affecting their
future. For a while, at least, they
were wondering if the nuclear pact
was such an agreement.

as the prevention of nuclear
war, the containment of local
or limited wars, the security of
lines of communications to the
sources of oil and other raw
materials and the protection of
American citizens and property
abroad.

The consensus is that strate-
gic planners must recognize
that local conflicts will increase
in number. One report at the
Naval War College noted "the
advent of nuclear parity in
terms of second-strike capabil-
ity between the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. and ultimately China
can only serve to exacerbate
the possibility of local aggres-
sions and escalation."

Arguments begin over priori-
ties. A general in the Pentagon,
who did not wish to be identi-
fied, said: "We must rethink
the Army's role; what do we
prepare for, war in Europe or
limited commitments around
the world? If the latter, how
are we to organize and arm
our units?"

Local-War Planning Stressed

American officers from the
ranks of major to brigadier
general are virtually unani-
mous in urging more thought
and effort to prepare for local
wars. They argue that, with re-
duced resources, the United
States sooner or later will have
to cut its ground forces in Eu-
rope if it is to be capable of
dealing with local conflicts in
Latin America, Asia or the
Middle East.

In the event of American
force reductions in Europe,
most American officers believe
the NATO allies will expand
their defense forces. A minori-
ty feels this is a dangerous
assumption in the light of op-
position in NATO nations to
present defense expenditures.

The anticipated dependence
on oil from the Middle East,
specifically the Persian Gulf
states of Iran, Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia, is rearranging
priorities. Naval officers now
regard missions to secure free
access to resources as second
only to sea control as a na-
tional objective.

Charles J. DiBona, special
consultant to President Nixon
on energy matters, told the War
College that by the next decade
the United States would be im-
porting 12 million barrels of
oil a day, half of the country's
daily consumption.

WASHINGTON POST
22 July 1973

Stephen S. Rosenfeld

Mr. Fulbright's Detente

As much as any public figure, Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) deserves credit politically and intellectually for building a national constituency to support detente. That has perhaps been his greatest service as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, so when he offers a major new formulation of the issue, as he did recently in a speech called "Getting Along with the Russians," he is entitled to a careful hearing.

It is his basic argument, not new but carried now to a logical conclusion, that questions of ideology or, if you will, values or morality have no proper place in relations between the great powers. Such questions only warp the true national interest, which is to cooperate with the Russians to prevent nuclear war—still a keen threat justifying first priority, he believes.

Such questions, moreover, involve a risky and unwarranted intrusion into Soviet affairs: the Jackson amendment, which would condition American trade policies on Soviet emigration policies, is Fulbright's Exhibit A. The Soviets cannot be expected to endure our intrusion in the name of "human rights," he feels, and their cooperation remains "absolutely essential if we are to protect the most fundamental of all human rights—the right of innocent people to stay alive in the age of nuclear weapons."

To bolster his argument, Fulbright offers the judgment that while considerations of ideology (in the form of "idealistic meddling") still enter into American policy, they have departed Soviet policy. "The Soviet Union has ceased to be the harbinger of world revolution and become instead a conservative status quo (European) power," he says. "If the cold war is running out, the essential reason is the running down of the Russian Revolution, which has come into its 'Thermidor,' that stage at which a revolution has run out of steam, its fire-breathing radicals exhausted or displaced, and normalcy and routine are restored."

Now, as this last citation indicates, there is in the latest Fulbright speech much to confirm his kinder critics' view that over the years his thinking on world affairs has not kept pace with events. It will be news to the foreign Communist parties financed by Moscow, for instance, to read that the Soviet Union is a status quo power. I will try to stick here, nonetheless, to Fulbright's principal argument that efforts to relieve Soviet Jews risk bringing on nuclear war.

The telling response is, I think, that the nuclear truce is no longer the fragile thing it was a decade or more ago when Fulbright undertook his effort to strengthen it. A long sequence of events and agreements has moved the world back from the nuclear brink and given both great powers confidence that they can manage their affairs so as to avoid war. The senator's argument is in a real sense the victim of his and others' successes. The notion that Soviet irritation over the trade-emigration link could push us both back into the old nuclear insecurity simply does not support serious examination.

Fulbright is on much stronger ground in his protests against the sweep of the Jackson amendment, which in its current form would deny trade benefits to all socialist countries, not permitting entirely free emigration. He is also right to criticize the theoretical implication of the Jackson rhetoric that the United States should use trade leverage to undo injustices everywhere. "Why not universalize the Jackson amendment and make it a vehicle to redress a wide range of the world's injustices?" Fulbright acidly asks. The reason not to, of course, is that American Jewish concern for emigration and Soviet concern for trade make this perhaps a unique occasion for a deal.

The fair and necessary tactical question remains of how far the trade-emigration link can be pressed, for Fulbright is surely right in calling for "selectivity of means." If pressed too far, conceivably trade could falter and emigration too. Although the basic political factors inducing Soviet-American cooperation would still be at work, some harmful political fallout would have to be expected. This would be so, whether one agrees with Fulbright that "there is no more promising field for the cultivation of trust than trade and investment" or that trust is better built by performance on "human rights" or by mutual force withdrawals from Europe.

Fulbright's own opinion, which is widely shared (and which happens to undermine his complaint that a trade-emigration link exists), is this: "If the Russians want our trade badly enough, they will bend to the Jackson amendment," he believes "they largely have already." President Nixon, though still nervous about the link, was able nonetheless to report important progress on other fronts at the recent summit. Fortunately, detente is sturdier than Fulbright believes it to be.

NEW YORK TIMES
10 July 1973

Invitation to Trouble

The dangers which accompany Administration efforts to boost United States arms sales abroad are nowhere more obvious and grave than in the Middle East, where oil-rich states have become a prime target for American military merchants.

Secretary of State William P. Rogers recently argued that large arms deals and negotiations with Iran and other Persian Gulf states represent a "stabilizing influence for peace in this rich oil-producing area." At the same time, Mr. Rogers described growing supplies of Soviet arms to countries in the same area as an "invitation to trouble."

Even the Israelis, who are deeply disturbed by the prospective sale of F-4 Phantom jets to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, concede that the United States has a valid interest in strengthening its position in the Persian Gulf. A case can be made for arming apparently stable and friendly regimes in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran against the threat to those regimes and to vital Western oil interests posed by the radical, Soviet-backed governments of Iraq and South Yemen and by allied revolutionary movements in several smaller Gulf states.

The trouble is, as has been amply demonstrated by experience in neighboring South Asia, that once American weapons have been transferred to another country, there is no way of insuring that they will be used—or not used—in a manner compatible with American interests. Even if the present "moderate" regimes prevail in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, it is questionable whether they would refrain from using their new military power to assist their fellow Arabs in the event of a renewal of the Arab-Israeli fighting.

If a more radical, Qaddafi-type leadership should emerge in Saudi Arabia—an ever-present possibility—sophisticated American weapons could become the spearhead of a much more aggressive Saudi posture in the Arab-Israeli dispute. Although it is probably true that the "limited numbers" of Phantoms that may be sold to Saudi Arabia over the next few years would not seriously challenge Israel's overwhelming superiority, they could tip the balance in favor of an irrational confrontation that no one can contemplate with equanimity.

Even without the destabilizing effects of the Arab-Israeli dispute, there is more than enough conflict and potential conflict within and among the Arab states and between the Arabs and an expansionist Iran to raise the most serious questions about the wisdom of sending more arms into this volatile area. It is unrealistic to speak of sophisticated weapons as a "stabilizing influence" in a region that is inherently unstable.

By mutually feeding a new Middle East arms race, the Soviet Union and the United States are both inviting the kind of trouble that their leaders have just pledged to strive to avoid.

SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, London

July 1973

BLACK SEPTEMBER EXPOSED: Part 4 of a Sunday Telegraph

special inquiry

Terrorists' biggest blackmail

by CHRISTOPHER DOBSON

with researchers in Cairo, Beirut, Jerusalem, Rome, Munich, Paris, Geneva, Stockholm, London

MOHAMED BOUDIA switched on the ignition of his Renault 16 in Paris and was blown to pieces . . . Mahmoud Hamshari answered the telephone in his Paris flat and died a lingering death after it had exploded in his face . . . Bashir Abu Khair went to bed in his room at the Hotel Olympic in Nicosia and was killed by a bomb planted under the mattress . . . Wael Zuaiter walked into the lift at his home in Rome and was riddled by 12 dum-dum bullets from a .22 pistol . . . Mohammed Yusuf al-Najjar, Kamal Nasser and Kamal Adwan left a meeting in Beirut and returned to their apartments where they were liquidated by an Israeli raiding party.

With each killing the Israelis crossed another name off their "Death List." They are working through this list methodically, eliminating the Palestinian terrorist leadership one by one.

The ruthless squaring of accounts was decided upon by the Israelis after the Olympic massacre. When the 11 athletes were killed at Munich last September a rage straight from the Old Testament swept through Israel. But an eye for an eye was not sufficient. It was decided to wipe out Black September, and in a speech which meant death to a number of men the Israeli Prime Minister, Mrs. Golda Meir, told the crowded Knesset: "We have no choice but to strike at them."

She appointed General Aharon Yariv, Israel's formidable spy chief, as her special adviser on counter-terrorism. His department was given the code-name Mivtza Elohim—"God's Wrath"—and Yariv took upon himself some of God's prerogatives. He set about protecting his people, turning Israeli embassies into miniature fortresses, and attacking his enemies, striking at them wherever he could reach them. In less than a year his agents have killed or maimed

over half the leaders of the Palestinian terrorist movement.

Yariv retired two weeks ago to go into politics and his place was taken by Brigadier Israel Lior, a 52-year-old career soldier who is military aide to Mrs. Meir and has no background of espionage.

It is expected that he will act as a co-ordinator, passing information to the Prime Minister and obtaining her sanction for major operations. He will not have the major decision-making power of Yariv. But, despite the change, the killing will go on, for there are still many names on the Death List.

Abu Iyad, the boss of Black September, is at the top. He is followed by Wadi Haddad of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (P.F.L.P.): Haddad planned the Japanese massacre at Lod, and the Israelis have tried at least once to kill him, firing a barrage of rockets into his flat from a nearby apartment. He escaped unhurt but shaken, and is now the most closely guarded man among the terrorists.

Ali Hassan Salameh, Khalil al Wazir, code-named Abu Jihad, and Fakhri al-Umari are other Black September leaders who occupy prominent positions on the list.

Along with them are the names of the Fateh officials who run offices in countries all round the world and the "sleepers," the undercover men whose cover has been "blown" by documents captured by the Israelis, and by their intimate knowledge of what goes on inside Black September.

There is no doubt that the Palestinian resistance movement has been thoroughly penetrated by the Mossad, the Israeli secret service. The execution squads that raided Beirut in April, this year, knew exactly where to go and whom to kill.

The Israelis fail sometimes nevertheless. They had made a previous raid on

a refugee camp where they believed Black September's leadership was meeting, and afterwards described the raid as a great success. But, although they killed some guerrillas and destroyed installations, it was not the success it should have been, for the meeting had been called off at the last moment. However, the fact that they knew such a security-conscious organisation as Black September was to hold such a gathering demonstrates the quality of their information.

It is said that when the Israelis made this raid the local guerrilla leader was telephoned, addressed by name and told to take no notice if he heard the sound of helicopters, it would be the Lebanese Army exercising. The helicopters duly arrived—and disgorged Israeli soldiers.

Many Arabs are convinced that one of the top leaders of Fateh must be an Israeli agent. They argue this for two reasons: 1, The Israelis know so much of the internal workings and the operational planning of the resistance movement that the source of information has to be a traitor at the top. 2, So many of Black September's operations are harmful to the Palestinian cause that only an enemy of the Palestinians could think of them.

The Palestinians themselves are certain that the Israelis could not do it all alone. They blame first the Jordanians, who have some 300 agents spying on Fateh in the Lebanon and have thoroughly penetrated the movement, and second the Americans.

After the Beirut killings, Fateh's leader, Yasser Arafat, swore that the Americans were responsible for the success of the raid and threatened a revenge that would be "swift and terrible." He alleged that the Americans had supplied the Israelis with their weapons and that American Embassy cars had been used. He also accused Armin Meyer, former American Ambassador to the Lebanon, of arranging liaison between the American and



Israeli intelligence services

Bassam Abu Sherif, the editor of P.F.L.P.'s newspaper *Al Hadaq*, also accuses the Americans of involvement in the raid. Bassam, who was maimed by an Israeli letter-bomb, occupies an office in Beirut's Mazraa Street and, surrounded by portraits of Che Guevara, Lenin, Marx and Mao, talks readily about the efforts being made by the rest of the world to fight Arab terrorism.

He claims that the United States has set up an operations room in Beirut to co-ordinate this fight and has delegated its best intelligence agents to it. The Americans have done this, he claims, for three reasons: 1, protection of United States personnel; 2, protection of United States oil companies and installations; 3, liquidation of international terrorism — meaning the Palestinians.

Again, according to Bassam, a common body has been formed to pool information from Jordan, Israel and the United States. Jordan was given responsibility for security in several Gulf States, and Israel was given a free hand in Europe. Like Arafat he accuses Armin Meyer of being the mastermind behind these efforts to wipe out the terrorists.

Meyer, who speaks good Arabic and is one of America's most senior diplomats, was appointed to run the State Department's inter-departmental working group on terrorism which was set up as a result of the Munich massacre. His group has a supreme board consisting of Secretary of State Rogers, Dr. Kissinger, the Ambassador to the United Nations and the heads of the C.I.A. (William Colby) and the F.B.I. (Clarence Kelley).

The group itself has been allotted unlimited resources and unlimited funds. It maintains close relations with N.A.T.O. and the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO).

Meyer has visited Europe twice in the past year for talks with N.A.T.O.; and what is called "a circle of security experts" has been established in CENTO. A spokesman in Washington insists that the group exists only to co-ordinate information, consider tactics and set up diplomatic task forces in cases of emergency. It was one such that tried to save the diplomats killed at Khartoum. The spokesman agreed that the group had relations with several countries, but would not admit to having them with Israel.

However, there is no doubt that, working through the C.I.A. and other specialised agencies, the group plays a much more active part in fighting terrorism than the spokesman cares to admit. Since Khartoum even more C.I.A. agents than usual have been working in the Middle East. Their objective is to infiltrate the terrorist groups in order to provoke dissension among the leaders and to give early warning of proposed operations. The Arabs are convinced that they go even farther and take an active part in Israeli operations.

At a meeting of the Palestinian leaders after the Beirut raid plans were devised for striking back at the Israelis and their "United States agents." These plans included attacks on embassies and residences, the murder of American diplomats and the sabotage of American installations. (Thursday's abortive attack by an Arab guerrilla on the El Al office in Athens was no doubt one such retaliatory strike.) Arabs known to have co-operated with the Americans were marked down for assassination.

Other countries play a less active part than the Americans in the fight against Black September: most European States concentrate more on protection than a radical cure—few want Black Septemberists in their jails—and would rather deport than prosecute. However, an efficient information system has been built up, and news about the movements of suspected terrorists and the possibility of operations is pooled. Again, most countries would rather trail terrorists moving through their territory and tip off the country to which they are headed than make the arrest themselves.

The Israelis flood the European police forces with detailed reports, and General Yariv claimed earlier this month that they had foiled 37 out of 48 planned attacks on Israeli targets abroad over the past two years. So much information comes from the Israelis that one French official spread his arms wide and said: "The lists of names the Israelis give us are this long."

Scotland Yard plays a special part in the fight against the terrorists. It acts as the co-ordinating centre for the dissemination of all the technical information relating to letter-bombs and other weapons. This arrangement was made after the letter-bomb killing last September of Dr. Shechori, the Agricultural Counsellor at the Israeli Embassy in London.

The British authorities' particular concern about Black September lies in its links with the I.R.A. These links have been forged by Ali Hassan Salameh, one of Black September's chieftains, and Seamus Costello, Adjutant General of the I.R.A. Two other members of Black September visited Dublin in May of last year, and it was through these contacts that Arab arms started to be delivered to Ireland.

Some came through Belgium and Germany, and the capture in March this year of the Claudia with its cargo of weapons—a present from Gaddafi—had been preceded by several other shipments. The British authorities had tipped off the Irish Republic about these shipments, but the boarding of the Claudia off the Irish coast was the first result of such reports.

Apart from arms the terrorists have also provided training for I.R.A. members at their camps. The exact number is unknown, but it is thought that up to 50 I.R.A. men have been through courses at the Fateh camp at Deraa in Syria and at a camp outside Benghazi in Libya.

The I.R.A. link has, however, not proved as productive as the terrorists hoped. The great uprising of revolutionaries that was planned at the meeting called by the P.F.L.P. in May of last year at Baddawi refugee camp near Tripoli, Lebanon, has failed to materialise. Among the national revolutionary groups that attended, the Baader-Meinhof group in Germany has been virtually wiped out. The I.R.A. is in retreat, and the Turkish, Iranian and Japanese terrorist groups are all under attack.

Given the cumulative effects of the world-wide assault on the terrorists, the future seems bleak for every branch of the Palestinian resistance movement. The Israelis claim that they have brought the level of guerrilla activity inside Israel down to a level which could not be reduced further without wiping out the guerrillas. Only one

Israeli soldier has been killed in the last year.

The Lebanese have severely curtailed their freedom of movement and action inside the Lebanon. It is now almost impossible for them to mount operations over the border. The Israelis are killing off their leaders one by one. The United States, enraged by the Khartoum killings and spurred by the need to protect its oil interests, is actively engaged in destroying the power of the terrorists. The other Western Governments are co-operating to foil their operations. Many moderate Arabs are appalled by their wanton killings. And their alliance with foreign terrorist organisations is crumbling.

Where, then, can they go? What can they do?

Physically they are retreating into safety from the Israeli killer squads. The headquarters of Black September is now established in a single-storey building in a quiet street near the centre of Damascus, far away from the easy sea and helicopter assault routes into Lebanon. The leaders have moved out of their expensive flats in the select districts of Beirut and have gone back to the safety of the refugee camps. They have been given more guards; they have stopped using official Palestine Liberation Organisation vehicles. Their families have been evacuated to Syria or Egypt. And they are discussing where they will go when—and this is thought to be inevitable—they are finally expelled from Lebanon.

Libya is the immediate refuge. There they would be sure of Gaddafi's support and would be able to maintain the semblance of being an army and political entity. This is the solution that appeals to Yasser Arafat and his followers, who insist that they must still show the world that they are a national liberation movement in being.

But the more conspiratorial are advocating a retreat to the Yemen where, although their movements will be circumscribed, they will be secure. They plan to leave behind them terrorist cells which would go completely underground, small, self-contained action groups living in the Middle East and Europe and waiting to carry out terrorist missions.

The Yemen is already playing an important part in Arab terrorism. It gives financial and military aid, especially to the most radical organisations. It trains members of the P.F.L.P. and its Marxist offshoot, the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (P.D.F.L.P.). It served as the base for the sea-borne attack by American "Black Panthers" on the Israeli-bound tanker *Coral Sea*; and it provided a haven for the P.F.L.P. hijackers of a Luftansa airliner—taking for its services \$1 million of the \$5 million ransom.

The Communist political climate in the Yemen is also congenial to the more radical Arab organisations who not only object to Gaddafi's fanatical brand of Islam but also give him little chance of surviving in the long run. Moreover, the Yemen is an ideal base for striking at the oil-rich Gulf States and the "reactionary" monarchies of Arabia. George Habash, leader of P.F.L.P., argues that "the path of the revolution lies through the reactionary Arab States."

This whole area has the added advantage, from the terrorist point of view, that it is close to

25 July 1973

SMITH HEMPSTONE

Foreign Aid: The Politics of Resentment

Of all the billions of dollars of the American taxpayers' money which profligate administrations have sown around the world in the past quarter-century, none has reaped such a bitter harvest as the \$10 billion pumped into India since 1959.

It always was naive to suppose that those nations which the United States so generously aided would be grateful for that assistance. Dependency is seldom a happy relationship. And yet in an era in which ironies abound, it is somehow doubly ironic that past American generosity should poison present relations between Washington and New Delhi.

Just the other day, American Ambassador to India Daniel Patrick Moynihan met with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to announce the termination of the U.S. aid program and to find a way to dispose of a mountain of U.S.-owned rupees worth \$840 million which Washington cannot possibly spend and the existence of which affronts Indian sensibilities. The rupees are a debt incurred by India for the purchase of surplus food in famine years at cut-rate, long-term prices.

Americans rightly find it hard to turn away from people dying of hunger. Yet

it is arguable that the provision of food to avert famine did India no favor: It simply made it possible for millions of people the land could not support to survive and procreate children who, in their turn, are doomed to lives of hunger and want.

Indeed, the churlish Indian response to United States assistance calls into question the whole concept of foreign aid. And high time, too.

The great success of the Marshall Plan, under which Europe rose phoenix-like from the ashes of World War II, fostered the simplistic notion that, given enough money, technical assistance and goodwill, poverty could be banished from the earth and the most backward nations introduced to the glories of industrialism and consumerism.

The point the aideologists missed — or chose to ignore — was that, in the case of Western Europe, we were dealing with nations which had already undergone the historical experience of industrialization. They had the skills, the institutions and the desire to become again what they once had been. The foundations, the preconditions, were there; in Western Europe, the job was one of reconstruction, not construction, and the difference is immense. In

the Third World, we were trying to build bricks without straw, and to lay them on sand.

The point is that we know virtually nothing about the determinants of development. Theories abound, but there are no provable absolutes.

If you will look at a map of the world, you will see that, in general, the developed countries lie well north of the Tropic of Cancer (the U.S., Canada, Europe, the Soviet Union and Japan) or south of the Tropic of Capricorn (Chile, Argentina, Brazil, South Africa and Australia). In between these parallels lie the barefoot nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Some theorists postulate that Protestantism and industrialization are linked, that the Moslem-Catholic prohibition against usury made impossible the accumulation of capital necessary for development. Others suggest that there is a linkage between climate and development. Still others are of the opinion that diet is the determining factor, that meat-eaters ultimately prevail over grain-eaters, and grain-eaters over rice-eaters.

There is always the danger of confusing cause with effect, and the probability is that there is no single reason why one nation or group

of nations is developed and others are not. Religion, climate, diet, national attitudes and social organization probably all play a role.

The point is that only a people, a nation, can determine what it wants to be. Nobody else can effectively make that determination for it. Many underdeveloped nations want the fruits of industrialization: automobiles, sewing machines, transistor radios, Coca-Cola. But, for reasons which we do not fully understand, they are unable or unwilling to create and sustain the preconditions for their own industrialization.

The concern has been more with appearances than with realities. Let a nation attain independence and the first things its rulers want are a steel mill, a national airline and a mammoth sports stadium. Never mind that its real needs are a workable population-control policy, an effective agricultural extension program and a system of simple vocational schools. These are not ego-massaging prestige projects.

And when resources in the form of money and technicians are received from abroad, this obviates the need for their generation at home, to the detriment of local pride, initiative and the development of responsive and responsible institutions.

In short, nobody appreciates something for nothing and it's high time we got out of the foreign aid business, except on a highly selective basis.

the oil wells that supply America and Europe with much of their power. The idea of a power crisis with Arabs in control of the means to starve America of fuel has caught the Palestinian imagination — with some reason, for few of the Gulf States could operate today without Palestinian technicians and civil servants.

The terrorists' reasoning now takes this form: with a trimmed down organization devoted purely to terrorism and financed by Gaddafi, they do not need the protection money paid them by the oil States; a few raiding parties could wreak havoc in the oil fields. Supported by the Marxist

regime in Yemen they could inspire revolution in the Gulf States; the next step, with the oil fields under "Arab Socialist" control, would be the blackmailing of the United States; either America forced the Israelis into giving the Palestinians their land back or her oil would be cut off.

All this may well be the stuff of dreams, but it is the way in which the Palestinians, frustrated in their attempts to overthrow Israel by military means, are beginning to think, and there are indications that the Russians are taking the dream seriously.

The Kremlin, full of practical men, never really believed in

the idea of a national liberation movement, although it paid lip-service and supplied weapons. It was also inhibited by the need to reach a détente with the United States. But now that the movement is going underground and is beginning to behave in a correct revolutionary fashion instead of mounting suicidal patrols against the Israeli Army, the Soviets can see possibilities of political advantage accruing to them.

A number of Palestinian leaders have recently made secret visits to Moscow, and British and American diplomats believe that the Russians will use the radical Arabs to extend their influence in the oil States, building up revolutionary groups inside those States to operate in the classic tradition of Communist take-overs.

But this is long-term thinking. In the short run, the rapidity with which the Israelis are crossing names off their Death List must force Black September into taking spectacular action. Whenever one talks to the resistance leaders one hears the same phrase: "We must prove our existence."

And the only way they can do that is by mounting operations which are going to make world headlines. The war of

assassination between the Israelis and the Arabs will continue, but these killings have become so commonplace that they attract little attention these days. They must now do something so audacious, so ruthless, that all the world will take notice. This is the terror to come.

Where will they strike? The Americans would seem to be prime targets after Arafat's threats. But it could well be that those militants who advocate a shift of operations to the Persian Gulf will choose the next target. The Israelis have already passed information to the Shah of Persia that Black September plans to try to

kidnap or destroy with limpet mines one of the super-tankers operating through the Strait of Hormuz, the jugular vein of the West's oil supplies.

One thing is certain, Black September will lash out again in fury and frustration, not caring whom it kills, desperate only to keep the Palestinian cause stuck in the global gullet with the world able neither to swallow it nor to spit it out.

Will the killing ever end? Black September's leader, Abu Iyad, answered that question last month when he attacked Palestinians who spoke of making peace: "We will cut out their tongues."

THE END

Far East

LONDON OBSERVER

12 August 1973

When the bombing stops, the real war begins

NEXT Wednesday, 15 August, looks like being a decisive day in the history of the Indo-China war.

In accordance with the decision of Congress, the United States Air Force must then stop the bombing which has become the most important weapon in the armoury of President Lon Nol's enfeebled Government in Cambodia. It is fair to suppose that without the American bombs the Government in Phnom Penh might suffer either military defeat or a collapse of self-confidence that must lead to a negotiated defeat.

But will it be as simple as that? The war in Cambodia is only part of the continuing struggle in Vietnam. The peace agreement signed in Paris earlier this year has not destroyed the Vietnamese Communists' desire to achieve power, by one means or another, in South Vietnam, any more than it has removed President Thieu's determination to defeat the Communists.

Nor has it altered President Nixon's support for Saigon, a support that apparently embraces all but the most flagrant South Vietnamese violations of the Paris agreement. One is less certain these days about the feelings of Moscow and Peking over what North Vietnam is up to, but this matters less, since Russia and China have never had the weight in Hanoi that the Americans had, and still have, in Saigon.

The determination of the two Vietnamese sides has been proved to be as tough as the most marvellous metal. To this has been added, in Saigon's case, a formidable American ally in the shape of Mr Nixon's, and Dr Kissinger's conviction that the power and credibility of super-Power America depends on Thieu remaining in power.

Unfortunately for the Cambodians, both the North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese, and the Americans as well, believe that what happens in Cambodia will

MARK FRANKLAND describes the grim prospects for Indo-China at this 'decisive moment' in the war.

affect, and may even decide, the future of South Vietnam. Saigon's fear, volubly expressed these days by any important South Vietnamese one happens to meet, is that a pro-Communist Government in Phnom Penh will give North Vietnamese and Vietcong troops an easy supply route and perpetual sanctuary. And that from here the Communists will either launch their last blitzkrieg against the South or at least keep it in such a state of uncertainty that it will be unable to achieve the peaceful prosperity that might one day reduce the Vietcong threat to insignificance.

But Cambodia's interest is that the fighting there should stop as quickly as possible. The chief concern of both Prince Sihanouk's men and President Lon Nol's supporters is the survival of an independent Cambodia. What sort of Cambodia, in a mainly peasant country that has no shortage of land and little knowledge of personal riches, is a matter of much less importance. The longer the fighting goes on, the more closely Cambodia's future is tied to the still unresolved but certainly bitter fate of Vietnam, and the less chance there is that much will be left of an independent Cambodia.

The superlative achievement of Prince Sihanouk until his overthrow in 1970 was to understand this, and to construct a sort of life-jacket out of the conflicting demands made on him by the Vietnamese, the Americans, and the Communist super-Powers.

The irredeemable mistake of the men who overthrew Sihanouk was to have underestimated his diplomatic brilliance. They forgot that the chief job of any Cambodian Government, while the Vietnamese conflict exists, is to

simply to ensure the continued existence of Cambodia: an imperative that Englishmen might find hard to feel in the lucky security of their guts but which any Pole or Czechoslovak would understand at once.

The barbarity of these last days of the American bombing is not that so many civilians have been killed, for over the years tens of thousands of civilians have been killed in Indo-China, but that the bombs are being dropped to help Saigon and Washington, not Cambodia. With the possible exception of Lon Nol and a few others, the Phnom Penh establishment would follow a firm lead towards negotiation. There have been men in Lon Nol's Government who have already tried to move that way.

The position of the Cambodian Communist side is more complicated. There are among them supranational Communist loyalties as well as ties with the ever-exigent North Vietnamese. There is the problem of Sihanouk himself, for many people in Phnom Penh fear he will take revenge if he returns. But most foreigners who have worked in Cambodia seem to agree that the guerrilla leaders are Khmers first, friends of the Vietnamese Communists second. And certainly, if Sihanouk does have one more role to play in Cambodia, it will not be as anyone's puppet.

It is common sense that an effort should be made to negotiate a truce before the bombing halt tempts the Communists to attack Phnom Penh, an assault that would surely kill and maim many people without serving—even by the most cold-blooded estimate—any Cambodian interest. The two Vietnamese sides, obsessed with themselves, can no more be ex-


pected to see this than a shipwrecked man swimming in the sea can gaze beyond his own small horizon. The only country with the power to understand, and then to help the Cambodians, is America. The question is whether she also has the magnanimity to do so.

Any Cambodian settlement now would go against Washington's and Saigon's idea of their own interests, as described above. It is therefore quite possible that Washington will try to keep the war going for the time being until a somewhat better settlement is possible. One should not underestimate America's ability to do this. The Americans have used many imaginative ways to fight clandestine wars in Indo-China and there is no reason to suppose their inventiveness has run out. The Cambodian Air Force could be bolstered up by highly skilled South Vietnamese pilots, and possibly by South Vietnamese planes too. There is also the possibility of direct South Vietnamese intervention to protect Phnom Penh.

It is a grim but simple situation. America could help Cambodia get out of a war that threatens her survival as a country, but only by risking the comfort and maybe survival of President Thieu's South Vietnam, a country that matters infinitely more in Mr Nixon's strategy for a 'generation of peace.'

A Cambodian who had supported the overthrow of Sihanouk and at first enthusiastically worked with President Lon Nol—later to leave Phnom Penh disenchanted and in fear of his life—once remarked that if we were still in the days before the sovereignty of nations was established as an unquestioned good, Cambodia would be swallowed up by its more aggressive neighbours and that would be that. It might still happen, but if it did the guilt should live to trouble the American conscience for many years to come.

THE ECONOMIST AUGUST 11, 1973



The end of an ill-told tale

It ends in Indochina on Tuesday midnight, and it leaves behind one lesson that is even more disturbing than the rest

It has been a 12-year war, since Specialist 4th Class Davis became its first American combat casualty 10 miles outside Saigon in 1961, and for the people whose lives will most obviously be changed by its outcome the war is by no means over yet; but for the United States it is. From midnight on Tuesday it is hard to see a weapon that Mr Nixon can legally use in Indochina without Congress's permission, or how he can get Congress to give its permission, or how in the present condition of his Administration he dare defy Congress. He can supply money and military equipment (see page 40), but that is that. The process of American government has reached its decision, and the Americans have switched off the war as if it were a television set: the reality will go on in Indochina, but they no longer want any part of it.

There are three things to be said in the week of the switching off. The first is that, having decided that they no longer wish to try to save their friends by their own exertions, the Americans now have to hope that their former enemies will do it for them. The preservation of something not wholly unlike the political structure of Indochina that John Kennedy set out to preserve a dozen years ago can still be achieved; but it depends on the hope that China, and to some extent North Vietnam, have changed their own minds since then about what they want to see happen on their southern borders.

It is possible that Chairman Mao and Mr Chou En-lai are now sufficiently worried about the expansion of Russian influence in southern Asia to want to prevent a Russian-influenced North Vietnam from becoming the master of Indochina. If they are, they will try to persuade Prince Sihanouk not to let the Cambodia he seems to be in the process of recapturing become once again the North Vietnamese base it was before 1970. He owes the Chinese something for three years of hospitality in Peking, after all. A Sihanouk who tried to be genuinely neutral would limit the effect of the Cambodian collapse on what happens next door in South Vietnam; and South Vietnam remains the central issue of the war. It is also possible that North Vietnam has been badly enough damaged by the war, and by the quarrel between Russia and China, to have revised its own war aims. The North Vietnamese may conceivably mean what they said in the peace agreement they signed in January. They may tell the National Liberation Front that it will eventually have to settle for whatever its own strength inside South Vietnam entitles it to, and that it cannot count on North Vietnamese guns to do what it cannot do for itself.

Neither of these things—neither Chinese co-operation nor the sort of understanding between Mr Kissinger and Mr Le Duc Tho that would make the January agreement something more solid than a scrap of paper—is very probable in itself; and a combination of them is even harder to believe in. But that combination is what Mr Nixon needs if the United States is to achieve even the minimum of what 50,000 Americans have died for in Indochina under three presidents. It is a measure of America's weakness that it should be relying on its adversaries' second thoughts to save it from the result of its own.

The second thing worth saying is that the reason why those three presidents sent American soldiers to Vietnam still seems a valid one. Leave aside the superstructure of the American argument for being in Indochina, the business of dominoes and the balance of power and the credibility of an American guarantee. There is something in all of those things, but the foundation

they rested upon was a proposition about Vietnam itself. The underlying belief was that a non-communist South Vietnam would offer the people who lived in it the prospect of a better life than a communist one would; that North Vietnam was helping the people who wanted to make South Vietnam communist; and that it was right to resist that. Whatever else the war has done, it has not destroyed any part of that proposition.

What it was for

Since the Americans started to withdraw their troops in 1969, President Thieu's government has become more authoritarian than it was before: Mr Thieu has taken more power to himself, and he has made even narrower the limits within which those who disagree with him are obliged to operate. The same sort of thing has happened in South Korea, in Thailand, in the Philippines, even in Singapore. It is one obvious result of the retraction of American influence from the periphery of eastern Asia. But it is still true that South Vietnam is a more open society than North Vietnam is, or than a communist régime in the south would be likely to be. It does have a parliament that can defy the president on an important issue, as it did in the election of the senate's leader last October. It does have newspapers in which a fairly wide range of dissent can make itself heard. It does not make it impossible for people to find out unpleasant things: Amnesty International could discover something about political prisoners in South Vietnam, but it could not in North Vietnam. It does offer the possibility of political choice, including, if the communists would agree to it, an election in which one choice would be to vote communist.

South Vietnam also has something more important than all this. It has, as North Vietnam does not, a basic structure of power out of which something more like an American or European democracy could emerge in the remainder of this century. The obstacle to liberalisation in any communist country is the communist party's monopoly of control over every aspect of political and intellectual life. Mr Thieu does not command, and cannot expect to command, such a concentration of authority in South Vietnam. He has to deal with men who are to some extent independent of him in the army, in the provinces, even in South Vietnam's first beginnings of a modern economy. It is no help in fighting a war, but it could be a decisive advantage after the war: the competition generated by a pluralist society is better for both politics and economics than a centralised system is. Even now, if it could have peace, South Vietnam would be a rather better place than the north for most people to live in. It would permit rather more diversity; it would allow rather more people the means for an independent life; its economy would undoubtedly grow faster. The margin of difference is not huge, and it is not as big as John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson hoped it would be, but it is there. And given a generation or two of peace the probability is that the difference would widen rapidly. This is the answer to the argument that South Vietnam is not different enough from North Vietnam ever to have been worth fighting for.

The heart that broke

The third point is that no one yet knows whether this basic American objective is going to end in success or failure; but if it does end in failure it will be important to remember where the failure happened. This has been a

hard war, hard to fight, hard to have to watch, and above all hard to understand. It was hard to understand because it required the ability to distinguish between friends and enemies whose politics were different shades of grey, and also because it was a policy war fought for balance-of-power reasons as well as for Vietnam itself.

The ideas the United States carried into the war have suffered a number of unmistakable defeats. The idea that American conscripts could fight a guerrilla war among an alien people, and fight it with understanding, has taken a beating. So has the idea that a rural Asian society could be democratised in half a dozen years by a crash course of American advice; it can be done, and it has been done in Japan, but it takes longer than that, and it needs peace to do it in. The old American faith in firepower, or some of the faith, has been broken too. When a B-52 spilled its bomb load over Neak Leung on Monday and killed up to 200 people it was a symbol of what has been worst about this war: it was a firepower machine trying to do what should be done more discriminatingly by men, and causing far more destruction than men would cause when it went wrong. These are all failures, and they will be recorded by history, but they are failures in the methods used to fight the war. If the purpose for which the war was fought at all also ends in failure, with South Vietnam getting the wrong government without even being asked whether it wants it, the reason will lie elsewhere. It will have happened because American opinion, and in particular the liberal community that claims to lead American opinion, failed to understand the war, and indeed let itself be rattled out of trying to understand it.

WASHINGTON STAR
16 August 1973

RICHARD WILSON

Implications of Backing Off in Asia

The last B52 which unloaded its bombs on Communist insurgents in Cambodia may have unknowingly finished a historic mission. This may be the end of direct American intervention, at least for many, many years, in the power struggles of small states.

Certainly it will be the end of it in Asia; and in world terms a landmark in what the British journalist, Henry Brandon, has called the "Retreat of American Power."

In his recent book under that title, Brandon wrote, after analyzing the Nixon-Kissinger policies and their public impact: "The retreat of American power will continue to prove a traumatic experience for Americans, their friends and even their enemies. Only its pace and its limits remain in doubt. Both, I hope, will be moderate."

The Cambodian symbol of the retreat of American power, forced upon Presi-

dent Nixon by congressional action, could easily become the working precedent for disastrous withdrawal from world leadership. Nixon so regarded it. He warned of the "dangerous potentials" and "hazards" of "this abandonment of a friend" which would have a "profound impact" in other countries. His attempt to negotiate a settlement, he said, has been "undermined."

More than that, the Nixon-Kissinger policy in Indochina has been repudiated and Nixon has had to accept the repudiation because he knew that he had reached the end of the road on further public support of intervention in Indochina.

Little reassurance can be found in the prospect of congressional intervention in national security policy in the future, either in Indochina or the newly developing relationships with Russia and China. But Congress is heading in that direction

Of course, it had reason to be rattled. The United States had other things apart from Vietnam working on its nerves in the 1960s, including a race rebellion and an apparent war of the generations. It had to watch the Vietnam fighting on television, and it is harder to measure the purpose of a war against its cost when you can see men dying in front of your eyes. It has also to be said that America's allies in Europe did very little to help it, and a lot to discourage it, in its difficulties. Those things are all part of the explanation, but the fact remains that the vital part of American opinion broke in the spring of 1968 and never really recovered. It never seriously tried to come to grips with the idea that a war can be fought on behalf of the rather better against the rather worse, or that it can be fought for the sake of the next couple of generations as much as for the present one. It never got down to the calculations that lie behind a balance-of-power war. It wanted a simple war, and when it found that it had not got one it either gave up, or swung right over to the opposite simplicity of supposing the other side were the heroes.

The trouble is that there are no simple wars any longer. Even in Europe, if it came to a war there, the Americans would not be fighting for friends they unreservedly approved of against enemies they wholeheartedly rejected. The last third of the twentieth century is not painted in blacks and whites; but the confrontation between the differences of grey goes on, and countries still need allies they can count on. It is the apparent failure to understand this, the failure of maturity at the heart of American opinion, that is disturbing. That is what a lot of people in Europe may be thinking about on Wednesday.

and there is scarcely an area in the world where the President may now expect to exercise unhindered his constitutional power to conduct the foreign affairs of the United States.

This carries us back many years to that benighted prewar era when William E. Borah, an Idaho senator, considered himself, as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, superior to the president of the United States. We go back even a few more years to the senatorial repudiation of the policies of Woodrow Wilson led by a Massachusetts senator, Henry Cabot Lodge, and the inception of the isolation years.

Flaws are being found now in Nixon's detente with the Soviet Union, and it can surely not be long before a senatorial committee will point out the hazards of the new relationship with the Peoples Republic of China.

The Russian grain deal is denounced by Sen. Henry

Jackson of Washington in his capacity as chairman of the Senate Permanent Investigations Subcommittee as an "obsession," and "infatuation" with farm exports. Jackson was already highly suspicious, in his role as a national security expert, of the nuclear agreement with Russia.

In all these circumstances Nixon's warnings to the North Vietnamese and assurances to Thailand ring hollow. "I can only hope," he said, "that the North Vietnamese will not draw the erroneous conclusion from this congressional action that they are free to launch a military offensive in other areas of Indochina. North Vietnam would be making a very dangerous error if it mistook the cessation of bombing in Cambodia for an invitation to fresh aggression."

Such warnings do not carry the authority they did before Congress vacated Nixon's Cambodian policy.

NEW YORK TIMES
16 August 1973

NIXON SEES PERIL TO PEACE IN HALT IN CAMBODIA RAIDS

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 15 — President Nixon marked the end of the American bombing in Cambodia with a new denunciation of Congress today for forcing the cutoff—an act that he said “undermines the prospects for world peace”—and with a new warning to North Vietnam not to take military advantage of the cessation.

A statement read by Gerald L. Warren, the deputy White House press secretary, said that Mr. Nixon continued to have grave reservations about the wisdom of the forced ending of all American combat activity in Indochina.

Later, in his televised speech to the nation about Watergate, Mr. Nixon again noted his concern about the possible impact of the end to the bombing. He said, apparently referring to Cambodia, that “vital events are taking place in Southeast Asia which could lead to a tragedy for the cause of peace.”

In the earlier statement, Mr. Nixon blamed Congress as he had on Aug. 3 in a letter to Congressional leaders for ruining the chances of Cambodia's neighbors and for eroding the Vietnam cease-fire accord by forcing an end to the bombing.

Effect on Friend and Foe

The statement, issued about 12 hours after the last American bombs fell in Cambodia, went beyond the Aug. 3 document to accuse Congress of endangering world peace:

“Most importantly, this Congressional act undermines the prospects of world peace by raising doubts in the minds of both friends and adversaries concerning the resolve and capacity of the United States to stand by international agreements when they are violated by other parties.”

Throughout the Vietnam war the Johnson and Nixon Administrations warned that if the United States broke its commitment to its Southeast Asian allies, it would lead to an erosion of other alliances and possibly encourage Communist states to take bolder risks.

The United States has no treaty commitment to Cambodia, and Mr. Warren was asked what “international agreement” was being broken by the end

of the bombing there.

He replied that he was referring to the Vietnam cease-fire agreement reached Jan. 27. The Administration has said that it was permitted to bomb in support of the Government of President Lon Nol as long as the insurgents, backed by Hanoi, refused to negotiate the settlement called for in that accord.

The end of combat activity at midnight was ordered by Congress on June 30 and reluctantly accepted by Mr. Nixon. The cutoff was attached as a rider to an appropriations bill needed to keep the Government functioning.

The White House statement today noted that Congress had first sought a June 30 cessation date and that the Aug. 15 date was “a necessary compromise to avoid a major disruption in United States Government operations and to allow the Khmer Republic more time to adjust to the new situation.”

In the six weeks since June 30, according to the statement, the combination of American combat air support and the Cambodian Government's efforts to strengthen its forces have left it “in better shape to defend itself.”

“We hope that the Government will be able to defend itself and to hold its own against the insurgents and their North Vietnamese sponsors,” it added.

Administration officials have painted a rather gloomy picture of the Lon Nol Government's ability to defend Phnom Penh without air support. Implicit in the White House statement was the view that the cutoff was a serious blow to Cambodia's chances.

It reiterated that the United States “will stand firmly with the Khmer Republic in facing the current challenge and will continue to provide the maximum amount of economic and military assistance permitted by present legal constraints.”

A major Administration concern has been that the North Vietnamese might be encouraged by the cutoff to mount a large-scale offensive against South Vietnam. To deter this the United States has kept its bomber force on station in Thailand and Guam, and Mr. Nixon has pledged to seek Congressional authority to resume bombing in case of such a breach in the cease-fire agreement.

In this regard, the White House statement said that “it should be clearly understood in Hanoi that the President will work with Congress in order to take appropriate action if North Vietnam mounts an offensive which jeopardizes stability in Indochina and threatens to overturn the settlements reached after so much sacrifice by so many for so long.”

Efforts to achieve the negotiated end of the Cambodian fighting have been unavailing, the statement said, adding that “the Communist side remains

Confusion in Cambodia

People Mystified as Direct U.S. Role Ends at a Time of Military Adversity

The writer of the following article has frequently reported from Cambodia for The New York Times since February, 1970, just before Prince Norodom Sihanouk's ouster.

By HENRY KAMM

As the orders went out to stop the American bombing of Cambodia, the end of direct United States military involvement there—like the beginning—was wrapped in controversy and confusion.

The President began the United States role, and Congress ended it. Domestic American considerations dic-

intransigently opposed to any compromise.”

The whole question of Cambodian negotiations has been cloaked in controversy and ambiguity. After the Vietnam agreement, Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's adviser on national security, said he expected similar agreements to follow in Laos and Cambodia. A Laotian cease-fire was negotiated in February, but Cambodian fighting continued, with the exception of a short lull early in February.

When Congress began considering a bombing cutoff in June, Mr. Kissinger told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that a major diplomatic effort was under way to try to bring about a cease-fire in Cambodia. He argued that a cutoff would set back the chances for a negotiated settlement.

On July 1 President Nixon, in signing the appropriations bill containing the cutoff, said that delicate negotiations were going on. Prince Norodom Sihanouk, nominal head of the Cambodian insurgents, who had proposed talks with Mr. Kissinger, announced about the same time that he would not agree to negotiations and said that none had taken place.

Administration officials said that the negotiations referred to by Mr. Nixon involved discussions with the Chinese, North Vietnamese and Russians. The officials now assert that as a result of the cutoff the insurgents are under no pressure to negotiate and all efforts have failed.

With Congress in recess until after Labor Day, there were few comments on the halt in bombing. Senator George McGovern, Democrat of South Dakota and a leading dove, said the United States should end all military assistance to Cambodia. Senator Barry Goldwater, Republican of Arizona, commented that it remained to be seen if the halt in bombing was wise. “I pray that it was, but I have my doubts,” he said.

tated the halt in the bombing, for the military situation has not changed in favor of the Phnom Penh Government since the final bombing campaign began in February.

Why the United States, having intervened, ended its intervention now, at a date that seems arbitrary, leaves the Cambodians confounded. But the Cambodian Government and most of the people of what had until this decade been a singularly placid country have believed all along that their fate would be decided by remote powers over which they have no control.

No Influence on U. S. Policy

With few exceptions Cambodians do not understand the controversy between President Nixon and Congress, which was compromised by the halt in bombing, because they believe that the President is the chief and Senators and Representatives are his employees.

The end—the United States acting out of reasons unconnected with Cambodia and the Cambodians left uncomprehending—was characteristic of the relationship between the two countries since the overthrow of Prince Norodom Sihanouk on March 18, 1970, drew Cambodia into the Indochina war and made the United States the ally of the Government in Phnom Penh.

For nearly three and a half years President Nixon and President Lon Nol have made war together without meeting. In all that time the Cambodian leader has depended on the United States for the survival of his Government while remaining mystified by the course and rationale of American policy. It cannot be said that he has influenced it.

From the beginning of Marshal Lon Nol's Government, relations between the two countries have been rooted in a fundamental misconception.

Marshal Lon Nol, then a lieutenant general and Prince Sihanouk's appointee as Premier, counted on the same American support against the Vietnamese Communists that South Vietnam and Laos were receiving. Moreover, despite the ex-

perience of the two neighboring countries, the leaders of the newly established republic in Phnom Penh had faith that such support would give Cambodia peace and security.

The Cambodian chiefs believed that, at worst, the Vietnamese war would spread to the Communist sanctuaries on the Cambodian side of the border, leaving Phnom Penh and the rest of the country at peace.

They were proved right on the sanctuaries, which the United States and South Vietnamese military commands had long wanted to attack on the ground after having struck at them frequently from the air.

Declining Role Overlooked

But the members of the Phnom Penh Government misjudged the long-term American intent. They failed to understand that the United States was in the declining phase of its war in Indochina, intent mainly on cutting its losses and withdrawing its troops without risk of immediate collapse in South Vietnam, and unable for domestic reasons to involve itself as pervasively as it had in Vietnam or Laos.

The result was partial involvement, which served American and South Vietnamese interests but mired Cambodia in a war for which she was unprepared and pumped American military and economic resources into a country as incapable of handling such sudden wealth as it was of fighting the war that had provoked the flow.

"I can't help a sad feeling that Cambodia is a little country that we have used and for which we must now bear a moral responsibility," reflected a senior American official with long experience in Indochina and intimate knowledge of the American-Cambodian relationship.

The relationship has been troubled from the beginning, and the United States has rarely done what Cambodian leaders expected. When Prince Sihanouk called on Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in 1953 to ask for American support in his demands for independence from France, Mr. Dulles told him Cambodia needed France as her guarantee against the Communists.

Eight months later Cambodia retaliated by refusing the protection of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization. But Prince Sihanouk concluded a military-assistance agreement with the United States in 1955.

A stormy eight-year relationship, during which the deepening American involvement in Vietnam clashed with Cambodia's sometimes militant neutralism, came to an end when Norodom Sihanouk, no longer King, broke diplomatic relations with the United States in May, 1965.

The principal cause was the rising frequency of American-South Vietnamese air and ground attacks on border villages and installations of Vietnamese Communist troops,

which were growing at a comparable rate of frequency. The diplomatic rupture was preceded by Cambodia's unilateral renunciation of American military and economic assistance.

To replace American military assistance, Prince Sihanouk explained in a recent interview, he felt obliged to allow the port of Sihanoukville—known since his overthrow as Kompong Som—to become a point of entry for supplies for the Vietnamese Communists and to have the Cambodian military haul the supplies to the sanctuaries.

"We wanted to get rid of American aid, and as a result we not only had to open a casino but to handle transport to become the Vietcong's coolies," the Prince said. "Two-thirds for the Vietcong, one-third for yourself, two-thirds for the Vietcong, one-third for yourself—at that rate one sells oneself."

Two Aspects of Policy

To forestall "selling" Cambodia to the Vietnamese Communists, whom he had often publicly characterized as a long-term menace to his country while wishing them victory over the United States and the Saigon Government, Prince Sihanouk seized or created occasional opportunities to indicate to the Americans that his principal interest was the maintenance of Cambodian independence and keeping his country out of the war.

The United States had a role to play, he often said, as a counterweight to the might of China. The United States should withdraw from Indochina, he said, but retain a presence in Southeast Asia.

Prince Sihanouk held onto a measure of sympathy in Washington, particularly in the State Department. But those who counseled respect for Cambodian neutrality found themselves under heavy pressure from the Pentagon to authorize raids on the sanctuaries.

In December, 1965, the American command in Saigon leaked information that field commanders had been authorized to pursue enemy forces into Cambodia "in clear self-defense" or to bring artillery and air strikes to bear in such circumstances. The State Department confirmed the leak but coupled it with proposals to help protect Cambodia's neutrality by international surveillance of her border with South Vietnam.

Occasional indirect contacts and such a public measure of goodwill as a highly publicized visit in November, 1967, by the then Mrs. John F. Kennedy to inaugurate a street named after President Kennedy led in January, 1968, to a visit by Chester Bowles as President Johnson's official representative.

Prince Sihanouk spoke candidly of his concern over the inroads the Vietnamese Communists were making as well as the continued military role of the United States in Vietnam. He strongly demanded that the American and South Vietnamese troops refrain from any attacks on populated places in Cambodia but indicated that he

was unable to prevent them from attacking the Communists along most of the densely jungled frontier region.

In return Mr. Bowles, according to Prince Sihanouk, promised that the United States would not adopt a policy of "hot pursuit" of the enemy into Cambodia.

While State Department resistance to incursions into Cambodia remained alive, The New York Times reported on May 9, 1969, that "knowledgeable sources" in the Nixon Administration had disclosed that for the first time B-52's had attacked Vietnamese Communist base camps and supply depots in Cambodia.

The secret bombing continued until the United States became openly engaged as a combatant in Cambodia after Prince Sihanouk's overthrow. Two factors made possible the Administration's success in keeping the bombing secret: the remoteness of the area and the diplomatic embarrassment to North Vietnam, whose soldiers on Cambodian soil were the target, in disclosing their own violation of Cambodian neutrality.

Despite the bombing Cambodia resumed diplomatic relations with the United States in July, 1969; the United States pledged respect for Cambodian neutrality, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Shaky Middle Course

As the war in Vietnam ground on, with no end in sight, Prince Sihanouk's ability to walk a middle course became increasingly compromised. His balancing act made enemies for him among factions of Cambodians who favored a position more clearly aligned with one side or the other.

It was the group that advocated closer ties with the United States, centered mainly on Prince Sisowath Sirik Matak and enlisting the last-minute support of Marshal Lon Nol, that overthrew Prince Sihanouk. Norodom Sihanouk holds the United States responsible for his downfall. American officials contend that in March, 1970, his policy was less hostile to the United States than it had been since the engagement in Vietnam and that there was no good reason to intervene.

The first Cambodian requests for American military equipment to fight off Vietnamese Communist attacks that began late in March were transmitted without encouragement. On May 1, 1970, Marshal Lon Nol was informed that more help than he had ever requested had arrived from the United States: for several hours American troops had been crossing Cambodia's borders to attack, in Mr. Nixon's words, "the headquarters of the entire Communist military operation in South Vietnam."

The United States informed Cambodia of the incursion more than an hour after Mr. Nixon had told the rest of the world. In Cambodia, which was only beginning to awaken to the harsh consequences of the ouster of Prince Sihanouk, no one was listening to the President's speech on Saigon radio.

Marshal Lon Nol's closest confidant, his brother, Lon Non, then a major, asked an American journalist to listen to the speech and tell him what the President had said so that he could inform his brother. No one on the staff understood English, he explained.

Cambodian leaders never doubted that despite White House assurances that the troops would leave by June 30 and would not penetrate more than 20 miles, they would not leave until the war was over.

Early in May Jonathan F. Ladd, a retired Army colonel, was told by Henry A. Kissinger, the Presidential adviser on national security affairs, to run a modest military aid program, giving the Cambodians only enough weapons to hold their own and doing what he could to keep the army together until the end of June, when the American troops were to withdraw.

His mission was not to prop up the Lon Nol Government, he was told, because any government friendly to the United States was acceptable.

Clearly, according to American sources close to the events, the original American aim was to do what the Pentagon had long requested: follow up the bombing of the Vietnamese Communist supply system in Cambodia with ground attacks into the storage areas for the supplies that came down the trail network despite the bombing.

The object, according to those sources, was to produce a comparative battlefield lull, during which the withdrawal of American troops could proceed in security and make "peace with honor" possible. The offensive, limited in time and space, produced the predictably negative result of driving the Vietnamese Communists deeper into Cambodia.

Once installed in the countryside and secure because of the weakness of the Cambodian Army, the Vietnamese Communists organized a Cambodian resistance movement, aided by the Khmer Rouge, a small faction of left-wing opponents of Prince Sihanouk who had gone underground during his rule. Gradually the war turned into an authentic civil conflict between Cambodians, each side aided by foreign allies.

The principal American role was widespread bombing, which, according to official American sources, killed many "enemy" troops and thus aided the Government army; according to most Cambodians questioned, it also killed many civilians and made enemies of the survivors not only for the Americans but also for the Government that is their ally.

The invasion of Cambodia, while failing to uncover the central Communist headquarters that Mr. Nixon set as the target, did upset the North Vietnamese supply network sufficiently to produce a lull that lasted until the big Communist offensive in the spring of 1972.

Cambodia became the subject of routine handling by the American Government, an ad-

NEW YORK TIMES

14 August 1973

The Bitter End

By James P. Brown

More than four years after President Nixon was first elected on a promise to end the war in Indochina and nearly seven months after he proclaimed "peace with honor," United States combat operations in the longest, most divisive war in the nation's history are scheduled to end tonight—not as a result of Presidential initiative but through a courageous mandate of Congress.

It is a most unsatisfactory ending, especially for a people long accustomed to victory in their foreign wars and success in almost anything they turn their hands to. After the last American bombs fall on Cambodia tonight, there still will be no victory in Indochina, no peace, and precious little honor. Unless Americans face up to these unpleasant realities with understanding and maturity, the aftermath of the war could prove as divisive as the conflict itself, generating recriminations as bitter as those that tore the nation after the alleged "loss of China" in the late nineteen-forties.

Already President Nixon has attempted to shift to Congress the blame for what he warns may be the "dangerous potential consequences" in Asia of an act which bars "combat activities by United States military forces in or over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia." The danger of a denouement in Southeast Asia that will be displeasing to Americans is very real; what is unreal is the intimation that continued bombings could significantly affect the outcome of the political struggles in the area and that vital American interests are at stake there.

It appears inevitable that in short order the beleaguered forces of the Lon Nol regime in Phnom Penh will completely collapse, to be supplanted by a new government. That government may have the former chief of state, Prince Sihanouk, as its figurehead but it will almost certainly be dominated by Communists. It is likely that the fall of Phnom Penh will have a profoundly unsettling effect on the truce in South Vietnam, such as it is, and it may speed the advent of a Communist, or at least a neutralist, regime in Saigon. It is even conceivable that a Communist victory in Cambodia will have repercussions in neighboring Thailand, as the Administration has suggested.

But, even if all these possible consequences are conceded, it still does not follow that the United States should continue to intervene militarily in Indochina to try to achieve a resolution there that will be more to its liking. The suggestion that Congress is "aban-

doning our friends" by withholding funds for combat operations implies American commitments and vital interests in the area which in fact do not exist, especially in view of the new international situation which President Nixon has helped to bring about. It assumes an ability to determine the outcome of domestic conflicts in the Indochina states that long and painful experience has demonstrated this country simply does not have.

Prolonging the brutal bombing of the Cambodian countryside could not long preserve the inept and corrupt regime in Phnom Penh, which has been steadily losing ground ever since the United States intervened in its behalf in the spring of 1970, shortly after the ouster of Prince Sihanouk.

Maintaining an anti-Communist regime precariously in Phnom Penh and a few other Cambodian urban centers has not prevented the return of Communist forces to their old sanctuaries along the Vietnamese border. The fall of Phnom Penh may hasten the collapse of the truce in South Vietnam, but that cease-fire has never been really effective.

As for Thailand, a more cohesive nation, with its unique—for Southeast Asia—history of independence from foreign domination, it should be able to cope with a Communist presence in Cambodia, if necessary, as long as its leaders deal effectively with their domestic problems.

The probable imminent collapse of President Nixon's ill-conceived efforts to achieve a Korean-type solution in Indochina by securing the Cambodian flank is no doubt deeply disappointing to the Administration. Indeed, the acknowledgment of failure in a long and costly military endeavor, originally undertaken with noble intentions, is a bitter pill for Americans generally to swallow.

It is the better part of valor, and wisdom, nevertheless, to recognize at last the limitations of power, to choose the lesser of evils in a situation which offers no happy ending, and to terminate resolutely an enterprise that is clearly doing vast harm to the United States and to the peoples it has sought to help.

Incredibly, while accepting the Congressional mandate to withdraw, President Nixon has again warned Hanoi that if it further violates the Paris accords "the American people would respond to such aggression with appropriate action." The only appropriate action today, as Congress has determined, is to leave the people of Indochina alone to solve their own problems.

James P. Brown is a member of the editorial board of *The Times*.

junct to the war in Vietnam, which was being phased out. The embassy grew to about 120 members, but the Ambassador, Emery C. Swank, took seriously his instructions not to become a pro-consul.

Scarred by the tragedies and failures of all-out intervention in Vietnam, the United States, to the surprise of the Cambodian Government, allowed it to manage its own affairs in the shrinking portions of the country that it controls, and to conduct its own war.

The United States Embassy and most American officials close to Cambodian affairs believe the Government and its military forces to be largely incompetent and often corrupt. But the United States has let Cambodia go her own way, powered on an overwhelming extent by American aid.

The embassy was aware of the deterioration in the political situation and the erosion of the Lon Nol government's acceptance by the people remaining under its control. It believed, like most Cambodians, that Lon Nol, now a brigadier general, was using his brother's position to make himself the hated strongman of the regime.

But even when General Lon Nol eliminated Lieut. Gen. Sisowath Sirik Matak, whom the embassy considered the only member of the Government capable of intelligent cooperation with the United States and purposeful use of American aid, the United States let it happen and did not bring pressure to bear until General Lon Nol put General Sirik Matak under virtual house arrest.

Although President Nixon has spoken encouraging words to and about the Lon Nol Government, no one in Washington shows faith in its ability to survive. The evacuation plans for Americans in Phnom Penh include provisions for Government leaders.

Mr. Kissinger has not yet found the time to see the Cambodian Ambassador, Um Sim. Mr. Um Sim fears it is because he would have nothing to say to the representative of the Phnom Penh Government. In this most critical time in Cambodian-American relations, Mr. Um Sim has therefore left Washington to represent President Lon Nol at the inauguration of President Alfredo Stroessner in Asunción, Paraguay.

Only one Cambodian figures seriously in discussions in Washington about the future of Cambodia. It is Prince Norodom Sihanouk, against whose backers the United States sent its bombers until now.

WASHINGTON POST
12 August 1973

'Stick Is Gone,' but U.S. Struggles On in Indochina

By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

A new set of bleak Indochina realities will confront administration strategists after midnight Tuesday, Aug. 14.

After that hour, by act of Congress, there is an absolute cutoff on the use of American funds, old money or new, "to finance directly or indirectly combat activities by United States military forces in or over or from off the shore of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia."

The law "is, unmistakably clear," administration officials agree, and "it will be complied with," they pledge. There will be no circuitous semantics, such as the euphemistic formula of "protective reaction" devised in the past, to justify military attacks as "defensive" responses to threats of enemy action. Congress has been told by Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

And yet, no American official experienced in Indochina is rash enough to guarantee that the last American shot in the Indochina war will be only an echo of history by Wednesday morning, Aug. 15.

For the United States by no means will be at the end of its tortuous road in Indochina on that date. After Aug. 15 the United States still will be massively involved in Indochina with money, if not with troops or aircraft. Nearly \$3 billion in continuing American military and economic aid for the non-Communist regimes in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia is being sought by the administration from Congress for this 1974 fiscal year. To the Communist side, this is hostile support for its adversaries.

One immediate question, therefore, is whether Communist forces will respond in kind to the American ban on U.S. combat activities throughout Indochina, where many thousands of American personnel will be present after Aug. 15. Administration officials now can do little more than hope for Communist forbearance.

The larger American strategic dilemma in Indochina is what will happen now to more than a decade's investment of blood, money and resulting national turmoil inside the United States, which spawned much of the Watergate virus in the nation's life, now that "the stick is gone" in Indochina—the stick of American military power.

In his angry letter of Aug. 2 to the Democratic leadership of Congress, President Nixon, charging a rebellious Congress with "abandonment of a friend," pledged that "the end to the bombing in Cambodia does not signal an abdication of America's determination to work for a lasting peace in Indochina. We will continue to provide all possible support permitted under the law."

The President stopped far short, however, of describing the total di-

mensions of the challenge that now faces his entire Indochina strategy. Cambodia is not merely the last missing piece to be fitted into the Indochina mosaic to produce a satisfactory result. Instead, it is the most glaring example of the incompleteness of the entire structure of "peace" in Indochina.

By its grossly exaggerated claim that the Jan. 27 cease-fire in Vietnam represented "the end of the war" in Indochina, the Nixon administration unwittingly encouraged its critics in Congress to treat its hyperbole as reality. The administration's hope was that the resulting withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam, and the return of American prisoners of war, would buy enough time from Congress to complete the U.S. military disengagement from all Indochina without blatant exposure of the ambiguities of the Jan. 27 accord.

If all the Indochinese participants in the war had gone along temporarily with the ambiguities in the Jan. 27 accord, the strategy might have succeeded, at least long enough for the United States to look upon Indochina as an aching memory. But time ran out before even the facade of the 'structure could be finished.

In South Vietnam the scramble began immediately on each warring side to seal off the other from the territory it occupied, or could grab. The South Vietnamese government of President Nguyen Van Thieu grabbed back the most, and dug in for prolonged struggle, assured of continuing American military and economic aid.

There was only the most remote chance, at best, that the North Vietnamese and Vietcong on one side, and Thieu's forces on the other, would seriously begin the process of "national reconciliation" they pledged in the Jan. 27 cease-fire accord. Presidential security adviser Henry A. Kissinger's public admonition, published in January, 1969, when he wrote with candor before he entered the White House, projected the almost-insurmountable barrier: "It is beyond imagination that parties that have been murdering and betraying each other for 25 years could work together as a team giving joint instructions to the entire country."

South Vietnam, in consequence, has not been reconciled, it has been partitioned.

Communist forces are now literally colonizing the

more sparsely populated sectors of South Vietnam which they control, while the Saigon government has reinforced its authority in the territory it dominates. The fighting has dropped to guerrilla-level, while each side recuperates from all-out warfare and replenishes its strength.

In Laos the pattern is somewhat more encouraging. The Laotians are no warrior race, nor even a race of normally hostile peoples. They have a tradition of accommodation, if left alone.

The cease-fire in Laos, proclaimed in February as an outgrowth of private talks between Kissinger and North Vietnam's Le Duc Tho during negotiations on the basic Vietnam cease-fire, set the stage for a division of political power in Laos on a 50-50 basis, in a coalition government. This apportionment of power, expected to be confirmed formally soon in the establishment of a coalition government, represents a major augmentation of power for the pro-Communist Pathet Lao, supported by North Vietnam.

Laos will be divided into two zones, with the Pathet Lao controlling the entire eastern portion of the nation, the sector most vital to North Vietnam, encompassing the Ho Chi Minh trail network running down into South Vietnam and Cambodia.

The generalized map accompanying this article illustrates what has taken place in Indochina since the Vietnam cease-fire accord in January, and perhaps also what may be ahead.

Communist forces, either of North Vietnam or its allies in each sector, control the entire spine of the Indochina peninsula as a result of the cease-fire agreements in South Vietnam and Laos.

Cambodia is a totally open flank on South Vietnam, lacking even the paper-thin barrier of a cease-fire agreement.

The forces of North Vietnam, astride the backbone of Indochina, are in geographic position to strike anywhere in the area.

No matter what happens in the continuing struggle for control of Cambodia, a war in which the insurgents are indigenous Khmer

Rouge, fighting with North Vietnamese military advice and logistic support, it appears totally improbable that there can be any settlement that will deprive North Vietnam of access to eastern Cambodia, site of the "sanctuary" bases adjoining South Vietnam.

Even if the North Vietnamese are obliged to remove their troops from eastern Laos and eastern Cambodia—which is what the Jan. 27 Vietnam cease-fire agreement calls for—North Vietnam seems assured of friendly allies to allow it reentry to the military critical sectors adjacent to South Vietnam.

What has occurred in Indochina is supremely illustrated by a maxim expressed in 1954, at the end of the French Indochina war, by Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, then under secretary of state: "... Diplomacy has rarely been able to gain at the conference table what cannot be gained or held on the battlefield."

For South Vietnam and Laos, the division of control and political power essentially parallels the share of military control at the time of cease-fire.

In South Vietnam, the Communist forces were obliged to settle for a slice of territory and no share—so far—in the political power controlled from Saigon. In Laos, the split is about even, in territory and political power when measured in terms of the more lightly populated area controlled by Communist forces, and the more fertile lowlands controlled by the central government of Premier Souvanna Phouma.

This pattern is what makes the prospect so ominous for the American-supported Cambodian government of President Lon Nol. The insurgent forces so dominate the battle for Cambodia that there is little bargaining power on the anti-Communist side. After midnight Tuesday, when critical American bombing support is cut off for Cambodia, the bargaining power of the Phnom Penh regime will be materially reduced.

At the time the Vietnam cease-fire was signed, and the groundwork was begun for reaching a cease-fire in Laos, the Lon Nol government also offered a cease-fire, which Phnom Penh and Washington described as an "unconditional" cease-fire. But its terms simply were not credible enough to supply any enticement to the Communist side.

Instead of the standstill cease-fires proclaimed in

South Vietnam and Laos, the Lon Nol regime, in the weakest bargaining position of all, made the most demanding offer of all. Lon Nol on Jan. 29 proposed a suspension of "offensive operations" by Cambodian forces, "to enable" North Vietnamese forces in the country "to leave our territory in the shortest possible time."

The offer was scoffed at on the Communist side.

With time, and with massive American aerial support, Nixon administration strategists hoped, the weak Lon Nol government could be revitalized, and the poorly led, corruption-plagued Cambodian army reinvigorated, to gain enough strength to bargain effectively with the pro-Communist Khmer Rouge.

During this period, which may prove to be a major historical error, the United States repeatedly fended off overtures for a negotiated settlement by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who was deposed as Cambodia's ruler by Lon Nol's forces in March, 1970. Sihanouk repeatedly has charged, and the United States repeatedly has denied, that he was overthrown as a consequence of "plotting" by the Central Intelligence Agency.

American intelligence agents unquestionably were working with anti-Sihanouk, Khmer Serei forces during the 1960s, whether or not there was any U.S. complicity in the coup which eliminated Sihanouk from power, even fragmentary public records show.

The full record of U.S. involvement in Cambodia during those years was touched only very lightly in recent hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee, which centered on the falsification of Pentagon records about the clandestine American B-52 bombing of Cambodia between March, 1969, and April, 1970.

The Nixon administration claimed it had Sihanouk's secret "acquiescence" to that bombing. Whether Sihanouk was aware of the magnitude of the 14 months of bombing, however, has not been established. The public record shows only that Sihanouk tolerated some degree of covert American military action against the North Vietnamese forces in his country when he became alarmed at the extent of their control of the eastern sector of Cambodia.

The North Vietnamese forces who were on the receiving end of the covert U.S. bombing now conceivably may be more suspicious of Sihanouk than they were before the recent disclo-

tures before the Senate committee. But there can be no doubt that leadership in Hanoi was fully aware that Sihanouk tried to play both sides of the East-West divide as he jockeyed to try to stay in power before the 1970 coup.

It is ironic that the Nixon administration now looks to Sihanouk as the man to negotiate with for a diplomatic settlement of the war, as the head of the Cambodian government-in-exile, only to be rebuffed by him. Sihanouk often has acknowledged publicly that the Khmer Rouge military units, who fight in his name, are the controlling power on the insurgent side, and once they gain power he will be only a ceremonial head of state.

The key to the future of Cambodia, however, administration officials continue to insist, is held neither by Sihanouk nor by the Khmer Rouge, but by North Vietnam.

Administration officials concede that the bulk of the fighting in Cambodia is conducted by the Khmer Rouge, although the Lon Nol government, and sometimes the United States, portrayed the North Vietnamese as a major fighting force in the battle for control of Cambodia. Recently, however, even the Lon Nol government is reported to have acknowledged to Thailand that no North Vietnamese military units are in the current battle for Cambodia.

What most distinguishes Cambodia from South Vietnam and Laos in terms of reaching even a temporary war settlement is that in Cambodia, once supporting American air power is gone, all the high bargaining cards would appear to be in pro-Communist hands. The insurgents seek no coalition with the Lon Nol regime; their demand is to eliminate it.

Prince Sihanouk, in his cable yesterday to old friend Sen. Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.), offered the United States an exit from Cambodia representing "peace in honor," but Sihanouk maintained the standing demand for a total halt to American support for the Lon Nol regime—knowing it could not survive the cut-off. (See story, Page A7.)

Administration officials give the Lon Nol government "a chance" to survive for an unstated period of time beyond Aug. 15, at least weeks, probably several months, but concede they simply "don't know" the ultimate answer.

Washington has been encouraged in recent days over the upsurge of aggres-

NEW YORK TIMES
15 August 1973

Bombs Hardly Hurt Reds. A Reported Defector Says

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia, Aug. 14 (UPI)—A soldier identified as a rebel who defected to the Cambodian Government side said today that six months of intense American bombings in Cambodia has inflicted little damage on insurgent troops.

The soldier, Hean Chit, who is 29 years old and who reportedly joined the Government side July 23, was present today at a news conference.

He said that while he was in command of more than 6,000 men, he took orders directly from North Vietnamese advisers.

Speaking through an interpreter, he said that in 10 United States air strikes, bombs killed only three or four of his men.

He said that he had received training in Hanoi on how to avoid the bombs and seek protection if they hit his positions.

The soldier said that he had commanded 12 rebel battalions near Kompong Speu, about 30 miles west of Phnom Penh, and that his orders were to take Kompong Speu and to surround and attack Phnom Penh. If the capital was not taken by the end of the year, then the North Vietnamese would attack it, he said.

siveness shown by government troops. U.S. strategists express confidence that there will be no sudden collapse of will or resistance by Phnom Penh's defenders. They hold the hope that once the government's troops are fighting "on their own," they will acquire greater confidence and effectiveness.

The struggle, however, admittedly will be to achieve "some kind of equilibrium" between the opposing forces, to try to induce the pro-Communists to bargain on a level approaching equality. The prospect may not be hopeless, but it surely is not bright.

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS
Washington, D. C., Sunday, August 12, 1973

Leaving Cambodia to Die

By Dr. Verne Choney

It will be happening in a few days. The United States will allow the Cambodian patient to die. Death will come, as it so often does, with mixed reactions from the survivors, even those on the freedom side of the human family.

Cambodia is, after all, the last place where the United States is actively engaged in the Southeast Asian conflict that has twisted and wrenched and ruined the philosophies, allegiances and treasures of our country for so many years. We are sick unto distraction with it.

So it is that on Aug. 15, when the last U.S. planes are scheduled to fly over Cambodia, providing for the last time bombing support for the beleaguered Khmer Army, many Americans will breathe a sigh of relief. I hope — I pray — that many will have been able to keep their sense of what is right; that they will have been able to set aside the oddly prejudiced reporting of the press; that they will note the passing with a sigh of pity and profound sorrow.

FOR WE AMERICANS have let Cambodia become fatally ill, needlessly. We are allowing the brave, battered Khmer patient to die, in what is the most unnecessary and cruel debacle in the Southeast Asian tragedy.

The Khmers are one people who wanted, and want, nothing to do with war. They are an ethnically homogeneous people who have cherished their culture and thrived in a beautifully simple, pacific existence for hundreds of years. They have been drawn into war against their will by North Vietnamese invaders and American supporters.

LET ME TELL YOU about some of the people of Cambodia whom I visited with recently, people living and fighting in the provincial capital of Kampong Thom. These aren't corrupt bureaucrats or corrupting merchants in Phnom Penh bruited so breathlessly by our press; they are simple, frightened, soft-spoken, determined seekers of peace with freedom.

Kampong Thom has been surrounded by the Communists for nearly two years. Its population currently numbers about 15,000 longtime residents, 9,000 resettled refugees and an undisclosed number of military. It stays alive through the airlifting of food, ammunition, gasoline and other supplies — and the determination of its permanent and temporary residents.

As our helicopter approached Kampong Thom's schoolyard, there was a crowd of perhaps 150 women and children and old men waving us down. When we got out of the chopper, they maintained a distance as we walked to greet the military governor, Gen. Taep Ben.

I wasn't sure why so many people were there but thought at first they were waiting for supplies. But since the biggest item, food, was only dropped by air, the only other explanation was what my interpreter finally explained: the three or four weekly flights by helicopter and, lately, DC3 are the only break in the routine for the people of Kampong Thom.

Taep Ben was anxious that we move along. He had left a staff meeting to meet our helicopter and apologized for having to return to it but said it wouldn't be long before we could begin our tour of the refugee resettlement areas, the hospital and other areas of the town.

The staff meeting droned on, as staff meetings must, with exchanges of information and orders.

LT. SAN SOK noted matter-of-factly that there would be a U.S. support air raid at approximately 1400 hours (the last one for which he would serve as forward ground controller, having been reassigned to Phnom Penh.)

One of Taep Ben's deputies mentioned that he hoped the next chopper would bring in some Jeep batteries, as they needed them at the hospital surgery (I guessed that the surgery must have been on the ground floor and that carefully positioned Jeeps provided what light was available). And so on.

Following the staff meeting, Taep Ben suggested we go into the sitting room for beer before starting the tour, so that I might talk with several of his staff. I realized that the beer break was a welcome change for the dozen men in the room and that maybe my turning their day upside down with my visit wouldn't be quite so much of an inconvenience as I had imagined.

First came the briefing from a harried old-young man who was in charge of refugee resettlement. He apologized in advance that he would not be able to go with us to the villages but he had urgent work in town. He was rebuilding a seven-square-block area that the enemy had leveled the year before. Taep Ben had given the project high priority; it would involve all able-bodied citizens, civilian and military alike, would build morale and would begin to build Kampong Thom anew.

The refugee director talked about how in the past seven months, since Khmer troops with U.S. air support had driven the enemy back eight miles from Kampong Thom's northern edge, 500 typical peasant homes had been built for refugees and had provided reasonably comfortable living and farming conditions for every formerly homeless person in the provincial capital.

The refugee resettlement areas on the other side of the river were just as the director had said. They were neatly laid out, classically constructed one-room peasant huts on stilts with wooden sides and wood or thatch roofs. The wood had been collected from ammunition cases. The quality of the houses was not first rate, but highly acceptable considering the harrowing circumstances. There was numerous old people, children and many women, but not an able-bodied man to be seen.

FROM THE NEW VILLAGES we went to the hospital. It shocked me. The building was shell-torn, but sturdy. It was inspection-clean inside and out. The staff of 11 included two doctors and all were in clean white hospital coats, making rounds through the neat, though doubly crowded, 75-bed facility. There were 150 patients,

typically two per bed, in the hospital. They were being bathed and cared for by their families and given what medical attention was available by the staff.

Making rounds with the doctors, what initially had been a favorable shock turned quite unfavorable as I realized how little they were able to do to cure the sick and wounded. They had no electricity; no anesthesia except ether drops or, occasionally, chloroform; no disease-specific drugs; no film or developer for the X-ray, even if there were electricity.

WITH ALL THE GOOD WILL and training in the world, this band of medics and aides was hardly able to do anything except make the ill as comfortable as possible. I remembered my colleague Dr. Tom Dooley's succinct answer to a shocked group of U.S. doctors visiting our facilities in Laos, in 1959:

"Yes, in some respects we are practicing 18th century medicine. But it is good medicine and we are practicing in a country that is used to 15th century medicine."

These people were forced back earlier even than that in their practice, simply because of a lack of supplies. I wondered how these medics do as much as they do, with so little?

"If they only had some sterilizing equipment, they could drain that young guy's chest. That head wound needs debridement. That child would live if she only had a stomach tube," I told myself.

"God, oh God, that M.A.S.H. in Korea was Walter Reed Hospital compared to this place."

My U.S. Embassy interpreter explained the bind that the Khmer government has been in. It was a case of what to leave out of the airlift survival kit: rice, ammunition or medicines. Invariably, it was medicines that would be left off the choppers and C-136s, to get as much food and amino aboard as possible. It took 20 tons of rice to feed Kampong Thom each week, and it all had to be airdropped in.

BUT AT WHAT A PRICE in human suffering and military morale. Every soldier in the Khmer Army knows, according to one Western military attache I talked with, that if he gets a head or chest or gut wound he is finished, simply for lack of decent medical aid. What better way to render a fighting force timid?

Following a look at the ravaged area that was scheduled for rehabilitation, we returned to Taep Ben's tattered mansion for lunch. Over a solid meal and two precious bottles of St. Emilion Bordeaux, 12 of us explored the futile questions of what could be done and what should be done first. My mind was jammed with what I had seen: there were enough needs here to take up the efforts of the Dooley Foundation for two years. But of course we couldn't neglect our commitments in Laos

and Nepal.

We would have to concentrate on providing disease-specific drugs and, perhaps, anesthesia and plasma. The idea of a generator for the hospital was appealing, but that would require gas, which would have to be flown in, and which just couldn't be counted upon.

While we were discussing these things, Lt. San Sok kept quietly going outside to radio up strike instructions for the tactical air support raid that we could see from the dining room. After about 30 minutes, the raid subsided and the Grumman OV-10 Forward Air Control plane headed in our direction, flying low.

IT PASSED OVER THE RIVER, wiggling its wings in salute. Then, just opposite the mansion, it made a series of loops, releasing colored smoke from beneath its wings, in a final salute to the departing San Sok.

My embassy friend told me the story of San Sok and Forward Air Controller Joe Gambino. San Sok, or Rustic Sam as he was called by Gambino, had become particularly friendly and incredibly effective over the radio guiding the American to enemy targets. They had often talked about getting together for drinks one day. And when Rustic Sam would lead Joe Gambino to a good enemy concentration, Joe would often shout over the radio, "I owe you another drink, buddy."

Then in April, in particularly rough ground-to-air combat, Gambino's plane

was hit, flying low. Joe ejected but too low for his chute to open. Gambino fell to his death not 50 yards from Lt. San Sok, his friend he had never met.

San Sok put a hand-lettered sign, "Joe Gambino Bar," over a closed beer joint in town. The townspeople gave Gambino an honored plot at the cemetery and constructed his monument from parts of his demolished OV-10 aircraft. Over the radio, Gambino's FAC-mates awarded San Sok their fallen comrade's pistol. As the story ended, one of Taep Ben's deputies said, "Whoever Joe Gambino was, we love him."

After lunch, everyone had a half-shot of cognac. We got into Taep Ben's Jeep and headed back for the schoolyard, where I would board the chopper for trips to Kampong Chhnang, Kampong Speu and Takeo, provincial capitals in similarly threatened circumstances.

PASSING THROUGH the town square, Taep Ben stopped his Jeep and took me to the foot of the four-faced monument Jayavarman, the great Ninth Century king and builder of a major temple complex at Angkor Wat. "This honored person," he said reverently, "will protect us." Then, as if he might be taken a little to somberly: "He has an advantage; he looks in all directions. And here, he has to."

The general had explained to me how his army had successfully learned how to advance under the protection of tactical

air support. "But it took time. The French taught us that we should advance in a line, across open terrain; nobody who wins wars has fought that way for 50 years. Sihanouk taught the army how to parade; at least we paraded him out of the country."

As we stood in the schoolyard, Taep Ben shook my hand in a long gesture of friendship. "We have great respect and love for Americans, but we are confused by you. How can you lose 50,000 dead and 1,000,000 wounded and billions in treasure, and now give up everything to the North Vietnamese?"

"Time is meaningless to us — it is all important to you. You are defeated by your impatience, and because of that, we all will die."

As the helicopter climbed over the scarred provincial capital, Taep Ben's closing remarks brought this thought: I may not die because of American airpower, but Taep Ben and his people perhaps will because of the lack of it.

Taep Ben was right. We are defeated by our impatience. We let the patient die.

Verne Chaney, M.D., is president and founder of the Thomas A. Dooley Foundation. Following a three-month return to Southeast Asia this spring, he is working on plans for medical assistance programs in Cambodia, as an addition to the foundation's existing work in other Asian lands.

Once Congress mandated the Aug. 15 bombing halt, the game plan fell apart. The Khmer Rouge and their North Vietnamese mentors, smelling military victory, took the offensive. The Phnom Penh regime, sensing desertion, reeled under the psychological impact of losing its bombing crutch.

Sihanouk, too, lost his bargaining power. Nixon no longer had the power to give him legitimacy. Sihanouk loudly proclaimed that he would have nothing to do with the United States, and publicly admitted that his future role probably would be as figurehead ruler of Cambodia.

The Chinese also drew in their horns. Whatever their private sentiments about Hanoi's ascendancy in Indochina, say officials, the Chinese rulers are not about to do anything publicly to stop a Communist victory in Cambodia. They gently suggested that Kissinger put off his early August trip to Peking — originally set for a bargaining session with Sihanouk — and Nixon agreed.

The irony is that Cambodia now becomes what the President once said it was — "the purest form of the Nixon Doctrine." Without the bombing, the Lon Nol government must prove it can survive with only the help of conventional American military aid in equipment and supplies.

If it can hold out for a month — a big if, officials acknowledge — only then is there hope that the insurgents will seek compromise.

WASHINGTON STAR
10 August 1973

WASHINGTON CLOSE-UP

A Game Plan Gone Awry

By George Sherman

President Nixon's game plan for Cambodia has truly gone awry.

That may be stating the obvious. But, as the President would say, it is worth making the point crystal clear as he now faces the forced bombing halt.

The harsh letter Nixon sent Congress as it went on August vacation suggests he is preparing to play politics with whatever disaster now befalls Cambodia. Beforehand, officials are trying to explain what the congressional "abandonment of a friend" means in more dispassionate terms.

The Nixon game plan saw essentially three local elements in the Cambodian equation — deposed ruler Prince Norodom Sihanouk, now in Chinese exile; the Communist Khmer Rouge, supported by Hanoi, and the tottering government of President Lon Nol in the capital of Phnom Penh.

In June, in the second marathon Paris negotiations with Hanoi's Le Duc Tho, and then later at the Washington summit with Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev, Nixon and trusty aide Henry A. Kissinger

thought they had set the stage for getting negotiations started among these three contestants.

American bombing, just enough to keep the Lon Nol government afloat, officials argue, was meant to play an essential role. These officials unabashedly admit the aim was to get Sihanouk back to power in a "neutral independent" Cambodia — an aim, they claim, privately shared by Peking.

To achieve that end, the argument goes, two requirements existed. Sihanouk needed some forces of his own in Cambodia — which he has, though minimal — to balance the Khmer Rouge, who detest him from the days when his own regime oppressed them.

Second, and more important, the exiled Sihanouk needed a new legitimacy that only the United States could bestow. That means, these officials say, Sihanouk must be seen as the only instrument able to gain the end of American bombing and a change in government in Phnom Penh — something the Khmer Rouge were not able to do on the battlefield.

In a word, Sihanouk, with Nixon's help, would have the power to break the Cambodian stalemate. At the same time, U.S. officials believed that the continuing bombing would keep Lon Nol's government from collapsing and give it bargaining power to make the best deal possible with Sihanouk.

Before Congress stepped in on June 30, these senior officials maintain, all the pieces were falling in place. Sihanouk was screaming about the American bombing so as to gain maximum credit for ending it.

Hanoi, with the backing of Moscow and prospects of American economic aid dangled before it, was also moving toward a cease-fire compromise, insiders maintain. Such a "cease-fire in place," even with Sihanouk back in power, would guarantee Communist possession of the vital Cambodian sanctuaries along the South Vietnamese border.

Then Congress rebelled. Partly through erosion of presidential authority in the Watergate scandal, partly through disillusionment with Nixon's "peace with honor" in Vietnam, time finally ran out for the White House in Indochina.

SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, London
19 August 1973

NERVOUS NATION AFTER THE BOMBING

**CHRISTOPHER MULLIN reports from
Phnom Penh, capital of Cambodia**

A NERVOUS calm hangs over Cambodia since American bombing stopped at 11 a.m. local time (4 a.m. G.M.T.) on Wednesday. With the halt of the bombing it is believed that little stands between the estimated 50,000 insurgents and their final goal, the capture of Phnom Penh.

The week leading up to the halt was marked by a lull in the fighting with the insurgents apparently melting away from their positions around the capital allowing Government forces to occupy all the main roads. Predictably, the Government has interpreted the fall off in fighting as a victory. Most observers, however, believe that the Khmer Rouge Communist insurgents have simply dropped back to regroup for what could be the decisive battle in the struggle for Phnom Penh.

There are several possibilities. The insurgents could try to take the city by force—something they may want to leave as a last resort, since any all-out battle in the city could cause heavy civilian casualties and could cost the Communists a lot in goodwill.

They may once again cut the roads leading to the capital, as they did in March. They may also close the airport and the Mekong River route from Saigon. In this way they could slowly strangle the city which is believed to have supplies to last a little under two months.

Finally, there is the chance of a coup within the present régime resulting in more realistic leadership prepared to surrender the city to the Communists without a fight. The present ruling council is known to be hopelessly split and, as one ambassador put it: "I should be surprised if they hang together—a rather unfortunate phrase—for more than a few days".

Exactly what will happen once the insurgents are inside the city remains to be seen. Having spent six months on the receiving end of some of the heaviest

bombing of the whole Indo-China war, they are likely to be very angry men.

They have already made it clear that there will be no mercy for Cambodian President Lon Nol or any of his top men should they fall into Communist hands. Neither are they likely to feel too charitable disposed to the 200-strong staff of the American Embassy from where the bombing of Cambodia was supervised.

Last week, Prince Sihanouk, deposed Cambodia's head of state, warned all foreigners to leave Phnom Penh, saying that he could not be responsible for their safety. In the past ten days Communist leaflets have appeared in the city warning people to stay indoors in the event of street fighting.

The Western Embassies are taking no chances and have reduced personnel to an essential minimum. By the end of last week the British Embassy was operating on a skeleton staff of seven, having advised all British residents to evacuate.

Some people feel that the ill-disciplined, heavily-armed Government forces are a bigger threat to public safety than the invading Army. In the past week, within 150 yards of my hotel, two people have died in separate nightclub incidents involving trigger-happy Government soldiers.

One of the dead was an Englishman, Mr. Sidney Evans, who worked for a civil engineering firm. He died when an army major machine-gunned in broad daylight a bar in which Mr. Evans was sitting.

The Americans, meanwhile, have capped three years of extraordinary blunders in Cambodia by accidentally B-52ing the Government held-town of Neak Luong, about 30 miles from the capital. The accident caused more than 400 casualties including 140 dead. One man was said to have lost his wife and ten of his eleven children.

The bombing error, the biggest of the whole Indo-China war, was ascribed to "a computer error in Honolulu."

It is clear that although forced by Congress to stop bombing, the Americans have by no means given up their struggle to hold Cambodia. According to a high

Embassy official the bombing halt could have beneficial side-effects: "Up to now Government forces have relied so much on our airpower that they have not got the most from their own resources."

"The withdrawal of airpower will increase their anxiety and that may be just what is needed to boost their determination. Anxiety is not necessarily a bad thing."

Shortly before the bombing halt, the United States made the first of a series of gifts aimed at bolstering the tiny Cambodian airforce in anticipation of an end to the bombing.

U.S. Ambassador Mr. Emory Swank presented a C-123 transport plane to General Sosthene Fernandez, Cambodian Chief of Staff. The presentation ceremony took place against a backdrop of explosions as United States bombers continued to plaster the area around the airport.

At present the Cambodian airforce consists of 24 T-28s (with 12 more on the way) and a handful of DC3s, converted into gunships. The T-28s were built mainly as trainers and are capable of dropping just one 500 pound bomb compared with B-52s, which can drop 30 500 pounders.

As far as the Cambodian Government is concerned, it seems that until the last minute they simply did not believe that the United States would go ahead with its pledge to stop bombing.

Questioned as to how the Army would perform without the bombing, Cambodia's Prime Minister In Tam still appeared to hold out the possibility that it may be restarted. He said: "American aid will increase. If the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong still refuse to accept the Paris Agreement, then I hope the United States may intervene again."

The continued reference by the Government to the insurgents as "North Vietnamese and Viet Cong" is also a tinge of unreality since most observers now agree that the bulk of the enemy's fighting is being done by Cambodians.

The Prime Minister said that the enemy were regrouping for

a renewed assault which he believed would come in the autumn when Sihanouk was attending the conference of unaligned nations in Algiers. "After that I don't know what will happen. The fact that the Mekong River is running high is the only advantage for the defenders of Phnom Penh."

Commenting on reports that the South Vietnamese are considering intervening, the Prime Minister told me: "There is no possibility of South Vietnamese intervention. We hope that we can protect ourselves."

South Vietnamese are as much feared in Cambodia as their northern neighbours. During the 1971 invasion of Cambodia, they earned themselves lasting hatred because of their pre-occupation with looting the homes of their allies.

It is only fair to say that recent reports have greatly exaggerated the immediate threat to Phnom Penh. Unless there is an internal coup there is no prospect of the city falling in the very near future.

It seems possible that the strength of the insurgents has been over-estimated, partly as a result of the breathtaking incompetence of Cambodian Government forces.

Most of the area around the city is in Government hands. On Thursday I was one of several journalists who accompanied the Prime Minister on a whirlwind tour of Army posts and refugee camps which took us 40 miles south of the city along Highway Four. We were several times able to leave the Highway penetrating for as much as two miles into the surrounding countryside in complete safety.

Phnom Penh seems far from being a city under siege. The shops are full, even with imported luxuries such as greyhairs and Martini. If the people have any thoughts of the war they keep them to themselves.

Colourful posters depicting the fearless Cambodian Army laying waste to all enemy in their path are stuck to walls in all main streets. Whether they will be so brave when they have to face the enemy without the aid of B-52s remains to be seen.

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WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS

Washington, D. C., Thursday, August 16, 1973

Bombing Lament Hollow

By Henry S. Bradsher
Star-News Staff Writer

HONG KONG — The U.S. Government's lament that the congressional halt of bombing of Cambodia has destroyed the bargaining power for compromise settlement rights sounds hollow to close observers of the tortured Cambodian scene.

It is on the same level as the wishful thinking that has preoccupied politicians in Phnom Penh for more than six months to the exclusion of a realistic analysis of their worsening situation.

They have talked hopefully of being able to negotiate with the "good" Cambodians among those fighting President Lon Nol's government. There are a lot of soldiers out there in rice paddies and jungles who would like to rally to the government if only the North Vietnamese would not obstruct it, politicians have insisted.

When repeated a few days ago by Information Minister Sum Chhum, such remarks produced a flurry of "peace talks" stories. These continued the Cambodian tradition of obscuring the basic problem.

CONTRARY TO some U.S. government officials, there never seems to have been any realistic possibility of a compromise which would have salvaged American honor along with Lon Nol's. In another of many repeated — and repeatedly ignored — lessons that air power has only limited influence on the over-all development of an old-fashioned small unit ground war, the Cambodian situation had been steadily deteriorating years before congress began applying the brakes. Opponents of Lon Nol therefore had little incentive to

Interpretation

bargain even before the bombing halt was voted.

Prince Norodom Sihanouk has always adamantly opposed any compromise. Although it is doubtful that he controls all, or even very many, of the forces opposing Lon Nol, his attitude has been indicative of the reality which many U. S. and Cambodian officials tried to ignore.

Sihanouk said several days ago that the exile government which he ostensibly heads but does not claim to control "will unfailingly be established in Phnom Penh in the not too distant future after the ineluctable final victory" of Lon Nol's opponents. Sihanouk has been vague about what happens after that, what kind of government it will be and what it will do. The reason probably is that he does not know himself.

To fill this gap his aides have continued in recent days repeating Sihanouk's five point statement made March 23, 1970, five days after the Cambodian National Assembly, voted him out of power.

ISSUED IN TWO slightly different versions from Peking, the statement dissolved "for high treason" Lon Nol's government, forbade any cooperation with it, promised establishment under Sihanouk of an alternative government, assembly and army, and called upon Cambodians to join in a united front with "the task of liberating the country and rebuilding it after victory over the imperialist enemy and its lackeys."

This offers nothing new in guidance for the situation

which will develop if the end of American bombing leads to collapse of Lon Nol's regime. Sihanouk, who has said he represents the past and others will be the future of Cambodia, apparently feels unable to lay down policies for a new situation which is unfolding.

Sihanouk represents a past which has seemed increasingly attractive to Cambodian people as the war has worsened. Phnom Penh politicians have sought to ignore this popular feeling and they still talk of some part of the Lon Nol regime surviving.

VIRTUALLY EVERY politician of importance in Phnom Penh has been claiming for months that he is capable of rallying "good" Cambodians to the government side if only given a chance. Some, including colleagues of Lon Nol's in the high political council that is theoretically running the country have said privately if only Lon Nol would leave Cambodia then the insurgents would be willing

to join the government. But, aside from the fact that Lon Nol stubbornly refuses to desert his sinking ship, this ignores the attitude of Sihanouk and presumably of others that the entire gaggle of leading politicians in the Lon Nol regime must be banished — if not imprisoned or executed. Repeated reports of North Vietnamese Army troops holding Cambodian allies in line to prevent their defecting to the government might have some validity.

So the government talks of fighting on without American air power but with continued U. S. military supplies. Even that presents problems. The highways and the Mekong river into Phnom Penh have been kept open by U.S. bombing and might now be closed. A senior American official in Phnom Penh calls the city's airport "a logistical nightmare" and says it is physically incapable of handling enough U. S. cargo planes to keep the city of 2 million fed and the Cambodian Army fighting for long.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
16 August 1973

CAMBODIA ABANDONED

AMERICAN BOMBING in support of tottering Cambodia against Communist attack ended yesterday, as ordered by a reluctant and resentful President Nixon. "We are abandoning a friend," he said bitterly. These words, and the situation they describe, will have a depressing effect on non-Communists in that area—with the exception, on the "I'm all right, Jack" principle, of brash and short-sighted Mr. WHITLAM. America's more perceptive protégés farther afield will also have an uneasy feeling in their bones. For the first time Mr. Nixon, weakened by Watergate, has been brought to heel on a major strategic issue. A resurgent Congress, in taming him, is expressing the American public's utter rejection of this foreign commitment in particular and its mounting antipathy to foreign entanglements in general.

Against this American background there is a hollow sound about Mr. Nixon's warning to the North Vietnamese, who were not intimidated by him even at the height of his power. The whole situation in Cambodia and Laos is collapsing, militarily and politically. South Vietnam, which could have held its own on equal terms, will soon have its long flanks once more intolerably exposed, but this time without American help. China's intentions now face the acid test. Will she—as her part of the tacit bargain with America, and in order to curb Russian influence—impose restraint on Hanoi? It is all very well, and of great mutual benefit, for America to bring China into the balance of power against the growing threat from an over-strong Russia. But it would be a bad start if China (who has staked out a claim in Laos) and North Vietnam should embark on a comradely Communist carve-up of South-East Asia. It is high time to send Prince Sihanouk back into his own to establish a genuinely neutral régime with Chinese and American support.

WASHINGTON POST
14 August 1973

Cambodia: Nixon's Doctrine in 'Purest Form'

"Cambodia is the Nixon Doctrine in its purest form . . . because in Cambodia what we are doing is helping the Cambodians to help themselves . . . rather than go in and do the fighting ourselves, as we did in Korea and as we did in Vietnam."

—President Nixon, press conference, Nov. 12, 1971.

In extenuation of Watergate, we are regularly advised by President Nixon's supporters and by the President himself to cast aside such petty matters and to concentrate instead on the splendors of Mr. Nixon's foreign policy. This, we are told, is what history will remember—the break-through with China, the rapprochement with Russia, the Vietnam disengagement, the SALT agreement, the building of structures for peace. Well, perhaps so, for the President has obviously accomplished quite a lot in foreign policy, and in any case we would not wish to take anything away prematurely from Mr. Nixon's place in history; time will test the enduring virtue in all these accomplishments.

But if it can reasonably be said that the Nixon Doctrine is the centerpiece, the master plan for foreign policy, as he himself has proclaimed it to be, and if "Cambodia" was the Doctrine "in its purest form," then it is not unreasonable to take a look at where we are in Cambodia, compared with where we were four years ago. For we are at a critical juncture, with an American cease-fire, for all practical purposes, presumably due to go into effect in Cambodia and the rest of Indochina tonight at midnight by an act of Congress forbidding further air support. We say "presumably" because we now know that there was clandestine bombing for 14 months at a time when strict respect for Cambodia's integrity was being publicly pledged; we have the record now of tactical air strikes deep in Cambodia when only carefully limited "interdiction" of bombing in border areas was being publicly acknowledged; we have heard of falsified reports to Congress about these bombing attacks, and we are hearing disingenuous denials of responsibility for these false reports. Finally, for the sake of a face-saving compromise between the Congress and the President, we have had several weeks of senseless bombing of Cambodia by B52s in the face of a fixed cutoff commanded by law—a period in which there have been at least three serious cases of innocent persons being slaughtered by misplaced bombs.

In short, the record does not encourage a belief that this administration will abide by its public account of what it is doing in Cambodia, or that it will not seek some other furtive way to influence the outcome there. Consider the historical background. In a press conference on May 8, 1970, just after the "incursion" by American ground forces, Mr. Nixon said, "The United States is, of course, interested in the future of Cambodia, and the future of Laos, both of which, of course, as you know, are neutral countries. However, the United States, as I indicated in what is called the Guam or Nixon Doctrine, cannot take the responsibility to send American men in to defend the neutrality of countries that are unable to defend themselves." Secretary of State William P. Rogers was more explicit; on June 7, a month later, in an interview on "Face the Nation," he made it abundantly clear that it was no part of the administration's central purpose to save the government in Phnom Penh. He described its fall as something that would be "unfavorable" but "not unacceptable in the sense that

we would use American forces to support the government." While he conceded that the bombing of supply lines leading from Cambodia to South Vietnam might have a dual benefit of helping shore up the Cambodian government, he insisted that "our purpose is to interdict communications and supply lines."

At yet another point he said:

"But the fact is, and I think people forget this, that at the present time, the South Vietnamese have about 1,100,000 men trained and armed. There are about 100,000 Thais. There are about 100,000 Laotians; now, probably, 50,000 Cambodians. All together, that totals about three times the strength of North Vietnam. So there is no reason why those forces, the forces of freedom, cannot compete successfully against the forces of communism . . . There is just one enemy, North Vietnam, supplied by the Russians and the Chinese. And there are three times as many armed forces in the friendly nations, and they have about three times the combined population of North Vietnam."

So what happened? First, of course, the initial, clandestine bombing had failed to knock out the sanctuaries, which was why we invaded Cambodia with ground forces. But the ground "incursion," while it wreaked havoc with the sanctuaries, hardly lived up to its billing as a "decisive act." Afterward there came the invasion of Laos and then the great North Vietnamese offensive in upper South Vietnam, and finally the mining of Haiphong and the resumption of the bombing of the North which is generally credited with producing last January's cease-fire agreement.

And now what do we have? Well, we still have North Vietnam as the common enemy—but there is almost no evidence that the "forces of freedom" can compete successfully. The Canadian cease-fire observers in their farewell statement described a continuing state of war in South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese buildup continues at record rates, with rising alarm about a new Communist offensive. In Cambodia, the squeeze tightens around Phnom Penh, and the celebrated sanctuaries are at the full disposal of the North Vietnamese.

It is hard to imagine a sorer record of performance in terms of what this country was led to expect from our initial involvement in Cambodia. And this leaves aside, of course, what all this says about the nature of the Vietnam "cease-fire" about which so much has been made in connection with the President's competency in foreign policy. The real tragedy of it is that the President was right the first time, at least in what he said publicly, and yet he still does not seem to recognize how right he was. For Cambodia was never ours to win or to lose or to neutralize. That is what we had thought the Nixon Doctrine so wisely recognized. Had Mr. Nixon himself applied it he would now be accepting as unfortunate, but "not unacceptable," the natural consequences of a policy which did not presume American omnipotence and which never pretended to guarantee a happier outcome than the Cambodians were capable of achieving by their own efforts and their own will. Instead he has been talking about the terrible consequences, which he is pleased to hold Congress accountable for, of "abandoning a friend," and he has been threatening some sort of reprisals against "fresh aggression or further violations of the Paris agreements" by the North Vietnamese.

"The American people would respond to such ag-

gression with appropriate action," the President told Congress 10 days ago, and this we submit, is a stunning claim to make in the name of a people who have never been consulted about any of the most important aspects of our Cambodian policy over the past four years. Instead, we were given the Doctrine which was never applied until Congress finally got around to applying it by law over Mr. Nixon's objections.

That, in effect, is the meaning of tonight's bombing halt, for what the President will now be left to work

WASHINGTON STAR

12 August 1973

Support for Warring Armies Appears Slim in Cambodia

By Henry S. Bradsher
Star News Staff Writer

HONG KONG—While arguments in Washington focus on the legality of U.S. bombing in Cambodia, supporters of Prince Norodom Sihanouk have raised the basic question of what kind of war it is.

The United States began helping the regime which ousted Sihanouk in 1970 on the grounds that it was resisting external aggression by North Vietnam. At that time his supporters contended the conflict was a civil war among Cambodians.

Most independent observers have felt for a year or more that the growth of Cambodian forces fighting the Phnom Penh government of President Lon Nol has transformed the situation into a civil war. But Sihanouk's supporters are now arguing differently.

They claim that Lon Nol's total dependence upon American weapons, economic aid and bombing while popular support for his regime wanes, combined with the buildup of backing for his opponents, has changed the nature of the conflict into resistance against external aggression — by the United States against, the supposed majority of Cambodian people.

THE SITUATION is confused enough in Cambodia to make any clear cut judgments suspect. Particularly vague is the composition and political allegiance of those forces which now dominate most of Cambodia, have isolated many of the provincial towns and are threatening Phnom Penh.

The reduction of Lon Nol's regime to a minority government is generally

accepted by Cambodian observers.

It is questionable how much the Cambodian people are genuinely supporting the opponents however or merely going along with the winning side.

It is doubtful to most observers that Sihanouk has any control over the forces now battering at the gates of Phnom Penh.

Indeed, he has often admitted that the final word in any peace negotiations or political settlement would have to come from those inside Cambodia rather than from his exile headquarters in Peking. Sihanouk has referred in this context to the Khmer Rouge (Red Cambodians) but that is a blanket label which applies to a number of political elements without indicating just who is in control.

Some commentators have seen Sihanouk's refusal to discuss peace terms with Dr. Henry A. Kissinger as an example of hard bargaining with the U.S. presidential adviser.

IT SEEMS equally likely, perhaps even more likely, however, that Sihanouk went off to North Korea when Kissinger was originally expected in Peking this week because the Prince knew he lacked the authority to bargain on behalf of the Khmer Rouge.

Who does have power among Lon Nol's opponents? There is one element composed of nationalists who are fighting for independent Cambodia that is possibly leftist but not Communist. A second is led by Communist line elements who also want to keep Cambodia separate and free. And a third is dominated by Cambodians trained in North Vietnam as instruments of Hanoi's imperialistic designs on all of Indo-

china. Those persons inside Cambodia to whom Sihanouk defers, headed by Khieu Samphan, seem to fall into the second category. But it is possible they belong in the third group.

If the Lon Nol regime collapses and Phnom Penh falls, the situation might begin to clarify gradually. But there is no certainty of it.

A NEW LEADERSHIP appearing in Phnom Penh might be simply a Cambodian version of the Pathet Lao.

There is extensive evidence that the Pathet Lao leaders who are now arranging their share of power in Vientiane are front men for Hanoi with little nationalistic independence. U.S. intelligence reports say that Cambodian troops now besieging Phnom Penh are advised, armed and generally guided by North Vietnamese. They are locally recruited soldiers for the war which Hanoi wants fought in Cambodia, American officials contend.

No one can be very sure, including U.S. intelligence officers, just how far this is true — how much the war is now and extension of North Vietnamese policy rather than Cambodian nationalism with North Vietnamese backing. It is obviously true, however, that this fits into the old American contention that Cambodia is suffering from external aggression. That was the original U.S. justification for helping Lon Nol after he overthrew Sihanouk with, according to former Premier Son Ngoc Thanh, the encouragement of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. President Nixon declared in late 1970 that "Cambodia is the Nixon doctrine in its purest form."

Calling Cambodia "a con-

crete illustration of Nixon doctrine principles" Nixon told Congress in February 1971 those principles were an "assumption of primary responsibility for its own defense; help from regional friends; (and) our support through military and economic assistance."

SOME OBSERVERS in Phnom Penh now feel Lon Nol has abdicated the primary defense responsibility to American bombers. They question how much regional help would have come without U.S. stimulation and compensation. At a news conference Dec. 10, 1970, Nixon said a quarter billion dollar aid program for Cambodia then pending in Congress "is, in my opinion, probably the best investment in foreign assistance that the United States had made in my political lifetime." The aid is so that Cambodians "can defend themselves against a foreign aggressor — this is no civil war, it has no aspect of a civil war," Nixon declared. This argument is turned upside down by Sihanouk's supporters.

The Premier of the prince's exile regime, Penn Nouth, expressed their attitude two months ago. His statement from Peking, June 12 attached the "third force" idea of a compromise that would have established more than one government in Cambodia. The war must go on until the destruction of Lon Nol, he said. "The essence of war in Cambodia" Penn Nouth said, was a war of aggression against the Cambodian nation and people by U.S. imperialism. The Cambodian nation and people have waged a peoples war for liberation... therefore, this is not a so-called civil war between brothers...

BEHIND the Marxist-

23 August 1973

North Vietnamese phrasing of this line, which is frequently repeated by the news agency of forces opposing Lon Nol, is a serious argument over who represents the majority of people in Cambodia now.

Lon Nol's claim is ebbing, but whether that of his opponents rests on anything more than bayonets and the negative element of popular desire for peace at any price remains to be seen.

NEW YORK TIMES
10 August 1973

Oust U.S. Troops, Lon Nol Is Advised By Amin of Uganda

KAMPALA, Uganda, Aug. 9 (UPI)—President Idi Amin sent "sincere and brotherly advice" to Cambodia's President, Lon Nol, today, telling him to get American troops out of his country since President Nixon was too busy with his own personal problems to know what they were doing.

General Amin, in one of a series of cables to various heads of government, told President Lon Nol that American action was not in the best interest of Cambodia and suggested that an American bombing mistake early this week was really a mistake.

General Amin, whose message was broadcast by the Kampala radio, said he was sending Mr. Nixon a copy.

"The American action supposedly in assistance of your country against your brothers and sisters is not in the best interests of your country and should be stopped and American troops removed immediately for the good of the country and the world," General Amin said.

"I further advise you to negotiate a reconciliation" with Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the ousted Head of State now in exile, "quickly in a spirit of understanding, love, trust and brotherhood," General Amin said.

He said that his cable was prompted by the American bombing of the Cambodian village of Neak Luong.

The Nixon doctrine in fringe Asia

By Charles W. Yost

New York

With the end last week of direct United States participation in the Cambodian war, the U.S. may perhaps hope that the curtain has rung down at last on the long tragedy of its military involvement in Indo-China.

One must take the precaution of saying "may perhaps hope" because the President and the Secretary of Defense continue to address stern warnings to Hanoi that, if it resumes the offensive in Vietnam, the U.S. will resume its bombing from air bases in Thailand or elsewhere.

These warnings confirm that the administration still holds the U.S. unilaterally responsible for enforcing the Paris agreements on Indo-China. It seems therefore, oddly enough, prepared to permit Hanoi to make the decision, so critical to the health of American society, whether or not the U.S. again becomes militarily involved in Vietnam.

Fortunately it would not appear that the Congress in its present mood would be willing to allow either Hanoi or the President to make such a decision unilaterally. If U.S. bombing should be resumed, it would probably provoke such a general outcry that it would be of very short duration.

However, other leftovers of American commitments in East Asia may, in the longer run, provide even greater risk of military reinvolvement. These are the continuing relationships with Thailand, Korea, and the Philippines, to whom the U.S. has, over the past two decades, extended both sweeping defense commitments and impressive military support.

The Nixon doctrine began four years ago to dilute these obligations to the extent that while reaffirming American treaty commitments and the nuclear umbrella, the doctrine said that henceforth the U.S. would look to those nations directly threatened to provide the manpower for their defense.

A story from Washington last week reported that, in another step in this same sense, Secretary Rogers expects henceforth to stress the non-military aspects of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, of which two of the above mentioned three countries are members. This is a sober recognition of reality since most other members of that organization have long since tended to ignore it and Prime Minister Whitlam of Australia has recently described it as "moribund."

Nevertheless, the fact is that, whatever may be the case with their other nominal allies, the U.S. remains very closely tied to these three countries. Over and above treaty obligations, the U.S. has about 40,000 troops in Korea; it has about 45,000 troops and a number of substantial air bases in Thailand; it has naval and air bases and about 16,000 troops in the Philippines.

It is also worth noting that all three of these countries are governed by

dictatorial regimes which have in recent months been tightening rather than loosening their authoritarian control of their populations. It is, of course, not appropriate or feasible for the U.S. to determine the form of government of its allies, nor indeed in a diverse world to limit its aid to those few willing and able to practice its style of democracy.

Still it is pertinent to inquire seriously, in each case where American aid may be the major factor determining the survival of a regime, whether that regime is primarily concerned with the welfare of its people or with the enrichment of its governing clique.

In the latter case there is a real question whether the U.S. may not be backing the wrong horse, whether a regime that is both authoritarian and corrupt can meet the rising expectations of its younger generation and can compete over the long run with more honest and progressive political movements, whether democratic or also authoritarian.

With regard to Thailand, Korea, and the Philippines, the U.S. may have painted itself into an uncomfortable corner. While in fact disapproving of much that these regimes have recently done and being skeptical of their future prospects if they continue on this course, it nevertheless implicitly encourages them to do precisely that by keeping its support at traditionally extravagant levels.

The U.S. maintains so close an association with them that it appears at least to share responsibility for all they do. If they come under serious attack, from either outside or inside, they will appeal to the U.S. for military support, and the U.S. will be tempted to supply it because, if they fail, their failure might seem to be America's failure.

If the U.S. wishes at the same time to apply the Nixon doctrine effectively, to lessen its responsibility for political behavior it cannot control, and to escape possible military involvement in three more Asian countries, it is time it lowered its much too conspicuous profile there.

According to latest reports, even the Thai Government finds the magnitude of America's embrace a little embarrassing and is asking that it phase down its presence. Whether or not the other two governments follow suit, a prompt and steady reduction of U.S. military forces there would be in both America's and their interest.

Each of them is already well equipped to deal with any external attack which is at all likely to occur. Whether they can deal with the internal opposition depends entirely on how they behave, not on how the U.S. does.

The author of this article writes from a background of 40 years as a United States diplomat.

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WASHINGTON POST
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Hidden History of U.S. Moves in Cambodia Emerging

By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

A hidden history of American military operations began emerging last week that challenges the basic record of United States involvement in the Cambodian war.

The significance of the piecemeal disclosures concerning Cambodia, plus other clandestine U.S. operations in Indochina that are now arousing congressional inquiry, transcends the dispute that suddenly forced the subject to the surface: falsification of records on secret American B-52 bombing of Cambodia in 1969-70.

New facts now available not only overturn the official version of how the United States entered the Cambodian war, but also illuminate the earliest roots of what has become known as the Watergate scandal.

News Analysis

The small nation of Cambodia, which the Nixon administration calls "the last lingering corner" of the Indochina war, now has come full circle in its rebounding impact on the American scene.

What the Nixon administration perceived as a vital need to conceal its secret actions in Cambodia, and elsewhere in the world, initiated the Watergate psychosis. The congressional rebellion over the sweeping use of presidential power in the Watergate pattern, as an administration official conceded last week, now has undermined presidential influence in the world. The reaction on Capitol Hill to Watergate, in turn, helped to embolden Congress to force a cutoff date of Aug. 15 on American bombing in Cambodia, or any further American combat throughout Indochina.

As a result, the administration now faces the Aug. 15 deadline in a position of extraordinary diplomatic weakness to bargain effectively to extricate the United States from Cambodia. To magnify the administration's dilemma, it may have to negotiate with deposed Cambodian Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who charges that he was removed from power as a result of Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. military machinations.

The riots that ripped American college campuses in the spring and summer of 1970 over the April 30, 1970, crossing of Cambodia's border by American troops were based on a highly limited amount of information then available about the U.S. record in Cambodia.

There was no public knowledge that for the previous 13 months the United States had been conducting massive bombings of Communist "sanctuaries" in Cambodia, with 3,620 B-52 runs between March, 1969, and April, 1970.

Nor does the official public record show, even now, that for years before the open American border crossing,

CIA and Special Forces units (Green Berets) were clandestinely supporting anti-Sihanouk forces, known as the Khmer Serei, in operations across the South Vietnamese-Cambodian border.

These secret activities are now liable to exposure in inquiries scheduled on CIA operations throughout Indochina, and further investigation of the falsified bombing reports.

No one can state with certainty what repercussions there might have been on the elections in 1970 and 1972 if the full state of American involvement in Cambodia were known in 1970.

President Nixon said last May 22 that the American reaction to known events in Cambodia reached "critical proportions" in mid-1970. He cited "nearly 1,800 campus demonstrations," "nearly 250 cases of arson on campus," and fatal clashes with law-enforcement forces on the campuses of Kent State University in Ohio and Jackson State University in Mississippi.

Administration alarm over the risk of exposure of its secrets about Cambodia and other subjects of high sensitivity led to creation of the "plumbers" unit in the White House, and the spreading web of officially authorized wiretapping and break-ins to find security leaks.

What concerned the Nixon administration was not so much the kind of information later leaked in 1971 by Daniel Ellsberg in the Pentagon Papers about American activity in Vietnam under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. The Nixon administration was appalled about the risk of disclosure of its win secret operations and negotiations.

Public attention was focused last week on only the narrowest consequence of Cambodian secrecy, the officially falsified bombing reports. Assistant Defense Secretary Jerry W. Friedhelm on Friday acknowledged that senior Pentagon officials made "a blunder of some magnitude" by sending Congress falsified reports that listed 3,630 bombing raids as having taken place in South Vietnam.

If that were all that has been revealed, or is now subject to disclosure in greater detail, the Nixon administration would have suffered an awkward, but not grievous, embarrassment.

Instead, the whole official U.S. history of how the Nixon administration enmeshed itself in Cambodia is now open to question.

On April 30, 1970, President Nixon startled the nation by announcing that attacks by American and South Vietnamese armed forces "are being launched this week to clean out major enemy sanctuaries on the Cambodian-Vietnam border."

This kind of operation was often proposed to President Johnson by U.S. military leaders, and repeatedly rejected in grounds it would be a dangerous widening of the war with unpredictable consequences.

President Nixon said there was a

sudden, drastic change in the situation.

For five years, he said, "North Vietnam has occupied military sanctuaries all along the Cambodian frontier with South Vietnam," using them for "hit-and-run attacks" on American and South Vietnamese troops across the border.

"North Vietnam in the last two weeks," President Nixon said, "has stripped away all pretense of respecting the sovereignty or neutrality of Cambodia."

The North Vietnamese troops, he said, suddenly had moved westward, in the opposite direction of the South Vietnamese border; "thousands of their soldiers are invading the country from the sanctuaries; they are encircling the capital of Phnom Penh." If "this enemy effort succeeds" in controlling Cambodia, the President said, "Cambodia would become a vast enemy staging area and a springboard for attacks on South Vietnam along 600 miles of frontier," jeopardizing the lives of Americans there and the entire U.S. program of troop withdrawals from South Vietnam.

Since 1954, Mr. Nixon said, it had been U.S. policy "to scrupulously respect the neutrality of the Cambodian people."

"For five years," he said, "neither the United States nor South Vietnam has moved against those enemy sanctuaries because we did not wish to violate the territory of a neutral nation. Even after the Vietnamese Communists began to expand these sanctuaries four weeks ago, we counseled patience to our South Vietnamese allies and imposed restraints on our own commanders."

No longer, however, the President said, could the United States sit by "like a pitiful, helpless giant" when "the chips are down."

Last week, U.S. officials, in the course of explaining the falsified B-52 bombing report, gave a drastically different account of how the United States first came to take major military action against the "sanctuaries" in Cambodia.

Very early in the Nixon administration, they said, the subject of U.S. troop withdrawals was directly linked to suppressive military action against the Communist bases in Cambodia.

In March, 1969, Pentagon spokesman Friedheim said on Tuesday, Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, the U.S. commander in South Vietnam, "was beginning to get his forces ready for the first withdrawal increment" of U.S. forces — although that was not announced until June, 1969, an initial pullback of 25,000 men.

Friedheim recalled that Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird, the prime promoter of the program of U.S. troop withdrawals from South Vietnam, visited South Vietnam in March, 1969.

Laird "went precisely to see in what manner it would be safe to accomplish the withdrawal program that the ad-

ministration wished to accomplish over the next few years," said Friedheim.

In the discussions with Laird, the spokesman continued, "General Abrams said if you want me to withdraw half a million Americans in a safe way, I would like very much to be able to deal with the threat which comes from these sanctuary areas."

"It was determined that that was a reasonable request for the U.S. commander to make," said Friedheim. The United States, he said, mounted "a major interdiction campaign" of B-52 bombing raids against the sanctuary areas.

The target areas were "essentially the same ones" later to be struck by ground troops. Friedheim acknowledged the "Fishhook" area where the Cambodian border projects deeply into South Vietnam, "the tri-border area" and other Communist base areas.

A newsmen asked Friedheim last Tuesday:

"You're sort of implying that the [B-52] raids weren't very effective, that we had to go in on the ground afterwards?"

"Certainly they were not satisfactory in and of themselves apparently, in the military judgment involved," Friedheim agreed.

Through a peculiar combination of circumstances, Prince Sihanouk, who was then Cambodia's ruler, never acknowledged the bombing raids. That was the original U.S. justification invoked for keeping them secret, that Sihanouk privately "acquiesced" in the air attacks because the uninvited Vietnamese Communist presence in his country was expanding to intolerable lengths.

Sihanouk, since his ouster in a coup launched in March 18, 1970, by anti-Communist and pro-American Lon Nol, the current President of the American-supported regime in Cambodia, has remained silent about the secret American bombing raids of 1969-70. But Sihanouk has charged that he was overthrown by an American-plotted coup arranged with Lon Nol and his supporters, which Nixon administration officials then and now firmly deny.

The sequence of U.S. operations in Cambodia now spread on the public record, however, and the still unacknowledged history of clandestine American and South Vietnamese operations across the Cambodian border in the

1969-1970 period and earlier years, is bound to revive questions about the circumstances of Sihanouk's overthrow.

Elliot L. Richardson, now Attorney General, on May 24 at a farewell press conference on his brief tenure as Defense Secretary said in a discussion about secrecy in the Indochina war:

"Of course, you know the circumstances under which the bombing of Cambodia was kept secret—I think there were some legitimate considerations in that context when Sihanouk in effect was anxious not to be put in a position in which he was aware of it or had acquiesced in it. But once Sihanouk was out [March 18, 1970] that consideration disappeared."

But that obviously was not the premise on which the Nixon administration bureaucracy operated until last week, when the falsification of the bombing reports was first revealed as a result of congressional challenge.

Moreover, the Nixon administration's claim of continuing "military operational and diplomatic sensitivities" still withholds from the public record the history of years of American clandestine involvement in Cambodia.

Although some of these secret activities have leaked into public print, the distinction between official and unofficial disclosures can be enormous in public—and political—consequences. A prime example is that there was a partial disclosure of the secret B-52 bombing of Cambodia as early as May 9, 1969, first printed in The New York Times.

That news leak touched off some of the early alarm inside the Nixon administration which precipitated creation of the White House "plumbers" group. But the intensity and duration of the B-52 bombing was never hinted at until last week, nor was the significance of that prolonged action on the entire course of developments in Cambodia.

Sihanouk once said of his once-placid kingdom of 7 million people, "We are a country caught between the hammer and the anvil."

For years he balanced delicately between the United States, China, North Vietnam and the Soviet Union. In 1965 he broke diplomatic relations with the United States, charging CIA plotting against his regime and flagrant violations of his border by American planes engaged in the Vietnamese war.

Between 1965 and 1969, Sihanouk se-

cretly permitted supplies for the Vietnamese Communist forces to be transported across Cambodia. His underdeveloped nation, he said, had little choice in the matter.

Last month, in an interview in Romania, Sihanouk said that "my greatest mistake was 1963, when I rejected American aid," but he said the terms for aid had become humiliating.

Sihanouk said that to placate his army—then headed by Lon Nol—which was dismayed over the loss of American military assistance, he opened the port of Sihanoukville to Chinese ships to deliver military supplies to Vietnamese Communist forces emplaced on Cambodia's border with South Vietnam.

"There was two-thirds [of the supplies] for the Vietcong, and one-third for my army," Sihanouk said.

But by 1967, Sihanouk began protesting publicly that his nation was getting the worst of the bargain from all directions.

Sihanouk said the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong were supporting "the Khmer Vietcong," or pro-Communist Cambodian rebels against his regime, and "because the Khmer Communists have mistreated us, we are compelled to repress them." But from the other direction, he said, "the Khmer Serei, Americans, Vietnamese, Thai and South Koreans [based in South Vietnam] have joined forces in attacking us."

In June, 1969, however, as he saw signs that the United States appeared to be preparing to pull out of Indochina with its halt to the bombing of North Vietnam in late 1968, Sihanouk feared that he might be left to grapple alone with the Vietnamese Communists in his country; he renewed diplomatic ties with Washington.

The Lon Nol regime, which replaced Sihanouk, presented an outright ultimatum to the North Vietnamese and Vietcong to withdraw, and closed the port of Sihanoukville to their forces.

This was a threat the new regime in Phnom Penh woefully lacked the physical capacity to sustain. It appealed to the United States for urgent military support.

To many U.S. military leaders this was "a golden opportunity" rather than a crisis to be shunned; an opportunity to strike on the grounds at the Communist "sanctuaries" that had survived 13 months of B-52 bombing.

NEW YORK TIMES

20 August 1973

'Anachronistic Relic'

Seven years ago, Presidential aspirant Richard M. Nixon described the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization as "a somewhat anachronistic relic." That was an understatement then. It is even more so today.

Assembled by John Foster Dulles as a barrier to Chinese expansion after the collapse of French resistance in Vietnam in 1954, SEATO was dominated from the start by Western nations—the United States, Britain, France, New Zealand and Australia. There were only three Asian members—the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan—and one of those, Pakistan, is not a part of Southeast Asia. Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and India refused to join.

France and Pakistan quickly lost interest in the organization and stopped participating in its meetings. Pakistan formally withdrew last year. Other members have been generally lukewarm. Nevertheless, the Nixon Administration, like its predecessors, has tried strenuously to keep

SEATO alive, despite the President's expressed misgivings and the profound regional and worldwide changes that have taken place since his election.

Secretary of State Rogers has announced that he plans to meet with SEATO ministers at the United Nations next month in an attempt to revive this moribund alliance—this time with more stress on increased economic cooperation and less on military aspects of the pact. Welcome as is this shift in emphasis, SEATO is hardly the appropriate vehicle for a serious cooperative endeavor to improve trade and lift economic standards in Southeast Asia. It would be more practical and more in keeping with the changed international climate to channel future American assistance to the region through more representative regional agencies set up for peaceful purposes, such as the Association for Southeast Asian Nations.

No matter how it may be altered, SEATO will remain a truncated anachronism; the symbol of a cold-war policy of military intervention that has now been discarded.

State Department Asserts Sihanouk Solicited Raids

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 25—The State Department today defended the 1969-70 secret bombing of Cambodia by asserting that Prince Norodom Sihanouk, then Cambodia's leader, solicited the secret American raids to rid his country of North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces.

At the same time, the department sought to refute the views of several senators who suggested yesterday that Secretary of State William P. Rogers had been less than candid about the systematic B-52 raids when he discussed Cambodia in closed hearings of the Foreign Relations Committee in April, 1970.

Charles W. Bray 3d, the department spokesman, said that Mr. Rogers mentioned the raids in testimony on April 2 and April 27, 1970, and that at least three senators had asked questions about the raids.

Not Free With Details

But the spokesman acknowledged that Mr. Rogers had not volunteered details on the magnitude of the raids which became public only last week.

Mr. Bray said he "presumed" that if Mr. Rogers had been asked by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for details of the raids, he would have provided them. But in fact, Mr. Bray added, no such detailed questions were asked.

The disclosure of the secret raids came last week after a former Air Force major, Hal M. Knight of Memphis, told the Senate Armed Services committee that early in 1970, he participated in widespread falsification of records being circulated within the military. The false records showed the bombing targets to be in Vietnam.

After Mr. Knight's disclosure, the Pentagon acknowledged that between March, 1969, and May, 1970, more than 3,600 sorties by B-52's were carried out in Cambodia, close to the South Vietnamese border. More than 100,000 tons of bombs were dropped on points described as Communist sanctuaries.

The magnitude of the bombing came as a shock to many members of Congress and to many State Department officials.

The department made public its accounts of the exchanges with Prince Sihanouk to support its contention that the raids had his sanction and therefore did not violate the neutrality or sovereignty of Cambodia.

The first such exchange, the department said, took place on Jan. 10, 1968, when Chester W. Bowles, then the Ambassador to India, was sent on a special mission to Phnom Penh to discuss with Prince Sihanouk the re-establishment of diplomatic relations.

At that time, there was con-

siderable discussion in the American press about the possibility that American troops based in South Vietnam might cross the border into Cambodia in "hot pursuit" of Communist troops going back and forth into South Vietnam.

According to the State Department version of the Bowles talks, Prince Sihanouk "stated that while he could not say so officially, the United States had the opportunity to exercise hot pursuit."

"He said he would not mind the United States going into the unpopulated area," the account continued, "and while he might protest to both those seeking sanctuary in Cambodia and those exercising hot pursuit, he would be very glad if the United States solved his problem."

According to the State Department version, Prince Siha-

nouk said "he could not be opposed to hot pursuit in uninhabited areas since the United States would thereby be liberating Cambodia."

"He said he wanted the United States to force the Vietcong to leave Cambodia," the account continued, "and that in unpopulated areas, where there are no Cambodians, he would shut his eyes."

The second exchange with Prince Sihanouk, the State Department said, took place in August, 1969, five months after the secret bombing had begun. In the midst of a long conversation with the Senate majority leader, Mike Mansfield, a long-time friend, the Cambodian Chief of State was quoted as saying that "there had not been Cambodian protests of bombings in his country when these hit only Vietcong and not Cambodian villages or population."

Mr. Bray said that "in this context, it is our view that during the period under discussion, March, 1969, to May, 1970, and to the best of our present ability to assemble facts, the only protests, public or private, which we received from the Cambodian Government involved those relatively few instances when there was accidental damage to Cambodian property, houses, livestock, or injury to Cambodians."

But Senator Mansfield, when asked about the State Department version of his conversation with Prince Sihanouk, said, "I don't recall that in any way, shape or form."

"To the best of my knowledge," Senator Mansfield added, "Sihanouk never mentioned the fact of the bombing."

Mr. Bray, when told about this, said that as the conversation occurred four years ago, "I don't find it surprising that the gentleman could not recollect."

Senator J. W. Fulbright, the committee chairman, said that he did not remember Mr. Rogers's saying anything about the bombing.

But on the House side, Representative Thomas E. Morgan, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, said that his panel had been informed, and "we knew they were bombing sanctuaries over there at Sihanouk's invitation."

Prince Sihanouk, leader of a Cambodian government in exile that he formed after being ousted by a coup d'état in March, 1970, told The New York Times in a cablegram yesterday that he never authorized the raids. But American officials have not said that he was asked for authorization, only that he gave his tacit approval.

Prince Sihanouk's message said, in full:

"The disclosure made by the Defense Department of the United States — to the effect that American air strikes against Cambodia were carried out beginning at the start of 1969 — quite simply proves that already, at that time, the United States Government was working toward the overthrow of the Khmer Chief of State, Norodom Sihanouk, because those bombing raids were certainly not carried out against so-called Vietcong sanctuaries, but in fact against Cambodian garrisons and villages.

"The raids were intended to convince the Cambodian people that I was incapable of bringing them peace. As for the assertion that I authorized those raids against my own people and my own country, that is like saying that I authorized the C.I.A. to carry out, along with the Lon Nol clique, the coup d'état of March 18, 1970, against myself."

The decision to begin the secret bombing of Cambodia was made by the National Security Council at the White House in March, 1969, the

Pentagon has said, in order to protect American forces in South Vietnam and provide for the start of the withdrawal of some of them that spring.

Mr. Bray could not provide any information on whether the United States contacted Prince Sihanouk about the start of the bombing.

That he did not protest was apparently interpreted in Washington as a sign that the Prince approved, and secrecy was maintained for fear that public disclosure would lead to a protest and force the end of the raids.

Mr. Rogers testified in a closed session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee after Prince Sihanouk's ouster, and amid speculation that the United States and South Vietnam would invade Cambodia. The invasion began on April 30 and May 1, 1970.

'Our Hearts Are Pure'

Full transcripts of the April 2 and April 27 testimony have not been made public, but excerpts made available to The Times yesterday quoted Mr. Rogers as saying, "Cambodia is one country where we can say with complete assurance that our hands are clean and our hearts are pure."

Mr. Bray said today that these excerpts "may not fully reflect what the Secretary told the committee or the sense of the discussion."

He said that Mr. Rogers, on April 2 in his opening remarks, "ran through the recent history of United States relations with Cambodia, noting the gradually improving relations which had led to the re-establishment of embassies, and noted that from time to time, the Cambodian Government made statements that made it clear that it did not object to bombings by the United States in Cambodia so long as there were no Cambodians in the area."

NEW YORK TIMES
23 July 1973

A.U.S. Correspondent Is Expelled by Saigon

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, July 21—Jacques Leslie, a correspondent here for The Los Angeles Times, has been ordered by the Government to leave South Vietnam.

Mr. Leslie said Saturday that he had been given no explanation, but that he believed his difficulties with the Government of President Nguyen Van Thieu began shortly after the cease-fire, when he became the first American correspondent to visit a Vietcong-controlled village.

Since then, Mr. Leslie has angered the Government with articles on corruption, political prisoners and the alleged misbehavior of Saigon troops. He said that a Government spokesman, Bui Bao Truc, had cited such articles last month in explaining why his visa had not been renewed. Mr. Truc could not be reached for comment.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
12 August 1973

Moscow, Peking, Hanoi Leaders Kept It Secret Too---Why?

BY GEORGE McARTHUR
Times Staff Writer

SAIGON—Since North Vietnam is now his public friend, Cambodia's sometime neutralist Prince Norodom Sihanouk can hardly admit that he had approved American B-52 raids against Hanoi's soldiers in his country back in 1969-70.

On the other hand, Hanoi's ruling Communist Party Politburo is unlikely to make a public issue of the prince's previous conduct. Hanoi never admitted sending troops to Cambodia in the first place. In addition, however, there were many things going on back then that Hanoi doesn't care to talk about.

For that matter, Sihanouk's complicity in the bombing was only grudgingly admitted by U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers, who did not see fit to go further into a secret item code-named Vesuvius or other cloak and dagger projects of the period.

There also are diplomats in Moscow, Peking and even Canberra, Australia, who are keeping quiet about the strange deeds of those devious days. The intricate rivalries and relations among all these people enabled the United States to bomb North Vietnamese camps in Cambodia for 14 months in virtual secrecy.

Apart from the complex entanglement, which made all parties hesitant to "go public," Western diplomats and intelligence specialists will only speculate on the specific reasons why Moscow and Peking kept silent — though they must have known of the bombings from Hanoi if not from occasional speculation in the Western press or from reports from their own embassies in Phnom Penh.

"You must remember the tensions between China and Moscow in 1969," said one American Asia expert, noting that was the year of the Sino-Soviet fighting on the Ussuri River. (Prof. William E. Griffith, a highly respected sinologist from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology has suggested that the Soviet Union secretly gave China a nuclear ultimatum that year.)

"Both Russia and China were already looking toward the United States. In those circumstances they were as content as Sihanouk to keep quiet," the American diplomat speculated.

Sihanouk's sprawling capital of Phnom Penh was a deceptively languid scene in those days. On the surface it was the last charming city in Indochina—the broad boulevards, pagodas and French colonial buildings unmarred by barbed wire. The

city's sybarites frequented Madame Tchoum's opium parlor or the casino or the floating restaurants on the Mekong—with sometimes a gala at the palace where exquisite dancers in golden costumes recalled the ancient glories of Angkor.

Beneath all this, however, was corruption and fear. Government soldiers at night would block whole highways and by-passes around the city while arms and rice convoys rolled through toward North Vietnamese and Viet Cong camps on the border and in the northern provinces. There was enough hanky-panky going on to stock a dozen grade-B spy thrillers.

The theatrical prince, in between filming his own grade-B movies, was engaged in a juggling act so intricate that all the pieces have yet to come down.

In 1967, Sihanouk was convinced that the Americans would be kicked out of South Vietnam within two years.

"Wait and see," he challenged a rare visiting group of newsmen in angry, high-pitched tones.

But he changed his mind—the unfailing trait that has always made Sihanouk's friends and enemies unsure and prone to secrecy and discretion in his capital.

The failure of the Communist 1968 Tet offensive to overthrow the Saigon government gave Sihanouk disturbing second thoughts. The North Vietnamese on his territory were becoming more numerous daily. His economy was precarious and his army virtually helpless. He was probably aware of another top-secret operation code-named Daniel Boone under which American Green Beret officers were leading patrols of dissident ethnic Cambodians into the border sanctuaries.

At any rate he became receptive to information from Washington. Highly secret and sensitive Operation Vesuvius was born. Couriers began to give Sihanouk very precise information—much of it from air reconnaissance photos—on just how extensive the North Vietnamese infiltration was.

The middle man was almost certainly Australian Ambassador Noel St. Clair Deschamps, the most able diplomat in Phnom Penh and one of the few Westerners trusted by Sihanouk.

The Americans avoided using the Central Intelligence Agency because of Sihanouk's abiding distaste for that organization.

It is unclear whether Sihanouk approved the initial B-52 raids which now began. He had earlier hinted that he would approve such raids if they were conducted without his knowledge. At any rate the raids were put on a regular basis and he was soon getting regular in-

formation on results.

The reestablishment of diplomatic relations with the United States in mid-1969 then made it starkly clear that Sihanouk was edging away from his previous intimacy with Peking, Hanoi and Moscow. He confirmed this with two unusual moves, one public and one secret.

The secret move was to close the port of Sihanoukville to the North Vietnamese arms and rice trade.

Then in October, 1969—quite obviously using information furnished by the Americans—Sihanouk published in his personal magazine *Le Sangkum* an official report from then Prime Minister Lon Nol. The bombshell report stated publicly for the first time that there were 40,000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong regulars on Cambodian territory, plus some home-grown Red forces. The prince thus permitted public discussions of all the stories that had been hotly whispered for months.

Much of this transpired in obscurity simply because the prince had long virtually barred the Western press from Cambodia and tightly controlled all that was written inside the country. The Communist bloc correspondents in his country were almost openly intelligence agents. Their private reports—which were doubtless voluminous and acid—caused soul-searching in all the Communist capitals. But nobody was going to blow the whistle. The big ball game remained in South Vietnam. The outcome was unclear and the mercurial prince might change his mind again.

Having set all this in motion Sihanouk set off on a mysteriously long trip to France. He announced he would visit Moscow and Peking on his eventual trip home. There are signs Sihanouk had set up Lon Nol—then out of royal favor although prime minister—as something of a patsy. Sihanouk wanted things to get worse and then be recalled home to save the situation. For their own interests he hoped Moscow and Peking would help him restrain Hanoi. He was well aware of the high tension building between Moscow and Peking and had used it in the past.

The play did not follow Sihanouk's scenario, however. When Phnom Penh's previously pliant politicians voted Sihanouk out of power in March, 1970, the move was overwhelmingly welcomed in the major populated areas of Cambodia if not the countryside. Moscow has never formally broken relations with the present Phnom Penh government.

While Peking gave him free radio time and safe haven and is now building him a private swimming

NEW YORK TIMES
20 July 1973

At a Glance: Dispute Over Secret Raids on Cambodia

THE BOMBING

In March, 1969, President Nixon authorized a secret B-52 bombing campaign against Vietcong supply and staging areas in Cambodia. Over the next 14 months 3,630 raids were flown and more than 100,000 tons of bombs dropped—all without public acknowledgment by the United States.

Most of the targets were suspected enemy troop areas, but the campaign, sustained as it was, apparently was a failure because the President was forced to order the invasion of Cambodia in May, 1970, in an effort to defeat the Vietcong.

THE REPORTING

As the campaign is reconstructed here, the White House directed that it be wrapped in stringent secrecy but reportedly did not specify how this was to be done. Pentagon officials now say that officers of the Strategic Air Command, which flies the B-52's, constructed what has been termed a "double entry" system. That system required that correct information about the bombing be relayed by a highly secure communications channel to the White House and the Pentagon, while false information indicating that the strikes took place in Vietnam was provided to the military's own internal reporting system.

Such high officials as Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's national security adviser and two men in office during the bombing, former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird and Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concede that they knew the bombings were taking place. But they deny that they knew the records were being falsified or destroyed and have, in fact, deplored and disavowed those actions.

WHO CONTROLLED THE BOMBING

Military and civilian sources say that the targets were chosen by a handful of civilians and officers in the Pentagon and approved by the National Security Council.

From Washington the orders apparently went to a special coordinating unit of the Strategic Air Command, known as SAC Advon, at the headquarters of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, in Saigon. Special officers flew the orders to four radar stations, which radioed them to the bombers as they flew to South Vietnam from Guam. After the mission copies of the orders were apparently burned or otherwise destroyed and the false reports were filed.

Damage reports were apparently made through the same channels.

Normally, B-52 strikes would be carefully coordinated, with target information developed by special photo-

intelligence units in Saigon and approved by the Vietnam command, then headed by Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, now Army Chief of Staff; by the Eighth Air Force on Guam, then headed by Maj. Gen. Alvin Gillem, and by the commander of Pacific forces, then Adm. John S. McCain. All strikes would have been logged, and becoming available—on computer—to literally dozens of officials.

Officials acknowledge that the double-entry system was designed to keep the information out of the military's own reporting channels. The question going unanswered here is: Why did the military feel that it could not trust its own classified reporting system?

WHAT IS AT ISSUE

Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, which first was told of the falsification of records by a former Air Force major on Monday, have expressed concern about a number of areas. First, they want to know who authorized the falsification, seemingly a clear violation of Article 107 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which makes such alterations a crime.

Second, there is concern about the scope of the raids, which were far heavier than those few Senators who were briefed on the subject had reason to believe. President Nixon's credibility is also at issue: Some Senators note that on April 30, 1970, the eve of the Cambodian invasion, he told a nationwide television audience that "for five years neither the United States nor South Vietnam has moved against enemy sanctuaries [in Cambodia] because we did not wish to violate the territory of a neutral nation."

Third, the Armed Services Committee wants to learn who authorized the Pentagon to provide classified summaries to the committee in 1971 and earlier this year that did not list B-52 missions in Cambodia before the 1970 invasion.

The Pentagon, in effect isolated on the issue, maintains that officials with a "need to know" were informed. The misleading information was not significant, it is said, because most officers did not "need to know."

WASHINGTON POST

14 August 1973

State Dept. Can't Find Record on Secret Raids

The State Department so far has been unable to locate any record that it ever requested secrecy to conceal the B-52 bombings of Cambodia in 1969-70, a spokesman said yesterday.

That qualified disclaimer of State's responsibility was made in the continuing, unsuccessful search to ascertain all the facts surrounding the falsification of records of 14 months of B-52 bombings. One issue is whether the secrecy was ordered primarily for political, or diplomatic, reasons.

"I have been unable to find anything in this building which suggests that officers in this department were aware of the double-accounting system," said State Department spokesman Charles W. Bray.

"Nor," said Bray, "are we aware of any request from the Department of State with respect to the maintenance of security. That is based on my present researches in the mat-

ter." Former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, now President Nixon's counselor for domestic affairs, was quoted as saying in a Chicago press conference last Friday that it was the State Department that requested secrecy for the B-52 bombings conducted between March, 1969, and April, 1970. Laird, referring to the prolonged, clandestine, bombing raids, said: "Their secrecy was not of great concern to the Defense Department, but to the State Department."

Since the disclosure in July that the clandestine Cambodian bombings were falsely reported to Congress earlier as having occurred in South Vietnam, Defense Department witnesses repeatedly said that the earlier secrecy was required by the Nixon administration for "diplomatic" reasons. That has been challenged by several members of the Senate Armed Services Committee who said they believed the primary reason for secrecy was to conceal the bombing from the American public, for domestic political purposes.

pool, China's initial reaction was less certain. Ambassador Kang Mao-tchao was kept in Phnom Penh for seven weeks after Sihanouk's ouster in 1970, trying to arrange some kind of deal with Lon Nol. Peking obviously doesn't wish to disclose details of those talks either.

At any rate, Sihanouk's stock appears once again on the rise. As usual in Cambodia the future appears obscure and, in consequence, nobody is inclined to rattle diplomatic skeletons that could be embarrassing to everyone.

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